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McCLELLAN, ROBIE W. Legal Aspects of Affirmative Action Admissions 
Programs in Higher Education (1979) 
Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 181 
The purpose of this study is to investigate and analyze the issues 
which confront officials in institutions of higher education as they 
strive to administer affirmative action admissions programs. This study 
will provide administrators with comprehensive data which will affect 
the legal and educational issues involved in selecting students for pro­
grams of study. The legal and moral foundations of affirmative action 
are analyzed in this study, and the salient points of the arguments for 
and against preferential admissions and preferential hiring programs are 
enumerated and discussed. 
Documentation which supports the factual base of the study is 
gleaned from a variety of source material. The sources include books, 
court cases, laws, letters from officers of the Federal courts, personal 
interviews, professional journals, and ERIC reports. The American 
Digest System, American Law Reports Annotated, The National Reporter 
System, and other legal bibliographical aids were consulted in locating 
case citations. 
Events and judicial decisions which led up to the Bakke decision 
are chronicled, and the study offers some basis for implications as to 
the future impact of the Bakke case. The period of the study spans the 
time between the Dred Scott decision (1857) and March of 1979. A re­
view of the Federal and State court cases which relate to affirmative 
action would logically revolve around cases concerned with public school 
desegregation. This study reviews the most significant cases which bear 
upon affirmative action programs in education. Since it is likely that 
there will be considerable controversy surrounding preferential hiring 
practices, in both education and industry, considerable attention is 
given over to current relevant cases such as Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Co., Sears, Roebuck _& Co_. v. Attorney General of the United 
States, Communications Workers of America v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, and Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth University. 
In summary, the Bakke decision held that race can be a legitimate 
consideration in placement of employees as well as acceptance and assign­
ment of students, although no quotas may be. assigned. Race may be con­
sidered, even though no specific proof of racial discrimination exists, 
according to the Supreme Court's ruling in Bakke. State-operated schools 
may therefore consider an applicant's race in making admissions choices 
so long as the applicant's race is not the sole factor. 
Generally, the research supports the conventional wisdom which holds 
that "the United States Constitution is just what the United States Sup­
reme Court says it is." Although the influence of the four men whom 
President Richard M. Nixon appointed to the Supreme Court (Justices 
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) is great, the Court today is 
not a monolithic body. Even when the justices are of one mind, the 
practical outcome of a landmark decision may not be easily predicted, 
nor may a timetable be set up to implement the decision in every case. 
The Congress, the Executive Branch of the government, Federal and State 
agencies, and academicians themselves play an important role in affirm­
ative action programs. Their roles are of especial importance in the 
area of employment practices. 
Because such a variety of factions submits inputs, it is difficult 
to draw specific conclusions as to the future outcomes of issues solely 
from legal research. However, on the basis of an analysis of this study, 
the following general conclusions concerning affirmative action admissions 
programs can be drawn: 
1. The impact of the Bakke decision will be a matter of legal 
interpretation and conceptual analysis for perhaps decades to come. 
2. An aura of uncertainty will surround affirmative action pro­
grams for quite a span of time to come as cases appear in courtrooms 
which concern the specifics of the general Issues. 
3. Educational administrators will be required to develop an even 
greater tolerance for ambiguity, since clearly drawn guidelines will 
not be available to them in the immediately foreseeable future. 
4. A higher level of dedication to the profession and a fuller 
measure of devotion to the welfare of humankind will be needed by those 
administrators who would withstand the pressure of the aforementioned 
ambiguity and undertainty. 
5. Some, perhaps many, admissions officers should employ more 
diverse criteria in choosing potentially successful nontraditional and 
minority group students. 
6. There is a need for testing devices which are more directly 
applicable for use in selecting nontraditional and minority group 
students. 
7. The academic community should be more involved in and more 
supportive of research which aims at understanding and serving the 
needs of the minority student. 
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Statement of the Problem 
This is an historical study of the legal ramifications of affirmative 
action programs in the United States. Specifically, the research is con­
cerned with affirmative action admissions policy in public universities. 
When candidates with superior qualifications are not admitted to programs 
of study (apparently) because minority group members with lesser qualifi­
cations fill all the open slots, a question of constitutionality arises. 
The reserach will describe the events and adjudications leading up 
1 
to the Bakke case. The research will examine the Supreme Court rationale 
in the ^akke case and will inquire into the possible consequences the 
decision will have on future admissions policies of public schools and 
universities. The study will also present an overview of current court 
cases which are likely to affect policy-level decisions of administrators 
in institutions of higher education. 
Based on the research findings, some recommendations will be made 
concerning establishing practical guidelines for educational decision 
making in the future. 
Procedures Used 
The basic research technique of this historical study will be to 
examine, analyze, and apply the available primary and secondary references. 
1 
Regents of the University o£_ California, Petitioner v. Allan Bakke, 
(See U_.__S_._ Law Week, 46 (June ~2~7, 1978) 4896~. 
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Relevant federal and state courts records contained in the National Reporter 
System, the American Digest System, Corpus Juris Secundum, and United 
States Reports will be the major primary sources. Secondary references 
include books related to civil rights concepts and journal and newspaper 
articles related to the history and significance of affirmative action 
programs. Judicial decisions which relate to the issue of reverse dis­
crimination, particularly the Bakke case, will be discussed in some detail. 
Delimitations 
Affirmative action programs are a source of heated debate among schol­
ars, jurists, and members of the general public. Those who support quota 
systems for selecting minority applicants can construct a persuasive 
rationale in support of their position. Their opponents are also able to 
offer up logical reasons for their beliefs. However, discussions of aff­
irmative action programs frequently degenerate into charges of reverse dis­
crimination and countercharges of bigotry and racism. Opponents of quota 
systems and proponents of quota systems are likely to equate opposition 
to their cause with oppressive and un-American philosophies of government. 
This study will be concerned with the legal questions involved. To 
some extent, the research will call attention to the reasoning processes 
which support the morality of some specific position on this issue. How­
ever,- no exhaustive effort will be expended to analyze the philosophical 
and educational arguments for and against quota systems or the concept of 
(so-called) reverse discrimination. 
Objectivity and exposition shall be the twin goals of this study. 
Some treatment of the Bakke decision and related cases will be included, 
and some suggestions as to the future significances of Bakke will be 
offered. Since the significance of Bakke is debatable, opinions from 
3 
both sides of the broader issues are cited in order to provide a base for 
analysis only. 
Significance of the Study 
Preferential admissions has been and remains a deeply divisive issue 
in American society. Probably no question has so perplexed the courts as 
well as the academic community. Few people of conscience justify the his­
torical deprivation of minority groups, particularly the systematic ex­
clusion from the benefits of acquiring collegiate and professional training. 
It is unlikely that a large number of people would oppose the notion of 
ameliorating the injustices of the past, if such amelioration were possible 
without creating new injustices by disadvantaging other groups. The 
critical issue now is whether preferential admissions policies achieve the 
objective of making amends for past injustices without creating new 
injustices. 
In September of 1971, a trial judge in the state of Washington 
ordered the University of Washington to admit an applicant to the law 
school. That applicant, Marco De Funis, Jr. had graduated from the 
University of Washington with a respectable academic record. When he 
was twice rejected for admission to law school, De Funis sued the Univer-
2 
sity of Washington to gain admission. The University of Washington 
challenged the 1971 order to admit De Funis. Ultimately, De Funis lost 
his case in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. 
When De Funis subsequently carried the case to the Supreme Court of 
the United States, the Court refused to hear De Funis' appeal on the 
2 
Z.4EL-L®. Y.* Qdegaard, 82 Wash. 2d II, 507 P 2d 1169 (1973). 
4 
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grounds that it was moot; that is, no live issue was involved. This 
ruling was handed down because De Funis had been allowed to enter the 
University of Washington Law School pending resolution of his suit. He 
had in fact registered for his final quarter in that law school when the 
Supreme Court handed down the De Funis decision in the spring of 1974. 
De Funis was widely reported in the national press in 1971, although 
few state court cases command the attention of the national media. 
De Funis' newsworthiness was derived from the fact that it represented the 
first court decision on the legality of preferential admission of minority 
group members. At that time (1971) some writers and commentators began 
to refer to preferential admission as "reverse discrimination." 
A test case based on issues similar to those of the De Funis case 
had been expected by observers for quite some time when the case came to 
trial in the state of Washington in 1971. In April of 1970, Vice President 
Spiro Agnew had learned of the University of Michigan's commitment to work 
toward a goal of ten percent black enrollment. In a major televised speech, 
Agnew called Michigan's commitment "some strange madness" which should be 
actively resisted by colleges and universities. Agnew said at that time: 
For each youth unprepared for college curriculum who is 
brought in under a quota system (italics are the writer's) some 
better prepared student is denied entrance. Admitting the obli­
gation to compensate for past deprivation and discrimination, 
it just does not make sense to atone by discriminating against 
someone else.^ 
Thus by the early seventies, preferential admission had developed 
into a divisive, even an explosive issue. Such issues, in our society, 
are virtually certain to wind up in court. The French social critic 
O 
-*Marco De Funis et al. , Petitioners v. Charles Odegaard, President 
of the University of Washington et al., 416 U.S. 312, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164, 
94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974). 
^Chronicle of Higher Education, April 20, 1970, p. 1. 
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Alexis de Tocqueville had remarked as early as 1840 upon the unique pen­
chant Americans displayed for carrying political conflicts and issues 
into the courtroom. It came as no surprise to astute observers that the 
Supreme Court's decision to hear the De Funis case in 1974 did not put an 
end to the issue of preferential admissions. The issue was predestined to 
reappear from the moment the gavel was sounded to dismiss D_e Funis. 
Through a series of events and adjudications, the issue was dramatically 
revived in the Bakke case. 
Emergence of the Bakke Case 
It was predictable that the Bakke case would reach the Supreme Court, 
at least it was predictable that someone, if not Bakke would carry the 
issue of preferential admissions to the highest tribunal of the land. The 
United States of America was founded on the principle that "all men are 
created equal," a principle stated in the Declaration of Independence. This 
statement means, in essence, that all men stand equal before the law. The 
history of the United States outlines a protracted effort to enact a prac­
tical attainment of this ideal, the ideal of equality before the law. 
One such effort, affirmative action, has been a highly controversial 
issue since the late sixties. Bakke, however, marks the first instance in 
which the Supreme Court of the United States actually faced the issue 
head on. The fact that the Bakke case has been front page news since its 
inception in 1974 makes it worthwhile to review the basic facts in the 
case very early in this study. The Bakke case provides a background 
analysis of the nature of the problems raised by affirmative action 
programs generally. 
6 
The Bakke Case resulted from the decision, of the University of 
California at Davis not to admit Allan Bakke, a white man, to the Davis 
Medical School. Bakke was denied admission in 1973 and again in 1974. 
He then filed suit against the regents of the University of California 
in State Court. His suit alleged that the special admissions program 
of the Davis Medical School denied him admission on the basis of his 
race. Under this special admissions program, 16 of 100 first year 
openings were, in practice, reserved for certain minority group members. 
On June 29, 1978, the Supreme Court by a 5 to 4 vote affirmed the 
constitutionality of college admissions programs which give special 
advantage to blacks and other minorities to help remedy past discrimina­
tion against them. However, the Court also ruled that the Davis Medical 
School was obligated to admit Allan Bakke. The Court stated that the 
school's affirmative action program was inflexibly and unjustifiably 
biased against white applicants such as Bakke. 
In the Bakke opinion, the Court provided some guidance for educa­
tors who are trying to insure that their admissions program will bear 
judicial scrutiny. Future cases will almost certainly result in rulings 
which will shed more light on what actually constitutes affirmative 
action. The research will summarize the significance of the Bakke 
decision to date. Some effort will be made to outline possible 
approaches the Supreme Court may take in the future. However, no effort 
^Regents of the University of California, Petitioner v. Allan Bakke. 
(See U_.__S_. Law Week, 46 (june 27, 1978) 4896. 
7 
will be made to anticipate future rulings of the Court. A highly 
respected scholar who did attempt to anticipate the Bakke decision 
is Dr. Harold Spaeth of the University of Michigan. In October of 
1977, Dr. Spaeth appeared on National Public Radio to discuss the 
Bakke case. Spaeth had programmed a computer to reflect the voting 
patterns of the nine Supreme Court justices. On the basis of his 
computer analysis, Dr. Spaeth was confident in his prediction that 
the Court would decide unanimously in favor of Bakke. 
Thus the Bakke decision does provide incontrovertible proof of 
one supposition: the Supreme Court remains unpredictable. In 1954, 
the Supreme Court ruled that a child could not be denied admission 
6 
to a public school on account of race. The Bakke decision holds that 
preferential treatment cannot be afforded to blacks over any other 
racial group. To some, this position signals a retreat from the Brown 
decision; some believe the Supreme Court has actually come full cycle. 
This study will devote some comment to a comparison of the Burger Court 
with the Warren Court. The research will analyze the events and adjudi­
cations which changed the complexion of desegregation philosophy between 
Brown and Bakke. 
This study is significant because it will present an analysis 
which will provide for education advisers and decision makers an organ­
ized approach to employ when considering the complexities of preferential 
admissions programs. To an extent, the study will be of value to 
6 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
8 
decision makers in industry as well as education. Litigation relative 
to employment and promotion by preferential treatment of minority group 
members looms large on the horizon. 
It is important that educators and business people refrain from 
speculation as to what future courses of action the federal judiciary 
will follow in cases involving preferential treatment of minority 
group members. This study will afford some insight into the complexity 
and tenaciousness of legal opinion in these matters. In view of Brian 
Weber's allegation that he has been deprived of his rights by "reverse 
discrimination," this study will serve as a timely word of caution to 
decision makers in education and commerce. Weber's case is scheduled 
for review by the Supreme Court. 
Organization of Remainder _o_f the Study. 
The remainder of this study will be divided into five major parts. 
Chapter II will discuss the conceptual foundations of affirmative ac­
tion, and an historical review of pertinent literature will be presented. 
This section will summarize the salient points advanced by advocates of 
affirmative action and preferential admissions programs as well as 
arguments and counterarguments set forth by opponents of such programs. 
These arguments raise the question of the validity of traditional methods 
which are used to select, or reject, nontraditional applicants to educa­
tional programs. This chapter will contain an historical treatment of the 
Federal judiciaries with regard to racial discrimination prior to Bakke. 
The events and adjudications which led to the De Funis and Bakke cases 
will be chronicled in a concise manner. The study will follow the 
9 
rationale of the judiciary in reaching its decisions. Among the 
cases which will be analyzed in the section are: Plessy v. Fergu­
son (1896), Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education (1899), 
Gong Lum v. Rice (1927), Sweatt v. Painter (1950), Brown v. Board 
of Education (1954), Brown v. Board of Education (1955), Bradley 
X* School Board of_ City of Richmond (1965) , Green v. County School 
Board (1968), United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education 
(1969), Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), 
and Defunis v. Odegaard (1974). 
Chapter III will build a scaffolding upon which to construct a 
logical analysis of the legal aspects of affirmative action admissions 
programs in higher education. In this chapter, the moral and philo­
sophical aspects of affirmative action programs will be discussed. 
The way in which affirmative action programs relate to the societal 
goal of maximizing the welfare of the most people will be analyzed. 
The discussion draws heavily on the works of Vilfredo Pareto and the 
concept of Pareto-optimality. Landmark court cases which have high­
lighted the Supreme Court's philosophy with regard to preferential 
admissions programs and various conceptual aspects of some landmark 
cases will be discussed in Chapter III. 
Chapter IV will consist of an analysis of landmark decisions of 
the Federal judiciary which have a direct bearing on preferential 
admissions programs. The Bakke case, Regents o_f the University of 
California, Petitioner v. Allan Bakke/ and other significant cases 
7 98 Sup. Ct. 2733 (1978). 
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which are now in litigation will be discussed in Chapter IV. Among 
O 
these cases will be Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 
and Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Attorney General of the United 
9 
States. In this chapter, the possible implications of the Bakke 
decision are discussed. The research alludes to the opinions of legal 
scholars, governmental officials, and the press in analyzing the rea­
sons why Bakke might, or might not, become a landmark decision. 
Chapter V will present a summary of the Supreme Court's position 
with regard to preferential admissions and preferential employment 
programs, based on information set down in Chapters I through IV. 
Chapter V will draw tentative conclusions as to the meaning of the 
Bakke decision. Also, Chapter V will offer some suggestions as to 
how a practical framework may be established for setting up practical 
guidelines which school officials may follow in administering affirma­
tive action programs. 
Since the implications of the De Funis case are of such great 
magnitude, the dissenting view of Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas is 
reproduced as a part of this study. Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting 
opinion in De_ Funis will appear in this dissertation as Appendix A. 
The entire opinion is reproduced in Appendix A. In this opinion, 
Mr. Justice Douglas declared that there is no constitutional right for 
8 
Weber v_. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 563 F. 2d 216 
(5th Cir. 1977). 
9 
Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Attorney General of the United States, 
No. 79-0224" (D.D.C., filed January 24", 1978). 
any race to be preferred in admissions decisions. In his opinion, 
Mr. Justice Douglas stated that a white is not entitled to any 
special advantage by reason of the fact that he is white, and went 
on to say that a white must not be the subject of any disability 
by reason of the fact that he is white. In sum, Mr. Justice Douglas 
said that whatever the race of an applicant, he has a constitutional 
right to be considered on his individual merits. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The fundamental issue raised in the Bakke case was how, if at 
all, race should be relevant to admissions decisions. In the specific 
sense, the question which the Supreme Court had to answer was whether 
Allan Bakke, a white man, had been improperly denied admission to the 
Medical School of the University of California at Davis. Bakke's 
suit was based on his contention that a special admissions program 
which reserved sixteen out of one hundred places in each entering 
calss was unconstitutional. 
In a practical sense, admissions directors and their associates 
must answer such fundamental questions as: What consideration should 
be taken into account in deciding which particular applicants to admit 
when space proscribes admitting all applicants? Is it ever morally 
sound to consdier the race of an applicant in decising whether to admit 
the applicant? What distinctions may be drawn between using quotas 
and other approaches to recruitment of minority 'students? 
The very use of the term "race" is fraught with unpleasant 
connotations and charged with emotional overtones. The issue of prefer 
ential admissions is difficult and divisive. People of great substance 
sound moral fiber, and keen intellect have weighed the facts in the 
issue and come to radically different conclusions. The Supreme Court 
13 
began hearing oral arguments in the case of Regents of the University 
of California v. Allan Bakke, respondent, on October 12, 1977.^ 
The Chronicle of Higher Education reported that by the time the oral 
arguments began, 121 persons and organizations had filed amicus 
curiae briefs. Thirty-two of the briefs were filed in support of 
Allan Bakke, eighty-four were filed in support of the University of 
California, and five others were filed which took no definitive 
2 
position. 
Divisive Character of the Issue 
It is unlikely that any organizations in the field of education 
wield more power and influence than the American Federation of Teachers 
and the National Education Association. It is not surprising that 
both organizations filed amicus curiae briefs with the U. S. Supreme 
Court. It is perplexing, if not startling, that the two organizations 
were on opposite sides of the issue. In its brief the National Educa­
tion Association concluded that the judgment of the California Supreme 
Court should have been reversed; that is, this organization supported 
the position that the Davis Medical School was acting in accordance with 
the Constitution in denying admission to Allan Bakke. The American 
1 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 98 Sup. Ct. 
2733 (1978) . 
2 
"Briefs in the Bakke Case," Chronicle of Higher Education, 
September 26, 1977, p. 4. 
Federation of Teachers, on the other hand, submitted an amicus curiae 
brief asking that the decision of the California Supreme Court be 
affirmed; that is, this group was of the collective belief that Davis 
Medical School violated Constitutional principles in denying admission 
3 
to Allan Bakke. 
In light of the fact that the issue of preferential admissions 
is such a controversial one, it is advisable to review the basic con­
cepts which frame the government's activities in the general area of 
affirmative action. 
The Concept of Affirmative Action 
It is worthy of consideration that the concept of affirmative 
action did not spring from legislative or judicial action. Rather, 
the concept of affirmative action was established through executive 
orders issued by a succession of U. S. presidents in the 1940's and 
1950's. During these two decades, the administrations were seeking 
to insure fair treatment for and prevent discrimination against 
employees by firms which were awarded government contracts. Through 
the 1950*s these executive orders were backed by no forceful enforce­
ment procedures nor any viable sanctions to be imposed for noncompliance. 
Thus, the executive orders during the forties and fifties were merely 
voluntary measures. Orders issued by President Kennedy in the early 
1960's directed that contractors include members of minority groups 
3 
"Bakke: Pro and Con," Phi Delta Kappan, gq No. 7 (March, 1978) 
447-455. 
and women in their work forces. President Kennedy's executive orders 
were the first to provide any substantial penalty for noncompliance. 
By the mid-sixties, affirmative action orders issued by the president' 
office had acquired forceful significance. 
For example, in 1965, Executive Order 11246 established the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance, the OFCC. The OFCC was given 
authority to monitor compliance under Executive Order 11246. 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also served to expand 
the concept of affirmative action. Title VI provided affirmative 
remedies such as preferential hiring and quotas for those who were 
victimized by discrimination. The concept of affirmative action 
expounded by Title VI was predicated on the idea of proven past dis­
crimination and upon the precedents established by courts is fashion­
ing remedies for such discrimination. 
More recently, a more advanced, or at least basically different 
concept of affirmative action has evolved. This concept has been 
instituted in the field of higher education. It includes voluntary 
preferential treatment for women and minority group members to over­
come the effects of discrimination and racism. Significantly, this 
latter concept functions without the necessity of proving past dis­
crimination in a court room. 
Affirmative Action: Pro and Con 
Those who support affirmative action programs hold that govern­
ment is morally obligated to correct past injustices which have been 
inflicted upon minority groups. Advocates of affirmative action see 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitu­
tion as legislation whose purpose was to protect black people against 
oppressive acts passed by southern legislatures in the period follow­
ing the Civil War. 
Affirmative action supporters regard these three amendments 
as essentially color-conscious legislation; therefore, they are insis­
tent in their belief that it would not be impossible to compensate 
for past discrimination without taking account of race. 
Those who oppose affirmative action programs are prone to 
refer to such programs in manifesting reverse discrimination. In the 
minds of opponents of affirmative action, the concept is in blatant 
conflict with the principle that reward is, and should be, a prime 
function of individual achievement. Since race is a factor in selec­
tion of applicants under affirmative action programs, as opponents 
say, such programs are unconstitutional. 
Opponents argue for legal formalism. In their belief, all 
persons must be treated alike except when some dissimilar treatment 
is specifically authorized by law. Proponents subscribe to the doctrine 
of legal purposlveness. They advance the argument that It Is the purpose 
of the legal system to Insure equality of opportunity and to guarantee 
equality of results. 
At the crux of the issue is the contradiction between the ideal and 
the reality. There is the ideal of social equality and then there is the 
reality of racism and the fact of a system built on social domination. 
Neither opponents nor proponents deny the existence of the contradiction; 
neither proponents nor opponents challenge the social desirability of 
resolving the contradiction. The differences among proponents and oppon­
ents of affirmative action lie in the area of the means which shall be 
employed to resolve the conflict between reality and the ideal. 
Advocates of affirmative action envision the law as an instrument 
of social transformation. They believe that the law is obligated by 
morality to operate in such a manner as to achieve equality of results 
in our society. A legal intervention should serve to achieve this 
equality of results, and it is necessary that this legal intervention 
be guided by racial considerations. "Unless racial considerations are 
built into the calculus of the legal intervention, the Inequalities which 
are built into our present system will remain institutionalized," say 
advocates of affirmative action. 
The opponents of affirmative action programs believe that assuring 
all citizens of equal protection under the law without regard to race will 
bring about total dissipation of the effects of past discrimination. 
Theirs is a laissez faire world, one in which the law should function to 
build a scaffold for a competitive and dynamic interaction of all 
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people, without regard to race or color. 
One will not solve the enigma posed by this contradiction between 
the real and the ideal by referring to the Constitution. The Consti­
tution affords no specific guarantee to present awards for individual 
merit. Neither does the Constitution spell out any warranty that any­
one will be compensated for past discrimination. One may only look to 
the relative merits displayed by the tenuous social theories enumerated 
above for concepts to guide one's rationale in legal interpretation 
involving affirmative action. 
In summary then, the principal legal issue in affirmative action 
arguments (and the heart of the legalities of the Bakke Case) is whether 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
use of racial classifications to implement special admissions programs. 
An understanding of the legalities of affirmative action, and of the 
reasoning process relative to Bakke, must therefore be predicated on an 
understanding of the constitutionality of racial classifications. It 
is then logical to consider this concept at this juncture in this study. 
Arguments For and Against Racial Classification 
Two basic constitutional arguments opposing the use of race as a 
basis for classification by any arm of government are often advanced. 
The first argument against racial classification is referred to as the 
"color-blind" doctrine. This position asserts that all racial classi­
fications are invalid, per se; the Constitution proscribes all racial 
classifications. This is essentially the position taken by Allan Bakke 
in his brief. 
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The "color-blind" doctrine has not been supported by Supreme Court 
decisions in cases prior to Bakke, nor was it supported in the Bakke 
decision. The Supreme Court has upheld the use of race in student assign­
ments to foster racial integration where there has been a finding of past 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . T h e  C o u r t  h a s  a l s o  p e r m i t t e d  t h e  u s e  o f  r a c e  a s  a  
7 8 
factor in finding remedies in employment discrimination. ' A major dif­
ference in the Bakke Case was the absence of showing a pattern of past 
discrimination. The Davis Medical School was not even in existence long 
enough to show such a pattern when the Bakke Case arose. 
The second basic argument against racial classification insists that 
the Fourteenth Amendment precludes "invidious discrimination against any 
9 
person." This thesis asserts that affirmative action programs are un­
constitutional because they manifest "invidious discrimination" against 
members of the white race. Proponents of affirmative action counter this 
argument with the assertion that in order for invidious discrimination to 
exist, it must result in a stigmatizing effect against those excluded 
from some program and that it must be aimed at a minority which has his­
torically been victimized by racism. Whites have not been the victim of 
^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
5 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
^Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
^Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
^Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
q 
For a more complete analysis of the rationales for and against 
affirmative action, see M. Kromkowski & I. Bright's "Affirmative Action: 
History and Results." In National Lawyers Guild Handbook: Affirmative 
Action in Crisis, Summer, 1977. 
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the racism and the oppression which the Fourteenth Amendment aimed at 
preventing, goes the argument, and therefore no invidious discrimina­
tion can occur. Discrimination against majority members does not meet 
the criteria of invidious discrimination. 
The analysis of arguments for and against preferential admissions 
through racial classification places the issues of the Bakke Case in a 
clearer perspective. It has long been apparent that the courts will 
support racial classifications only when such classifications promote 
a compelling state interest and are effected in a manner which is least 
objectionable in serving that state interest. 
A critical question remains intact although the Court has now ruled 
in the Bakke Case. That question is: Is there any way to accomplish 
the goals of integration and equal opportunity while completely ignoring 
racial factors? The Supreme Court's record has trended away from uphold­
ing the legality of classifications based on race. Not since 1944 has 
10,11 
the Court upheld a racial classification by a state. Yet, there is 
still no definitive answer to the question of whether special admissions 
programs will be judged differently because they discriminate in favor of 
oppressed minorities; the ultimate decision as to the constitutionality 
of special admissions programs was not laid down in the Bakke Case. When 
such a decision is reached, the effects will be far reaching. If affirm­
ative action programs in admissions are held to be constitutional, the 
Supreme Court and the Justice Department will have to build new inroads 
into the traditional area of equal protection rights. 
10 
Hirabavashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
11 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
21 
If no special admissions programs based on race in any way are 
permitted, the consequences could be bleak. While there is probably no 
way to making a conclusive statement, many informed observers believe 
that if affirmative action does not survive, minorities will be virtually 
12 
eliminated from professional schools. Nationally syndicated columnist 
William Raspberry cites sources in support of his estimate that between 
59 and 70 per cent of the blacks attending graduate and professional 
schools in 1977 would have been ineligible for admission except for 
•I O 
special admissions programs. It is easily predictable that educational 
decision makers will face problems centered around special admissions 
for quite some time. It is equally predictable that the news media will 
soon be providing a lot of coverage on yet another important case which 
will revolve around this unsettled and important issue. 
Dred Sc_otJt Jto Allan Bakke: A Judicial Review 
An intelligent speculation as to the educational implications of 
the Bakke. decision must be predicated on an understanding of the past 
out of which the decision arose. We are now no more than two generations 
removed from a time when teaching a black person to read was a criminal 
act. Our past has witnessed the rise of the law as a vehicle for con­
verting racism into an unchallenged modality of social control. 
12 
See (for example) James W. McGinnis, "The Challenge to Affirmative 
Action." Journal of Employment Counseling, 15, No. 2 (June, 1978) 73-78. 
13 
Raspberry, William, "Merit System v. Special Admissions." The 
_(^e_^sbor_o J^^ord_,_ Jijly 20, 1977, p. A-8. 
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It was through legalities that slavery became institutionalized. 
The law enabled the Black Codes, which prevailed after the Civil War, 
to achieve a degree of oppression over black people which was almost 
equivalent to slavery. 
It is significant that the intent of those who framed the Fourteenth 
Amendment (which sought to protect and guarantee the threatened rights of 
former slaves) is still debated by legal scholars today. A central issue 
in the morality of legislation concerned with human rights is whether the 
law may rationally and morally seek to change folkways through stateways. 
This question played an important role in the Plessy Case,^ infra, in 
which the United States Supreme Court declared that "legislation is 
powerless to eradicate racial instincts." A review of the Federal 
judiciary's decisions which are relevant to school desegregation and 
admissions policies will lend insight into the possible implications of 
the Bakke decision. 
The Nine teenth Century Cases: Dred 
Scott, Plessy, and Cumming 
The history of the Bakke Case actually commences with the Dred 
Scott decision.*"* In the case of Dred Scott v. Sanf ord, a slave, Dred 
Scott, sued for his freedom on the grounds that he had lived for a pro­
longed period of time on free soil. This case progressed through the 
courts in Missouri and ultimately to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The Supreme Court ruled that Dred Scott was not free and stated 
^Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
15Pred Scott v. Sanford, Mo., 60 U.S. 393, 19 L. Ed. 691 (1857). 
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moreover that blacks were not citizens. Chief Justice Roger B. Tanney, 
writing the decision for the Court, declared that blacks, both slave and 
free, were "so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man 
was bound to respect." In a legal sense, this statement summarizes the 
legal status of blacks in the United States until the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War. 
The next milestone recorded in the progress of the legal positions 
of blacks was marked by the Supreme Court's decision in the case of 
Plessy v. Ferguson. Homer Plessy, a black man, was arrested and convic­
ted in Louisiana when he made an attempt to ride in a railroad car which 
was reserved for whites. Plessy's case progressed through the Louisiana 
courts and thence to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court 
upheld an 1890 Louisiana law segregating railroad carriages. 
Justice Brown, in writing for the majority, declared that the 
creation of "separate but equal" accommodations was a reasonable use of 
state police power. Additionally, Brown denied that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been intended to abolish distinction based upon color, or 
to enforce social as distinguished from political . . . equality, or a 
co-mingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Only 
one Justice, John Marshall Harlan, dissented in Plessy Ferguson. 
Harlan predicted that "the judgment this day rendered will, in time, 
prove to be quite as pernicious as . . . the Dred Scott Case." "The thin 
disguise of equal accommodations," wrote Justice Harlan, "will not mislead 
anyone nor atone for the wrong done this day."^ 
^Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality 
of a Louisiana statute which provided for "equal but separate accommoda­
tions for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger 
coaches for each passenger train." This "separate but equal doctrine" 
was the guiding principle in school legislation as well as school policy 
for at least fifty years, even though the case which gave birth to the 
policy, Plessy, bore no direct relation to academic endeavors. 
Three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Cumming v. Richmond 
County Board of Education.^ In Cumming, the plantiffs charged that the 
school board of Richmond County, Georgia used funds to provide a similar 
school for colored pupils. A state law in Georgia required that separate-
but-equal public educational facilities be provided for children of both 
races. Despite this provision, the Richmond County Board ceased oper­
ations of a high school which served sixty black students, but continued 
to aid a high school for white boys. According to the school board, 
this decision was motivated only by a lack of funds, not by any hostility 
toward blacks. The board's rationale was that circumstances dictated a 
choice between an elementary school for blacks or a high school for 
blacks. 
In finding against the plantiff, Cumming, the Court ruled that it 
was constitutionally permissible for a school district to provide a high 
school education for white children but not for blacks when the reason 
for failure to provide for blacks is lack of funds, instead of hostility 
toward blacks. 
^Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
Gong Lum v. Rice: A Non-Black Issue 
Until 1927, no further decisions of major importance insofar as 
the issue of school desegregation is concerned were handed down. In that 
year, the U.S. Supreme Court, hereafter referred to as the Court, ruled 
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in the Case of Gong Lum v. Rice. A Chinese-American girl, the daughter 
of Gong Lum, had been excluded by a Mississippi superintendent of educa­
tion from attending a white school because she was not a member of the 
white race. Mississippi laws provided for "separate schools . . . being 
maintained for children of the white and colored races." The Court ruled 
against Gong Lum, who sought to have his daughter admitted to a white 
school. In so ruling, the Court declared that no right of any Chinese 
citizen is infringed by classifying him or her for purposes of education 
with black children or by denying him or her the right to attend schools 
established for members of the white race. Thus, Mississippi was per­
mitted to place Chinese students in black schools, a decision which was 
based on the Court's belief that a state was permitted to regulate the 
method of providing for the education of those educated at public expense. 
Placing Chinese students in black schools was adjudicated to fall within 
the state's authority to regulate its public schools and did not conflict 
with the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1950: The Modern Era Begins 
By the year 1950, when the Court heard the Case of Sweatt v. 
1 9  .  .  . . .  
Painter, issues and attitudes had changed drastically in the United 
1 & 
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
1 9 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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States. In this case, Sweatt, a black, was denied admission to the law 
school of the University of Texas, a state-supported law school. Sweatt 
was denied admission solely on the basis of his race. Texas law forbade 
the admission of blacks to the University of Texas, and the law school 
was a division of that University. When a court order directed the State 
of Texas to provide a legal education for Sweatt, Texas created a sepa­
rate law school for blacks. This newly-created school was unequal to 
the University of Texas Law School in many obvious ways. It was not as 
large, nor was it equal in many intangible respects, such as the repu­
tation of the faculty or the alumni. Neither did the school have any 
standing in the community or enjoy the prestige of the Texas Law School. 
Further, the newly-created school was prohibited from enrolling whites. 
Therefore, Sweatt refused to enroll in the new law school and sought 
entry into the Texas Law School. 
The Court's ruling was the education of Sweatt could have acquired 
at the new law school was unequal to that he would receive at the Texas 
Law School. The Court ordered that Sweatt must be admitted to the Law 
School of the University of Texas, providing he proved qualified for 
admission. 
Thus, in 1950, Texas was ordered to admit blacks to its law school, 
a school which had previously been all white. In ordering Sweatt's admis­
sion, the Court declared that the equal protection clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment forbids state action which discriminates against persons 
on the basis of race. 
The year 1950 witnessed yet another landmark Supreme Court decision 
concerned with racial discrimination. In that year, G. W. McLaurin, a 
black man, had been admitted to the University of Oklahoma to pursue a 
Doctorate in Education. An Oklahoma statute required that blacks be 
admitted to white programs of study only when comparable programs were 
unavailable at black state colleges. The law further reuired that 
blacks would be educated on a segregated basis when they were granted 
admission to programs in white schools. McLaurin, in compliance with 
the Oklahoma statute, was assigned isolated seats in the classrooms as 
well as the library and the cafeteria. McLaurin filed for injunctive 
relief, challenging the constitutionality of the restrictions imposed 
upon his attendance. 
Chief Justice Vinson and his fellow justices held, unanimously, that 
McLaurin was entitled to the same treatment by the state as students of 
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other races. The Court declared that assigning McLaurin to special 
tables in the cafeteria and special seats in the classroom deprived him 
of his personal and present right to equal protection of the laws. 
Thus, the Supreme Court clarified its position that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits any state action which arbitrarily denies a person 
or group equal protection of the law, and that any attempts to segregate 
blacks in the manner McLaurin was segregated would not be tolerated. 
The rulings handed down in Sweatjt and McLaurin set the state for the 
landmark decision handed down by the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of 
Brown e_t al. v. Board of Education of_ Topeka, pawnee C_ount£, Kansas 
21 
et al. This decision was handed down on May 17, 1954. 
20 
Mt^amrin v. Oklahoma Statue Regents_ for Higher^ Education, 339 U.W. 
637 (1950). 
21 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Brown 1: "Separate But Equal Has No Place" 
In actuality, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka involved three 
other cases which were quite similar in nature. Class actions origin­
ating in Kansas, South Carolina, Delaware, and Virginia were consolidated 
and decided in the one case, Brown v. Topeka. Because of a case involv­
ing similar circumstances and the same plantiff, Brown v. Topeka has come 
22 
to be known as Brown I_. Brown II will be considered following this 
summary treatment of Brown I_. 
Brown JE arose because in each of the four separate cases (from 
Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware) black students were seek­
ing admission to public schools on a non-segregated basis. Of the four 
states involved, only Kansas did not have a statute on the books which 
required the segregation of black and white pupils in the public schools. 
South Carolina, Delaware, and Virginia had statutory and constitutional 
restrictions which required that blacks and whites be segregated in the 
public schools. 
Plantiffs who challenged the state laws were denied relief, except 
in the Delaware case. The basis on which the federal district courts 
denied relief was the "separate but equal" doctrine handed down by the 
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson. As previously stated, the "separate but 
equal" doctrine held that the Constitution of the United States required 
only equality of treatment. In Plessy, the Supreme Court had ruled that 
equality of treatment is attained when the races are provided substan­
tially equal albeit separate facilities. It is important to note at this 
22 
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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point that the Delaware federal district court granted relief in the 
instance under consideration only because the schools which black child­
ren attended in that area were substantially inferior. 
The unanimous opinion of the Court was handed down and read by 
Chief Justice Earl Warren. It is remarkable that one of the attorneys 
for Belton, the plantiff who sought relief in the Delaware Case (Gebhart 
23 
v_. Belton) was Thurgood Marshall, the current Supreme Court Justice. 
The gist of the Court's decision in Brown v. Topeka (Brown I) is 
simply this: There can be no discrimination against students in their 
admittance to the public schools on the basis of race. The Court's 
rationale emanated from its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
which guarantees that citizens receive equal protection of the laws. 
Segregation of children in public schools on the basis of race alone 
deprives minority children of equal educational opportunities. This 
deprivation exists under a segregated school system, ruled the Court, 
even though that school system may offer physical facilities and other 
tangible considerations which may be equal to those in other school sys­
tems. Because of this deprivation, such segregated school systems vio­
late the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Brown I_: Chief Justice Warren's Opinion 
Because of the sweeping impact of Brown v_. Topeka (Brown I) and 
because of its relevance in matters involving preferential admissions 
and affirmative action programs, a portion of Chief Justice Warren's 
opinion is reproduced here: 
23Gebhart v. Belton, 75 S. Ct. 753 (1955). 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public 
education in the light of its full development and its pre­
sent place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in 
this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools 
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws. 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function 
of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance 
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate 
our recognition of the importance of education to our demo­
cratic society. It is required in the performance of our 
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today 
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cul­
tural values, in preparing him for later professional train­
ing, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportun­
ity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms. 
We come then to the question presented: Does segrega­
tion of children in public schools solely on the basis of 
race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" 
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority 
group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that 
it does. 
In Sweatt v. Painter (US) supra, in finding that a 
segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them 
equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large 
part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective 
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." 
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 94 
L ed 1149, 70 S Ct 851, supra, the Court, in requiring that 
a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like 
all other students, again resorted to intangible consider­
ations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in discus­
sions and exchange views with other students, and, in gen­
eral, to learn his profession." Such considerations apply 
with added force to children in grade and high schools. 
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifi­
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling 
of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever 
to be undone. The effect of this separation on their 
educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in 
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the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt com­
pelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs: 
"Segregation of white and colored children in public 
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored child­
ren. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of 
the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro 
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of 
a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, 
therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the educational and 
mental development of Negro children and to deprive them 
of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial(ly) 
integrated school system." 
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding 
is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in 
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. 
We conclude that in the field of public education 
the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Sepa­
rate educational facilities are inherently unequal. There­
fore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by 
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any dis­
cussion whether such segregation also violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Because these are class actions, because of the wide 
applicability of this decision, and because of the great 
variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees 
in these cases presents problems of considerable complex­
ity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate 
relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary ques­
tion — the constitutionality of segregation in public 
education. We have now announced that such segregation 
is a denial of the equal, protection of the laws. 
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A companion case to the Brown I_ Case is Boiling v. Sharpe. In 
Brown JL, the Supreme Court ruled that the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially 
24Boiling v. Sharpe^, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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segregated public schools. In Boiling v. Sharpe, the Court held that the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits racial segregation in 
the public schools of the District of Columbia. 
Boiling v. Sharpe arose because black children in Washington, DC 
were refused admission to public schools attended by white children sole­
ly on the basis of race. In rendering the decision in Boiling v. Sharpe, 
the Court stated: 
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related 
to any governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro 
children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes 
an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the 
Due Process Clause. 
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits 
the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, 
it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would im­
pose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. We hold that 
racial segregation in the public schools of the District of 
Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 25 
Brown II: Responsibility for Desegregation Lies 
With School Authorities 
In Brown I_, the Court set forth the fundamental principle that racial 
discrimination in public education is unconstitutional. In Brown II, the 
Supreme Court held that local school authorities bear the primary respon­
sibility for implementing the Brown I_ decision. It is the function of 
the federal judiciary, said the Court, to decide whether a school board 
is complying in good faith. It is, said the Court further, also the 
function of the federal courts to reconcile the public interest in order­
ly and effective transition to constitutional school systems. 
The Court thus acknowledged that Brown I_ had failed to inspire 
reform in the schools to the extent desirable. The Court itself stopped 
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short of active involvement in Brovm II, but stipulated its reliance on 
the lower courts. In Brown rt, the Court asserted that the principle of 
equal opportunity in education could not be sacrificed merely because of 
public obstinance. The Court demanded that a "prompt and reasonable 
start" toward full compliance be made and ordered that such compliance 
must proceed "with all deliberate speed." 
A summary of the opinion of the Court, which was delivered by Chief 
Justice Earl Warren is reproduced below because of the impact of this 
ruling on future desegregation activity. 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions of that 
date, declaring the fundamental principle that racial discrimi­
nation in public education is unconstitutional, are incorporated 
herein by reference. All provisions of federal, state, or local 
law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to 
this principle. There remains for consideration the manner in 
which relief is to be accorded. 
Because these cases arose under different local conditions and 
their disposition will involve a variety of local problems, we 
requested further argument on the question of relief. In view 
of the nationwide importance of the decision, we invited the 
Attorney General of the United States and the Attorneys General 
of all states requiring or permitting racial discrimination in 
public education to present their views on that question. The 
parties, the United States, and the States of Florida, North 
Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Texas filed briefs 
and participated in the oral argument. 
These presentations were informative and helpful to the Court 
in ijts consideration of the complexities prising, from the trans-
ijtion to a system of public education f_ree_d of_ racial discrimination. 
The presentations also demonstrated that substantial steps to 
eliminate racial discrimination in public schools have already 
been taken, not only in some of the communities in which these 
cases arose, but in some of the states appearing as amici curiae, 
and in other states as well. Substantial progress has been made 
in the District of Columbia and in the communities of Kansas and 
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Delaware involved in this litigation. The defendants in the 
cases coming to us from South Carolina and Virginia are await­
ing the decision of this Court concerning relief. 
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may 
require solution of varied local school problems. .School 
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, 
assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to 
consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes 
good faith implementation of the governing constitutional 
principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions 
and the possible need for further hearings, the courts which 
originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial 
appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand 
the cases to those courts. 
in fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be 
guided by equitable principles, _^quity__has__been 
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies 
and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and 
private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these tra­
ditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal 
interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as 
soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effec­
tuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of 
obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated 
in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in 
our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take 
into account the public interest in the elimination of such 
obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should 
go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional 
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of dis­
agreement with them. 
While giving weight to these public and private considerations, 
the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt- and 
reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, 
ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find 
that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in 
an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to 
establish that such time is necessary in the public interest 
and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest 
practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider prob­
lems related to administration, arising from the physical 
condition of the school plant, the school transportation 
system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance 
areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining 
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and 
revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary 
in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider 
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the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to 
meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a 
racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this 
period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction 
of these cases. 
The judgments below, execpt that in the Delaware case, are 
accordingly reversed and the cases are remanded to the Dis­
trict Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders 
and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary 
and proper to admit to public schools on a racially non­
discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties 
to these cases. The judgment in the Delaware case—order­
ing the immediate admission of the plaintiffs to schools 
previously attended only by white children—is affirmed on 
the basis of the principles stated in our May 17, 1954, 
opinion, but the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of 
Delaware for such further proceedings as that Court may 
deem necessary in light of this opinion. It is so ordered?^ 
(Emphasis added.) 
j^acklash; S_chool _Sx_stems_ Attempt t_o Circumvent Desegregation Orders 
To comply with the decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in 
Brown I and _^ovm_II, the school board in Little Rock, Arkansas, laid 
out a plan for gradual desegregation of the public school system. The 
school board's plan included a stipulation that nine black students be 
admitted to a high school which had previously been all white. The state 
legislature, in an effort to abort the plan to admit blacks, passed laws 
which short-circuited the process of their admission. The Governor of 
Arkansas then dispatched troops to keep the nine black students from 
entering the high school. 
The public's opposition was so violent to the integration of this 
school that the blacks could attend the school only at great risk to their 
safety. Federal troops were dispatched to protect the blacks. In the 
face of violence and the threat of further violence, the Little Rock 
Brown v. Board of .Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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School Board sought to postpone implementation of their desegregation 
plan. 
The Supreme Court turned a deaf ear to the Little Rock School 
27 
Board's effort. In the case of Cooper v. Aaron, which arose out of 
the Little Rock School Board's efforts to postpone the desegregation of 
the aforementioned high school, the Court ruled that public hostility 
cannot justify the implementation of school desegregation plans. The 
Court remarked that this held true especially when acts of public hos­
tility are encouraged by the laws passed by the legislature and by the 
acts of public officials. 
In Cooper v. Aaron, the Court declared that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as interpreted by the Court in Brown _I and Brown II, is the 
supreme law of the land. Further, the Court stated, Article VI of the 
Constitution makes this law binding on the states. The Court, in Cooper 
v. Aaron, made clear its position that state support of segregated 
school systems would not be tolerated inasmuch as such support is pro­
scribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cooper v. Aaron was heard by the 
Supreme Court in 1958. Five years later, in the case of Goss v. Board 
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of Education the Court again ruled against state action which tended 
to create or maintain segregated public school systems. In the Goss 
case, the Court made specific reference to the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Elsewhere, this study will address itself 
to an analysis of the rationale of the Court in deciding what does and 
what does not make provision for equal protection of various groups. 
^Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
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The interpretation of the meaning of "Equal Protection" is of vital 
importance in questions of affirmative action and preferential admissions. 
Goss: "Racial Classifications Violate the Equal Protection Clause" 
In the Goss Case, the Board of Education of Knoxville, Tennessee 
sought to effect desegregation plans which provided for rezoning of 
school districts. In essence, the Knoxville plan permitted a student 
who had been reassigned to a school to transfer back to his former 
school, where his race would be in the majority. The effect of this 
provision was clearly seen as moving the students in only one direction, 
back across racial neutral zones and back into segregated schools. The 
Court asserted in Goss that no transfer plan based on racial factors can 
be valid. Since it offers some insight into the Court's interpretation 
of the Equal Protection Clause, and since this interpretation is crucial 
in matters of preferential admissions, a portion of the Court's decision 
is quoted below. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion of the Court 
in Goss, a decision which was unanimous. In part, the opinion of the 
Court declared: 
This provision is attached as providing racial factors as 
valid conditions to support transfers which by design and oper­
ation would perpetuate racial segregation. It is also said that 
no showing is made that the transfer provisions are actually 
essential to the effectuation of desegregation in that other 
procedures are available. 
It is readily apparent that the transfer system proposed 
lends itself to perpetuation of segregation. Indeed, the pro­
visions can work only toward that end. While transfers are 
available to those who choose to attend school where their 
race is in the majority, there is no provision whereby a stu­
dent might transfer upon request to a school in which his 
race is in a minority, unless he qualifies for a "good cause" 
transfer. As the Superintendent of Davidson County's schools 
agreed, the effect of the racial transfer plan was "to permit 
a child (or his parents) to choose segregation outside of 
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his zone but not to choose integration outside of his zone." 
Here the right of transfer, which operates solely on the basis 
of a racial classification, is a one-way ticket leading to but 
one destination, i.e., the majority race of the transferee and 
continued segregation. This Court has decided that state-
imposed separation in public schools is inherently unequal and 
results in discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483, 98 L ed 873, 
74 S Ct 686, 38 ALR2d 1180 (1954). Our task then is to decide 
whether these transfer provisions are likewise unconstitu­
tional. In doing so, we note that if the transfer provisions 
were made available to all students regardless of their race 
and regardless as well of the racial composition of the school 
to which he requested transfer we would have an entirely dif­
ferent case. Pupils could then at their option (or that of 
their parents) choose, entirely free of any imposed racial 
considerations, to remain in the school of their zone or to 
transfer to another. 
Classifications based on race for purposes of transfers 
between public schools, as here, violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court said in 
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 323 US 192, 203, 89 L ed 
173, 184, 65 S Ct 226 (1944), racial classifications are 
"obviously irrelevant and invidious." The cases of this Court 
reflect a variety of instances in which racial classifications 
have been held to be invalid, e.g., public parks and play­
grounds, Watson v. Memphis, 373 US 526, 10 L ed 2d 529, 83 
S Ct 1314 (1963); trespass convictions, where local segrega­
tion ordinances pre-empt private choice, Peterson v. Green­
ville, 373 US 244, 10 L ed 2d 323, 83 S Ct 1119 (1963); 
seating in courtrooms, Johnson v. Virginia, 373 US 61, 10 L 
ed 2d 195, 83 S Ct 1053 (1963); restaurants in public build­
ings, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715, 6 
L ed 2d 45, 81 S Ct 856 (1961); bug terminals, Boynton v. 
Virginia, 364 US 454, 5 L ed 2d 206, 81 S Ct 182 (1960); 
public schools, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483, 98 
L ed 873, 74 S Ct 686, 38 ALR 2d 1180, supra; railroad 
dining car facilities, Henderson v. United States, 339 US 
816, 94 L ed 1302, 70 S Ct 843 (1950); state enforcement of 
restrictive covenants based on race, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
US 1, 92 L ed 1161, 68 S Ct 836, 3 ALR 2d 441 (1948); labor 
unions acting as statutory representatives of a craft, Steel 
v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 323 US 192, 89 L ed 173, 65 S Ct 
226, supra; voting, Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649, 88 L ed 
987, 64 S Ct 757, 151 ALR 1110 (1944); and juries, Strauder 
v. West Virginia., 100 US 303, 25 L ed 664 (1879). The recog­
nition of race as an absolute criterion for granting trans­
fers which operate only in the direction of schools in which 
the transferee's race is in the majority is no less uncon­
stitutional than its use for original admission or subsequent 
assignment to public schools. Be Boson v. Rippy, 285 F2d 43 
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(CA5th Cir). 
The alleged equality — which we view as only super­
ficial — of enabling each race to transfer from a desegre­
gated to a segregated school does not save the plans. Like 
arguments were made without success in Brown, 347 US 483, 
93 L ed 873, 74 S Ct 686, 38 ALR2d 1180, supra, in support 
of the separate but equal educational program. Not only is 
race the factor upon which the transfer plans operate, but 
also the plans lack a provision whereby a student might 
with equal facility transfer from a segregated to a deseg­
regated school. The obvious one-way operation of these two 
factors in combination underscores the purely racial charac­
ter and purpose of the transfer provisions. We hold that 
the transfer plans promote discrimination and are therefore 
invalid. 
This is not to say that appropriate transfer provisions, 
upon the parents' request, consistent with sound school 
administration and not based upon any state-imposed racial 
conditions, would fall. Likewise, we would have a different 
case here if the transfer provisions were unrestricted, allow­
ing transfers to or' from any school regardless of the race 
of the majority therein. But no official transfer plan or 
provision of which racial segregation is the inevitable con­
sequence may stand under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In yet another case based principally on an interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court ruled 
that a school board could not constitutionally close county-operated 
public schools while giving financial aid to white private schools. 
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This case, Griffin v. County School Board, developed because of cer­
tain activity in Prince Edward County, Virginia. In that county, the 
school board, faced with a court order to desegregate, refused to appro­
priate funds to operate the public schools. In spite of this refusal to 
release funds to support the public schools however, the County granted 
tax credits to some citizens who made contributions to private white 
schools. 
^Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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When the federal court ordered the reopening of the public schools, 
the school board challenged the validity of the court order. The Supreme 
Court rule 1 that the local federal court was justified in ordering that 
the schools be reopened, remarking that the action of the Prince Edward 
County School Board was tantamount to failure to provide equal educa­
tional opportunity to black students. 
Two other cases, Bradley v. School Board of Richmond^0 and Rogers 
31 
v. Paul, are deserving of at least passing comment. Both cases were 
related to desegregation plans proposed by school systems. 
In Bradley, desegregation plans for two school systems were 
approved by a local district court. These plans made no provision for 
assignment of school teachers on a nonracial basis. The Court ruled, 
in Bradley, that the assignment of faculty on a nonracial basis must be 
considered in a desegregation plan. 
So-called "grade-a-year" plans were challenged in the Case of 
Rogers v. Paul. Under a grade-a-year plan, a particular grade is selec­
ted and integration begins with that grade. For example, a school system 
might elect to begin integrating in the tenth grade. Under such a system, 
some students will continue attending segregated schools. This was the 
case in Fort Smith, Arkansas, the city which gave birth to Rogers v. Paul. 
Additionally it was clear that blacks in Fort Smith attended a high school 
which did not offer as wide a range of courses as was offered to white 
students in other schools in the area. At issue in Rogers v. Paul, there 
30Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103 (1965). 
31Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965). 
was also the question of the allocation of faculty on a racial basis. 
In Rogers v. Paul, the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case to the District Court for the Western 
District of Arkansas. 
The net effect of the Court's action was to order that black 
students who could not avail themselves of equal course offerings under 
grade-a-year plans be admitted to a white school which offered a super­
ior curriculum. Further, the Court declared that racial allocation of 
teachers is unconstitutional inasmuch as such allocation denies students 
an equal educational opportunity. 
The '^Freedom of Choice" Issue 
The issue of "freedom of choice" was attacked head on in the Case 
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of Green v. County School Board. In 1965, the School Board of New 
Kent County, Virginia adopted a freedom of choice plan in order to 
retain its eligibility for financial aid from the federal government. 
The plan permitted students, except those students entering the first 
and eighth grades to make a choice each year as to which school they 
wished to attend. 
The New Kent County school system served around 1,300 students. 
The student population was roughly fifty per cent white and fifty per 
cent black. Within Kent County, there was no residential segregation. 
Members of both races were disbursed throughout the school system. 
There were only two schools in the county, one for whites and one for 
blacks, and a fleet of twenty-one buses transported students to segre­
gated classes. It was not uncommon for bus routes to overlap. 
^Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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After three years of operation under the freedom of choice plan, 
there had been no student of the white race who had elected to attend 
the all-blaclc school. Eighty-five per cent of the black students in 
the system still attended the all-black school. 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion 
of the Court in Green. The Court's opinion noted that the freedom of 
choice plan in New Kent County had a long history of failure, and re­
marked that there seemed to be little promise that the plan would achieve 
the required nonsegregated school system. The Court therefore remanded 
Green v. County Board to the District Court "for further proceedings con­
sistent with this opinion." While falling short of declaring freedom of 
choice plans unconstitutional, the Court made it clear that a plan which 
proves ineffective must be discontinued, and that it must be replaced by 
an effective plan. Such a substitution, said the Court, must be quick 
in coming in order that the requirement of equal protection under law 
for black students may be complied with. 
From the mid-sixties until the end of the decade, federal district 
courts pushed the efforts to desegregate the schools. Dilatory tactics 
and patterns of token integration typified the results in many parts of 
the nation. 
In the Case of States v. Jlo^ILtZ E^duca-
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tion, the Court chastised the school board of Montgomery County, Ala­
bama for its failure to act in bringing about desegregation. Justice 
Hugo L. Black, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, said: 
33 
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 
225 (1969). 
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The record shows that neither Montgomery County nor any 
other area in Alabama voluntarily took any effective steps 
to integrate the public Schools for about ten years after 
our Brown decision. In fact, the record makes clear that 
the state government and its school officials attempted in 
every way possible to continue the dual system of racially 
segregated schools in defiance of our repeated unanimous 
holdings that such a system violated the United States Con­
stitution. 
The of Majority-Minority Ratios 
The 1968 Court order which resulted in U.S. v. Montgomery County 
Board of Education becoming a Supreme Court case dealt with several 
issues. One of the issues in the case was the requirement that the 
Montgomery County School Board integrate certain grades and prepare re­
ports based on yearly proceedings by the Board. Another issue centered 
around the 1968 court order to take steps in the direction of integrat­
ing facilities and staffs. The order provided that the board should move 
toward a goal whereby "in each school the ratio of white to Negro faculty 
members is substantially the same as it is throughout the system." The 
case came to the Supreme Court from the Court of District Judge Johnson, 
whose name became famous because of his involvement with Ala a a desegre­
gation cases. Johnson's Court had ordered the nonracial allocation of 
faculty and had also directed the school board to comply with definite 
mathematical ratios. The school board challenged the reliance on mathe­
matical ratios. 
Alluding to Judge Johnson's record of patience and fairness and 
lamenting the school board's lagging pattern of compliance, the Court 
accepted the need for specific goals. In yet another unanimous decision, 
the Court ruled that numerical ratios are proper guidelines for deseg­
regation. 
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On October 29, 1969, the Court handed down sfill another unanimous 
decision which attacked the efforts of officials to delay the integra-
O I 
tion process. In Alexander v_. Holmes County Board of Education, a case 
originating in Mississippi, the Court declared that continued operation 
of racially segregated schools under the previous standard of "all delib­
erate speed" was no longer constitutionally permissible. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had granted a motion for delaying implementation 
of an earlier order mandating desegregation in several Mississippi school 
districts which educated thousands of children. Alexander v. Holmes 
County Board of Education was remanded to the lower court with the in­
struction that the court "issue its decree and order, effective immedi­
ately, declaring that each of the school districts here involved may no 
longer operate a dual school system, and directing that they begin immedi­
ately to operate as unitary school systems within which no person is to 
be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color." 
In Green County School Board, supra, the Supreme Court first 
adopted the percentage of black-white students attending a school as a 
primary criterion for deciding upon the effectiveness of a desegregation 
plan. Of course, the Court sought to provide guidelines which would 
reduce litigation in Green. In actuality, the Green decision increased 
the number of segregation-related cases heard by the courts. School 
systems looked for and found loopholes left open by the Green decision. 
The loopholes existed because of the Court's failure to provide a work­
ing outline of what an acceptable desegregation plan would entail. 
^^Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 369 U.S. 19 (1969). 
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Neither did the Court specify what a "unitary school system" was. The 
ambivalence which radiated from these two points generated considerable 
confusion and gave rise to many subsequent court cases. 
fusing/ Dilemma _WiJ±ln. a frL^mma 
For many years, the issue of busing has held center stage in 
desegregation activity. Some of the complex problems relevant to deseg­
regation plans were directly addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Federal District 
Court Judge James McMillan of Charlotte, North Carolina had handed down 
a decision which supported a program of racial balancing which required 
busing school children in Charlotte and Mecklenburg County. The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari in Swann on June 29, 1970. 
School districts everywhere in the country awaited the Swann decision 
anxiously. The federal courts operated without definite guidelines as 
to the extent to which busing could be employed while the Court weighed 
the evidence in Swann. In Swann, the Court considered for the first 
time the nature of corrective steps which district courts might take in 
ordering a school system to cease operating as a segregated system. 
The Court, in a unanimous opinion, upheld several remedies included 
in Judge McMillan's order, specifically upholding the transporting which 
he had ordered. Some guidelines for corrective action were finally laid 
down in Swann. The principle established was that when school aurhorities 
do not find and use effective methods to eliminate state-imposed segre­
gation, then the district courts have broad power in devising remedies 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). 
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that insure prompt transition to a unitary school system. Four courses 
of action were open to district courts because of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Swann. The Court said in Swann that: 
(1) The courts may alter school attendance zones. They may 
require busing to schools which are not nearest the 
student's home in order to achieve desegregation. Objec­
tions to busing will be sustained by the courts only when 
the travel time is excessive. 
(2) District courts may forbid patterns of school construction 
and abondment which operate to reestablish or perpetuate 
a dual system. 
(3) When racial quotas are not used as inflexible requirements 
but as a starting point to shape a desegregation plan, 
then the courts may impose racial quotas upon a school 
system. 
(4) District courts may constitutionally order that teachers 
be assigned to achieve a certain degree of faculty deseg­
regation. 
Language Barrier: Gue^ Hung^ Lee v. Johnson 
With notable exception of Gong Lum v. Rice, major desegregation 
suits in the fifties, sixties and seventies involved blacks. In 1971, 
the Supreme Court heard the Case of Guey Hung Lee v. Johnson, a case 
which involved Chinese students in San Francisco. In 1947, a California 
Education Code provision which established separate schools for students 
of Chinese ancestry was repealed. Nonwithstanding the appeal, the board 
of education persisted in drawing lines which tended to perpetuate the 
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existence of Chinese majority schools. In Guey Hung Lee v« Johnson, 
parents of children of Chinese ancestry were trying to stay implementation 
of a court-approved desegregation plan. The plan involved the reassignment 
^^Guey Hung Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215 (1971. 
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of Chinese-American pupils to elementary schools. Justice William 0. 
Douglas, rendering a one-judge opinion in chambers, ruled that when a 
program of desegregation had been fostered by state law and state action, 
it was mandatory to take prompt steps to desegregate. Only the most 
unusual circumstances would permit delay, wrote Justice Douglas, adding 
his opinion that no such unusual circumstances prevailed in the Case of 
Guey Hung Lee v. Johnson. In so ruling, Justice Douglas remarked: 
Brown v. Board of Education was not written for blacks 
alone. It rests on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, one of the first beneficiaries of 
which were the Chinese people of San Francisco. See Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. The theme of our school deseg­
regation cases extends to all racial minorities treated 
invidiously by a state or any of its agencies. (Emphasis 
added) 
Desegregation by. ̂ ^^^rij^tjLng^ 
Two years after Guey Hung Lee v. Johnson, the Supreme Court ruled 
in a landmark case which involved Hispanics as well as black pupils. 
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Keyes v. School District No. 1^, Denver, Colorado, developed after a 
Denver, Colorado school board adopted a voluntary plan for the desegre­
gation of the predominantly black Park Hill section of the city in 1969. 
Many of Denver's public schools were in fact segregated, although the 
school system had never operated under any statute or constitutional 
provision which required or permitted segregation. Following the devel­
opment of the voluntary desegregation plan, a school board election was 
held. As a result of the election, a majority of the members of the new 
board opposed the plan for voluntary desegregation. A court order was 
37 
Keyes v. School District No. 1^, 413 U.S. 921 (1973). 
48 
obtained which mandated the desegregation of the Park Hill section, an 
order which stated previous segregation in the area had been caused by 
the policies of prior school boards. In Keyes, proponents of integra­
tion sought out desegregation orders for the remaining schools in the 
district. These proponents of integration also asked that Hispanics be 
counted along with blacks for purposes of defining segregated schools. 
It was their reasoning that this act of combining blacks and Hispanics 
was just because Hispanics, like blacks, suffered the penalties imposed 
by educational inequities. 
In Keyes, the Court ruled, in a split decision, that a local court 
may order a district-wide remedy for segregation when a substantial por­
tion of a district is shown to be segregated. The Court also agreed 
with the faction which held that Hispanics and blacks should have been 
counted together in defining a segregated school. Keyes stands out as a 
significant case for yet another reason. In Keyes, the Court required 
the desegregation plan in Denver to reflect the bilingual and bicultural 
needs of Hispano-Americans. 
The Swann and Keyes cases mark the onset of a new area insofar as 
resistance to court-ordered desegregation through busing is concerned. 
In recent years both Congress and the Executive branch of the government 
have resisted court-ordered busing. These two cases offer good illustra­
tions of the two basic types of segregation with which the courts must 
cope. Swann is illustrative of de jure segregation; segregation had 
actually been legislated in North Carolina. Keyes, by contrast, involved 
de facto segregation; although segregation had never been mandated by law 
in Denver, it did exist in fact. 
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In Keyes, the Court handed down a ruling which sought to eliminate 
segregation by means of crossing school districts when pupil assignments 
were made. This involved, of course, an increase in court-ordered 
transportation of students. In contrast to the Keyes decision, when the 
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Court heard Milliken \r. Bradley (in 1974), the Court agreed that the 
Detroit school board had contributed to the perpetuation of segregation. 
Yet the Court failed to make a recommendation which required inter-
district participation. The Court commented that it would not make a 
recommendation of inter-district particiation since there was insufficient 
evidence that inter-district violation of desegregation efforts had indeed 
occurred. In sum, the Court ruled in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 
(the 1974 case which is known as Milliken I) that court-ordered school 
desegregation plans cannot cross school district lines to include a 
district. This prohibition against crossing district lines may not 
apply when it can be shown that districts have failed to operate unitary 
school systems or have committed acts which fostered segregation in 
other school districts. 
The previous1 cases have dealt almost exclusively with desegregation 
in the public school systems. A basic understanding of the issues under­
lying the Bakke and Weber cases requires a summary analysis of three 
other cases which have little direct bearing on pupil problems. These 
three cases are Griggs v. Duke Power, Lau v. Nichols, and Washington 
v. Davis. 
38Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I). 
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Employment ,Test_ing, _and Language .Classes: Jlnxesj^lved Issues_ 
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Griggs v. Duke Power Company ' grew out of Duke Power Company's 
employment practices. In 1955, the Duke Power Company began to require 
that employees have a high school diploma unless they would settle for 
assignment to only the lowest paid jobs. These jobs were invariably in 
departments that had been traditionally black. It was virtually impos­
sible to transfer from or be promoted from one of the traditionally 
black departments unless the worker had a high school diploma. 
Beginning in 1965, Duke Power required that anyone who would be 
transferred to higher paying departments (which were traditionally white) 
make satisfactory scores on professionally-prepared general aptitude 
tests. It was shown that whites who lacked high school diplomas and who 
failed the aptitude tests had been working adequately in higher-paying 
departments for years. The requirements of passing the aptitude tests 
and having a high school diploma tended to make a disproportionate num­
ber of blacks ineligible for promotion or transfer from the low-paying 
departments. Black employees of Duke Power Company challenged these 
diploma and testing requirements in Griggs v. Duke Power. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Griggs that neither diploma nor degree 
requirements, nor generalized aptitude tests may be used to disqualify a 
disproportionate number of minority group members, in the general case. 
Griggs places a burden on the employer to demonstrate a direct correlation 
between the skills being tested for and adequate performance on the job. 
In Griggs, the Court ruled that Duke Power's job and transfer requirements 
39 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424; 28 L. Ed. 2d 158; 
91 St. Ct. 849 (1971). 
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were not directly indicative of the employee or applicant's ability 
to perform adequately on the job. The Court's ruling in Griggs was 
based on the language of Title VII, Section 703 (h) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Title VII, Section 703 (h) of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 forbids employers to use tests and diploma requirements 
as a means to disqualify disproportionate numbers of minority group 
members except when the tests are shown to be directly indicative of 
the ability to perform adequately on the job. 
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Washington v. Davis, like Griggs, is an employment-related 
case. The Washington v- Davis case grew out of the procedure used by 
Washington, D. C. officials in selecting recruits for the police 
academy. The selection process involved the use of "Test 21," a test 
which was generally used also to test verbal ability in applicants 
for federal civil service jobs. 
Test 21 could be shown to be a valid test, inasmuch as a passing 
score on the test correlated with successful completion of the police 
academy's course of study. Although the test correlated with comple­
tion of the course of study, a correlation with performance on the job 
was not shown. 
There was no apparent or deliberate effort to engage in discrimina­
tory action in administering or evaluating the test. However, four times 
^^ashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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as many blacks as whites had failed the test. Black applicants challenged 
the test on the basis that its impact was racially disproportionate and 
that the test was, therefore, unconstitutional. 
The Court's decision in Washington v. Davis was split 4/3/2; that 
is, four justices were in the majority, three concurred, and two dis­
sented. Test 21 was ruled to be a constitutional device for selecting 
applicants for the policy academy in the nation's capital. The Court 
noted that Test 21 was (1) racially neutral on its face, (2) administered 
without racially discriminatory action or intent, and (3) reasonably 
related to a legitimate state purpose. The legitimate state purpose was 
that of insuring a minimum level of verbal ability in police recruits. 
41 
Lau v. Nichols involves the obligation of a school district to 
provide special instruction for non-English-speaking students. State 
statute in California imposed the teaching of English as a major goal in 
public education. In San Francisco, the school system failed to offer 
any special compensatory program to about 1,800 Chinese-speaking stu­
dents. Chinese students claimed the school system to be in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and also to 
be in violation of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 
601 prohibits recipients of federal aid from discriminating against stu­
dents on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Under Section 
602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare has the authority to promulgate regulations which further 
Section 601. HEW guidelines say that "where inability to speak and 
41Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
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understand the English language excludes national-origin minority 
children from effective participation in the educational program offered 
by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rec­
tify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program 
to these students." 
In Lau v. Nichols, the Court ruled that those districts which receive 
federal aid are obligated to provide instruction of a special nature for 
some non-English-speaking students. The special instruction must be 
provided for those students whose education is severely hampered by 
language barriers when there is a substantial number of non-English-
speaking students within the school district. 
In ruling that the district in San Francisco was obligated to provide 
special instruction to Chinese-speaking students, the Court declared that 
failure to do so was violative of Section 601 of the HEW regulations. 
It is interesting to note that the Court did not decide whether the San 
Francisco school district had violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in ruling in the Case of Lau v. Nichols. The 
importance of the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
can scarcely be overstated in matters which involve affirmative action 
and preferential admissions. The next section of this study is, there­
fore, given over to a discussion of the federal judiciary and its appli­
cation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Th_e ^eaning of the E^qual Protection Clause 
Much debate concerning programs of preferential admissions (and 
affirmative action programs of any kind) centers around an interpretation 
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of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is often 
said that the Constitution is just what the Supreme Court says it is. 
When we trace the history of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, we find that the Court has consistently upheld 
reasonable racial discriminations. Where regulatory discriminations have 
been regarded by the Court as supportive of the intent and purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and whore the Court has regarded such discriminations 
as enhancing the general welfare, then the Court has ruled the discrim­
inations to be constitutional. 
Notwithstanding the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, discrimination against women and minority groups prevailed 
long after the Civil War. Obviously the amendments did not wipe out dis­
crimination overnight, nor even in a century; yet a pattern of some toler­
ation of discrimination in the interest of the general good emerges when 
one examines the overview of Supreme Court decisions which bear directly 
on the Equal Protection Clause. 
In 1872, the Court handed down its decision in the Slaughter House 
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Cases, the first cases which interpreted the Equal Protection Clause. 
In the Slaughter House Cases, the Court stated: 
The existence of laws in the States where the newly 
emancipated Negroes resided, which discriminated with 
gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, 
was the evil to be remedied by this Clause, and by it 
such laws are forbidden. 
It is apparent that the Court was explicit in establishing the 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment; its purpose was to serve the general 
4 ? 
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
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good by remedying the historical evil of discrimination. 
In the year 1885, the Court recognized the police power of states 
to prescribe regulations which would "promote health, peace, morals, edu­
cation and good order of the people and to legislate resources and add 
I 
to its wealth and prosperity." Thus the Court began applying the Equal 
Protection Clause to the already burgeoning number of economic regulations 
being imposed on various segments of the.economy. This application of the 
Equal Protection Clause to economic regulation was manifested in the Case 
of Barbier v. Cminol^, a case in which the Court stated that: 
From the very necessities of society, legislation of 
a special character having these objects in view, must often 
be had in certain districts . . . Special burdens are often 
necessary for . . . general benefits. Regulations for these 
purposes may press with more weight upon one than upon 
another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or 
unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with 
as little inconvenience as possible, the general good. 
Under the above interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Courts have permitted discriminatory regulations which have imposed 
unequal burdens on various segments of the economy. Such discriminatory 
regulations have been allowed whenever they are deemed to be reasonable 
and when their net effect has been to promote the general good. A statu­
tory discrimination will be held Constitutional whenever the Court per­
ceives a rational basis for the discrimination. The Case of New Orleans 
44 v* Dukes offers a vivid illustration of this fact. 
In New Orleans v. Dukes, the Court ruled that opticians may be 
restricted from selling eyeglasses without a prescription, while sellers 
^Barbier v. Connoly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885). 
4.4 
New Orleans v. Dukes, 42 U.S. 297 (1976). 
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of ready-to-wear eyeglasses are exempted from this restriction. One may 
conclude that the reason for exempting the ready-to-wear eyeglass mer­
chant is that his glasses merely magnify. On the other hand, the opti­
cian may be involved in a more complex effort to correct problems of a 
nature which could require the supervision of a medical expert. In any 
case, if a reasonable purpose, one which promotes the general good, can 
be ascribed to a discriminatory restriction, then that restriction will 
be upheld as constitutional. 
It is important to note in considering the implications of the 
Equal Protection Clause that the party objecting to a regulation bears 
the burden of proving that a classification is arbitrary, that is}the 
classification does not rest on any reasonable basis. This principle was 
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established in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company. 
In cases involving racial classification, it is also true that the 
burden of proving a regulation to be arbitrary lies on the party who 
raises the objection to the regulation. The Court held that a statute 
which made it a crime for blacks and whites to intermarry was unconsti-
46 
tutxonal in the Case of Loving v. Virginia. This statute was declared 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court stated 
that a reasonable mind "cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose. 
. . . which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his 
conduct is a criminal offense." 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company, 220 U.S. 61, 78-79, 
(1911). 
46 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966). 
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The Supreme Court developed "a most rigid scrutiny" test to 
determine whether or not racial classifications are permissible after 
the question of internment of Japenese-American citizens emerged during 
4 7 
World War II. In the Case of Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court 
was dealing with distinctions "odious to a free people whose institutions 
are founded upon the doctrine of equality." These distinctions were made 
on the sole basis of racial ancestry. A related Case, Korematsu v. United 
4.8 . 
States, involved similar circumstances and a similar outcome. 
The Court required a stricter standard in cases where the purposes 
of the Equal Protection Clause appeared to be subverted. After subjecting 
the law to the "most rigid scrutiny," the Court decided that the law was 
necessary for our "national security and therefore, was constitutional." 
This ruling has been criticized since the end of World War II. 
Judge Wisdom in United States v. Jefferson County Board of 
49 
Education stated: 
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To 
avoid conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, a clasifi-
cation that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a bur­
den must not be based on race. But the Constitution is color 
conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetrated and to 
undo the effects of past discrimination. The criteria is the 
relevancy of color to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
Remedial racial classification is acceptable. If racial classification 
does not amend past discrimination, it necessitates the application of 
^Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
AO 
Korematsu v. UnJ.ted States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
49 
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 327 F. 2d 
836, 876 (1966). 
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the strict scrutiny test. 
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, the Court 
stated : 
(Classification by race) is something which the Constitution 
usually forbids, not because it is inevitably an impermissible 
classification, but because it is one which usually, to our 
national shame, has been drawn for the purposes of maintain­
ing a racial inequality. Where it is drawn for the purpose 
of achieving equality it will be allowed, and to the extent 
it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by race, it will 
be required. 
The Federal Appellate Courts have approved affirmative action goals 
in a variety of cases. Reversal of historical racial discrimination has 
been promoted through the hiring and promotion of minorities and women 
in Carter v. Gallagher ̂  Associated General Contrac tors v. Altschuler; 52 
NAACP v. A1len, ̂ and United States v. Masonry Contractors Association. 54 
Racial classification has also been permitted for school integration 
purposes. The Supreme Court upheld a 1969 district court order requiring 
that two teachers out of twelve within a given school district must be 
Negro. This ruling was handed down in the Case of United States v. 
Montgomery County Board of Education. 55 
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920, 
931-32 (1968). 
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315 (1972). 
52 
Assoc iated Gen. Contrac tors v. Altschuler, 490 F. 2d 9 (1973). 
53NAACP V. Allen, 493 F. 2d 61A (1974). 
54 
United States jt. Masonary Contractors Assn., 497 F. 2d 876 (1974). 
55 
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 
255 (1969). 
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In the 1971 c ase of Swa nn v. Char lotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
5 6 
Education, the Supreme Court said that: 
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad 
power to formulate and implement educational policy and 
might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare 
students to live in a pluralistic society each school should 
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflect­
ing the proportion of the district as a whole. To do this 
as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary 
powers of school authorities. 
The Supreme Court has shown that it will sometimes sustain the use 
of quotas or classification by race in order to achieve school integra­
tion. The presence of historical racial discrimination, or the absence 
thereof, has become a very important factor in rulings handed down by 
the federal judiciary. In the Case of Moe v. Confederated Selish and 
Kloteni Tribes, the Court upheld a special tax immunity for Indians 
as a preferential treatment based on special historical relationships. 
. 5 8  
In a related case, Morton v. Maneari, the Court upheld discrimination 
based on special historical relationships. In Moe v. Confederated 
Selish and Kloteni Tribe_s, the Court ruled that such discrimination was 
not "invidious" and was therefore permissible under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United State Constitution. 
In very recent years, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized 
the requirement that discriminatory intent must be proven before a vio­
lation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
^Swann v. Chariot:te-Meeklenburg Board of^ Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). 
"^Moe v. Confederated Selish^ & Kloteni Tribes, 96 Sup. Ct. (1976). 
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Morton v. Maneari, 417 U.S. 5 35 (1974). 
will be adjudicated. The importance of this requirement is graphical 
5 9 
illustrated in the Case of Washington v. Davis. The Court ruled on 
the practice of redistricting on racial percentages in the Case of 
60 
v. QKnm_^gR , declaring that: 
(Courts) have no constitutional warrant to invalidate a 
state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, 
because it undertakes not to minimize or eliminate the 
political strength of any group or party but to recognize 
it and, through redistricting, provide a rough sort of 
proportional representation in the legislative halls of 
the s tate . 
"^Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
^Gaffney v. Cummings, 413 U.S. 735, 754 (1973). 
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CHAPTER III 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS 
Probably very few people would attempt to construct a rational 
denial that Americans who are members of certain groups have received 
inequitable treatment during most of this country's history. Very few 
now openly question the desirability of affording an equal opportunity 
to members of minority groups and women in this enlightened age. Prac­
tically every American will agree that it is only just that these 
disadvantaged Americans be afforded the opportunity to catch up with 
other Americans and share in the fruits of our abundance. As a philo­
sophical principle, the great majority supports "affirmative action" as 
the method whereby those who have suffered previous discrimination may 
now be drawn into the mainstream of America's socioeconomic activity. 
Of course, no American wants "reverse discrimination" to occur; that is, 
after all, just another form of the evil which we have fought so dili­
gently for at least three or four decades. 
Reverse discrimination is affirmative action which is practiced 
in violation of some statute or in violation of the Constitution of the 
United States. It is unfortunate, however, that a review of the court 
opinions yields no definite guidelines as to what affirmative action is 
or should be. 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the meaning of the term 
"affirmative action" to the extent that such clarification is possible. 
62 
Conflicts involving affirmative action (and Bakke, De Funis, and many 
other cases grew from such conflict) arise from two sources. The first 
source relates to case law, and in the area of education, that case law 
relates directly to racially segregated public schools. The second source 
of conflict arises from legislation which is aimed at preventing discrim­
ination in employment. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 marks the beginning 
of a new era in legislation which focuses primarily on employment dis­
crimination. 
Chapter II of this dissertation reiterates and summarizes case law 
as related to desegregation in the public schools. Following the deci­
sion of the Court in Brown _I, a large number of failures to desegregate 
school systems were recorded. The Green case dealt with so called free­
dom of choice plans, and offers but one of many examples of a case in which 
the Supreme Court ruled that a school system fell short of the mark in 
effecting a workable plan of desegregation.'" In Green, the Court declared 
that school officials must bear the responsibility for initating _action 
to dismantle school systems which were racially dual. The Court directed, 
in the Green case that: 
School officials are clearly charged with the affirmative dutjr 
TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS MIGHT BE NECESSARY to convert a unitary 
system. (Emphasis added.) 
There has been no doubt that the federal judiciary requires that 
affirmative action be taken in discharging affirmative duty imposed 
on school officials by the Green decision. Federal courts, and particu­
larly the Supreme Court, have shown a consistent reluctance throughout 
^reen v. County ^choo_l Board, 391 U. S. 431 (1968). 
63 
our history to become involved in the administrative affairs of schools 
and corporations as well. The Court has gone further than is its usual 
custom toward assuming an administrative role where school desegregation 
cases have been involved. Lower courts have also been more administra­
tively involved in desegregation cases than in other types of litiga­
tion. The courts have assumed an obligation to establish standards for 
evaluating school officials' efforts to desegregate. The standard, 
established in the Green Case, has been the degree to which desegrega­
tion did in fact occur. 
Hie precedents which were laid down in the school desegregation 
cases were standing freshly at hand when Congress enacted the nondis­
crimination acts of the 1.960's. It was logical that administrative 
agencies charged with enforcing the nondiscrimination acts would adopt 
the standards of evaluation employed in the desegregation cases. 
Insofar as evaluating the validity of a charge of discrimination, 
the approach of the administrative agencies has been to classify the 
people involved by race, analyze their situations and ascribe number to 
race and situation. A disparity of figures could be regarded as prima 
2 
facie evidence of discrimination. Disparity of numbers has been used 
as the criterion for talcing action, and the criterion for evaluating the 
action has been the numerical result achieved. It has been a common 
practice for the administrative agencies to establish numerical goals 
which would enable the institution involved to know when it had met the 
agency's standards. This approach appears logical on the surface. The 
2State of Alabama v. U.S., 304 F. 2d 583 (1962). 
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weakness inherent in employing numerical goals is that such goals are 
difficult to distinguish from quotas. Quotas have consistently been 
declared to be themselves discriminatory, and therefore not permissible. 
The courts have lately been exerting a great effort to establish a 
clear distinction between goals and quotas. The courts agree that if a 
numerical target serves only as an objective, it is clearly nondiscrim­
inatory. Goals which serve only as objectives constitute an appropriate 
form of affirmative action. Whenever the target numbers are functioning 
in a legal manner, the target numbers may not be used to establish auto­
matic proof of discrimination; that is, failure to hit the target does 
not, per se, become proof of discrimination. When the numerical goal 
becomes a required objective, however, that goal becomes a quota. Quotas 
are, of course, objectionable because they may be attained only by ex­
cluding some in order to select or except others. Reduced to simplest 
terms, a quota functions within a system of preferential selection. 
Such a system is a system which practices reverse discrimination. 
Preferential Admissions Programs 
3 
De Funis v. Odegaard is probably the most famous case involving 
so called reverse discrimination except for the Bakke case. In his case 
against the law school of the University of Washington, Marco De Funis 
charged that the law school had adopted an admissions policy which selec­
ted nonwhite applicants who scored lower than white applicants on the 
law school admission test. The University of Washington did not chal­
lenge this allegation, and readily admitted that it did indeed employ a 
racial classification for admission purposes. However, the Washington 
De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
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Law School defended it as a means of compensating for previous racial 
inequities. The law contended that racial classification for admission 
purposes was not unconstitutional, but was, in fact, representative of 
the kind of affirmative action which the Supreme Court required. There 
was considerable evidence in support of such a contention at the time 
th6 De Funis Case arose. In the Case of Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Rede-
4  . . .  
velopment Agency, for example, the Second Circuit Court said: 
What we have said may require classification by race. That 
is something which the Constitution usually forbids. Not 
because it is inevitably an impermissible classification, 
but because it is one which usually, to our national shame, 
has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequal-
ity. Where it is drawn for the purpose of achieving equal­
ity, it will be allowed, and to the extent it is necessary 
to avoid unequal treatment by race, it will be required. 
(Emphasis added.) 
How the Court might have applied its wisdom to the De Funis Case 
will never be fully known. Although the Court did accept the De Funis 
Case and did hear it argued, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that 
the case was moot. In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice William 0. 
Douglas declared that any system based on racial classification must be 
subjected to close scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice 
Douglas voiced the fears of those who oppose racial classifications in 
his dissenting opinion in the De Funis Case. In response to the argu­
ment that there could be a compelling state interest in selecting candi­
dates for law school by racial classification, Justice Douglas wrote: 
To many "compelling" would give members of one race even more 
than pro rata representation. The public payrolls might then 
be deluged say with Chicanos because they are, as a group, the 
Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920, 
921-32 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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poorest of the poor and need work more than others, leaving 
desperately poor individual blacks and whites without employ­
ment. By the same token large quotas of blacks and browns 
would be added to the Bar, waiving examinations required of 
other groups, so that it would be better racially balanced. 
The State, however, may not proceed by racial classification 
to force strict population equivalencies for every group in 
every occupation, overriding individual preferences. The 
Equal Protection Clause commands the examination of racial 
barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory 
as to how society ought to be organized.5 
However, Justice Douglas believed that the courts would look 
favorably upon criteria that measure the achievement of an individual 
who struggled under the weight of past disadvantages. If an applicant 
had pulled himself up by his own bootstraps, this fact could be given 
consideration in making the admission decision. Justice Douglas wrote 
in commenting on this consideration: 
A black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into 
a junior college may thereby demonstrate a level of motiva­
tion, perserverance and ability that would lead a fair-minded 
admissions committee to conclude that he shows more promise 
for law study than the son of a rich alumnus who achieved 
better grades at Harvard. That applicant would not be offered 
admission because he is black, but because ... he has the 
potential, while the Harvard man may have taken less advantage 
of the vastly superior opportunities offered him.^ 
In a dramatic footnote-to-history piece of journalism, Time 
Magazine reported in commenting on the Bakke decision that it has learned 
that the Court had reached a majority ruling in favor of Marco De Funis, 
the white applicant who alleged that his failure to gain admission to 
the University of Washington Law School was caused by reverse 
5Pe Funis, 416 U.S. at 312, 342-343. 
^Ibid. 
discrimination.7 The Court ducked that issue in 1974 by declaring the 
case moot because De Funis had already been admitted to the University 
of Washington Lav; School. De Funis was, in fact already registered for 
his final quarter in law school at the time the decision in De Funis' 
case was handed down. 
De Funis filed suit for himself alone. The case was not brought 
as a suit for a class of applicants to the law school. In his suit, 
De Funis asked that the school's admissions policies be declared to be 
racially discriminatory. He further asked that he be admitted to the 
school. De Funis was indeed admitted by court order to the law school, 
and completed all but his final quarter while the appeal of his case 
was still pending. 
A fact of importance in the D_e Funis case is that the Constitut­
ion of the United States requires that the courts are obligated to decide 
all controversies which are actively involved in live issues. This 
duty is imposed on the courts by Article III of the Constitution. In 
ruling on the De Funis case, the Supreme Court stated that an actual 
controversy must exist at the time of review as well as the time the 
legal action begins. 
The rationale followed by the Court in De^ Funis held that since 
De Funis' opportunity to complete law school was assured, there was no 
^"Bakke Wins, Quotas Lose," Time, July 10, 1978, p. 9. 
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actual controversy at the time the case was reviewed by the Court. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington had upheld the 
University of Washington Law School admissions policies which allowed 
for preferential treatment of "minority" applicants. The court ruled 
that considering racial or ethnic background as one factor to be used 
in selecting students did not violate equal protection provisions of 
the state and federal constitutions. This, ruled the court, was true 
even though the selection policy resulted in the rejection of some white 
applicants who had higher grade point averages and higher test scores 
8 
than those of "minority applicants." 
Since the implications of the De Funis case are of such great 
magnitude, the dissenting view of Chief Justice Hale of the Supreme 
Court of Washington should be noted. In De Funis, the Washington 
case Chief Justice Hale declared: 
Racial bigotry, prejudice and intolerance will never 
be ended by exalting the political rights of one group or 
class over that of another. The circle of inequality can­
not be broken by shifting the inequities from one man to 
his neighbor. 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas in the 
D£ Funis case (in the Supreme Court of the United States) is replete 
with issues, and merits inclusion in a study of this scope. 
Mr. Douglas' dissenting opinion is therefore reproduced herein as 
Appendix A. 
8 
De Funis v. Odegaard, 507 P. 2d 1169 (Wash. 1973). 
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In his dissenting opinion, . Mr. Justice Douglas stated that there 
is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. He further 
declared that a white is entitled to no advantage by reason of the fact 
that he is white. Nor, said Mr. Justice Douglas, should the white man 
be the subject of any disabling factors due to his race alone. Mr. Jus­
tice Douglas stressed the necessity, on constitutional grounds, to 
consider each applicant on the applicant's individual merits alone. 
The burden of responsibility borne by admissions committees is 
awesome, considering that committees are obligated to judge the merits 
of each applicant without regard to race, sex, ethnicity, or religion. 
Lacking firm guidelines from the Supreme Court as to what constitutes 
a fair set of criteria, the burden must fall on the shoulders of some 
few individuals. Theirs is the responsibility to use their best 
judgment in making decisions. These decisions will almost always 
not be acceptable to everyone. 
The seed of this dilemma is identified at this juncture with 
the name of Allan Bakke. However, the seed was already growing at the 
time Marco De Funis was in court. To refuse to face the issue again 
in Bakke's case would have left the Supreme Court open to charges of 
shirking its responsibility. If De Funis had been proven right, then 
the implied course of action which would flow from previous Supreme 
Court decisions was discriminating and unconstitutional. 
If the University of Washington Law School were right, then the 
Supreme Court would have to hold actions which appeared to be clearly 
discriminatory to be legal and constitutional. As was recorded in 
Chapter II of this study, school desegregation cases moved swiftly from 
ruling de jure, segregation impermissible to invalidating specific 
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techniques for effecting integrated school systems. Very soon, under 
pressure from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, educational administra­
tors began applying preferential selection methods in both educational 
admissions and employment areas. The move from student body to employ­
ment applications was logical to administrators, since a number of the 
desegregation cases involved faculty and staff assignments as well as 
pupil assignments. Thus, the stage was set to apply the rationale of 
desegregation cases to complaints of employment discrimination under 
the Civil Rights Act. It was predictable that the cry of "reverse 
discrimination" would soon be heard in the areas of school employment. 
Indeed it is now being heard and sometimes heeded. In Chapter IV, 
this study will make mention of some of the cases which relate to 
alleged reverse discrimination in employment situations. The school 
administrator will ultimately have to be concerned with this issue as 
the institution performs its personnel function. 
Th_e Dilemma o_f ^din^^qn_s 
Thurgood Marshall is, of course, a member of the Supreme Court, 
the only black justice sitting on the Court today. In 1947, Justice 
Marshall was the director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund. At that time, Mr. Marshall unleashed a scathing attack on classi­
fication by race. Under such a classification, the laws of the State of 
Texas deprived Herman Sweatt, a black man, of admission to the University 
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of Texas Law School. In 1947, Mr. Marshall denounced racial classifi­
cation thusly: 
There is no understandable factual basis for classification 
by race, and under a long line of decisions by the Supreme 
Court, not on the question of Negroes, but on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, all Courts agree that if there is no rational 
basis for the classification, it is flat in the teeth of 
in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. u 
Today, however, those who support special admissions programs con­
tend that racial classification is not only rational but absolutely 
necessary. Many of those who have become vigorous advocates of special 
admissions programs are the same people who, a short time ago, denounced 
any form of racial classification. Justice Marshall himself now seems 
perfectly willing to tolerate racial classifications which operate to 
remedy the wrongs of previous discrimination. In a dissenting opinion 
in the Bakke Case, Justice Marshall wrote: 
During most of the past 200 years, the Constitution, as 
interpreted by this Court, did not prohibit the most in­
genious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the 
Negro. Now, when a state acts to remedy the effects of that 
legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe this same Con­
stitution stands as a barrier. 
In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devas­
tating impact on the lives of Negroes, to bring the Negro into 
the mainstream of American life should be a state interest of 
the highest order. The racism of our society has been so per­
vasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed 
to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes in America is 
not merely the history of slavery along, but also that a whole 
9 
See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
10 
See McGeorge Bundy, "The Issue Before the Court: Who Gets Ahead 
in America?" Atlantic, 240, No. 5 (November, 1977), 43. 
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people were marked Inferior by the law. And that mark has 
endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot has 
not been realized for the Negro; because of the color of 
his skin, he never even made it into the pot... 
Inasmuch as the misfortunes of one man affect all mankind, it is 
difficult to disagree with Justice Marshall's statement that "none... 
has managed to escape the impact" of racism. To all but the most opti­
mistic, it seems unlikely, even today, that all members of all groups 
can escape some degree of discrimination. Prior to Bakke, the most 
important case concerning (so called) reverse discrimination was the 
Case of De Funis v. Odegaard. De Funis, it will be remembered, chal­
lenged the University of Washington Law School's policy of giving some 
preference in admissions decisions to members of minority groups. It is 
ironic that Marco De Funis, a second generation Sephardic Jew, is himself 
a member of a minority group.^ Paradoxes of this ilk abound in the liter­
ature of affirmative action and preferential admissions. It is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to delve deeply into the metaphysics of equal 
opportunity as a philosophical concept. Yet some mention of societal. 
goals must be made in any thesis which addresses itself to the topic of 
racial discrimination. The sine qua non of any governmental policy (at 
least of a democratic governmental policy) is that it maximize the welfare 
of the most people. The Italian sociologist and economist Vilfredo Pareto 
is regarded by social scientists as an excellent resource in examining the 
reality of supposedly egalitarian social and economic systems. Systems 
which maximize the welfare of the community as a whole are said by 
H 
David L. Kirp and Mark G. Yodof, "De Funis and Beyond," Change, 
6, No. 9 (November, 1974), 23. 
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Authorities in the social sciences to be "Pareto optimal." Pareto saw 
the distinction between maximizing the welfare of the individual and 
maximizing the welfare of the community. With respect to utility for 
a community, Pareto lays down as principles of government policy "that 
a government ought to stop at the point beyond which no 'advantage' would 
accrue to the community as a whole; that it ought not to inflict 'useless' 
sufferings on the public as a whole or in part; that it ought to benefit 
the community as far as possible without sacrificing the 'ideals' it has 
in view 'for the public good'; that it ought to make efforts 'proportion-
12 
ate' to purposes and not demand burdensome sacrifices for slight gains." 
Pareto offered only formal analysis, and was well aware that the 
use of such terms as "advantage" and "useless" and "utility" had reduced 
his analysis for formality. The question of specific application was 
left up to the policy process in Pareto's world; but this is the genesis 
of Pareto optimality. The system must function within the limits imposed 
by the status quo distribution of property, personal ability, and so on, 
with no necessarily unique optimum emerging for once and for all. As 
Pareto expressed it, when the community can adopt a policy procuring 
greater benefits for all individuals, it should pursue it as long as it 
is advantageous to all, and . . . "where it is no longer possible . . . 
it is necessary, as regards the advisability of stopping there or going on, 
to resort to other considerations foreign to economics—to decide on grounds 
12 
Vilfredo Pareto, A ^e_a^isci on General Sociology (New York: Dover 
1963), Sections 2131-2133." 
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of ethics, social utility, or something else, which individuals it 
13 
is advisable to benefit, which to sacrifice." Pareto himself offers 
an example of the principle mentioned here in his monumental work 
Treatise on General Sociology: 
When it (government) shuts a thief up in prison, 
it compares the pain that it inflicts on him with the 
utility resulting from it to honest people, and it 
roughly guesses that the latter at least offsets the 
former; otherwise it would let the thief go. For the 
sake of brevity, we have here compared two utilities 
only. A government of course—as best it can, and 
that is badly enough—compares all the utilities it 
is aware of. Substantially, it does at a guess what 
pure economics does with scientific exactness: it 
makes certain heterogeneous quantities homogenous by 
giving them certain coefficients thence proceeding to 
add the resulting quantities and so determine...the 
maximum of utility for a community.-^ 
Thus, government must constantly weigh the relativity of sacrifice. 
In evaluating the degree of sacrifice, Pareto sees the necessity for a 
redetermination of the norms and a change in existing limits. In his 
Treatise on General Sociology, he offers this example: 
Let us imagine a community so situated that a 
strict choice has to be made between a very wealthy 
community with large inequalities in income among its 
members and a poor community with approximately equal 
incomes. A policy of maximum utility of the community 
may lead to the first state, a policy of maximum 
utility for the community to the second. We say, may, 
because results will depend upon the coefficients that 
are used in making the heterogeneous utilities of the 
various social classes homogeneous. The admirer of 
the 'superman' will assign a coefficient of approximately 
13Joseph Lopreato , ViJ^fredo P_aret_o: Selections from His Treatise . 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1965), pp. 23-31. 
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zero to the utility of the lower classes, and get a 
point ol: equilibrium very close to the equalitarian 
condition. There is no criterion save sentiment for 
choosing between the one and the other. 
Pareto's recurrent theme is the importance of psychic states: 
We are to conclude...not that problems simul 
taneously considering a number of heterogeneous 
utilities cannot be solved, but that in order to 
discuss them some hypothesis which will render them 
commensurate has to be assumed. And when, as is most 
often the case, that is not done, discussion of such 
problems is idle and inconclusive, being merely a 
play of dirivations cloaking certain sentiments—and 
those sentiments we should alone consider, without 
worrying very much about the barb they wear.^ 
(Emphasis added). 
As Pareto and others have written, the utility of a community 
(or individual) is a function of the end the community (or individual) 
seeks to attain. Talcott Parsons underscored the necessity for 
societal goals when he wrote that the ultimate ends of individual 
action systems are integrated to form a single common system of ulti­




Ibid., Section 2135. 
16Ibid., Section 2137. 
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Talcott Parsons. The Structure of Social Action-
McGraw-iiill, 1937 ), p. 249. 
(New York: 
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Pareto's wisdom offers much food for thought to the social theorist. 
Yet there may be, within the volumes penned by Pareto, something for use 
by those who would actually effect constructive change. In analyzing 
the work of Pareto, the eminent legal and economic scholar G. H. Bosquet 
remarked: 
The method is always the same: seek for the common 
elements in variable phenomena; i.e., the mejjijpd that has 
been so successfully used in other sciences. 
Economists, in their efforts to describe the situation which maxi­
mizes the welfare of most people, refer to "the general equilibrium of 
exchange." This equilibrium of exchange will occur on a "contract 
curve," which is an optimal locus. At some point on this curve, one 
or both parties to a transaction may benefit, and neither will suffer 
a loss by exchanging goods. When society as a whole has attained 
exchange equilibrium, there is no reorganization that will benefit 
some members of society without causing harm to some other members of 
society. A Pareto-optimal organization, then, is one Such that any 
change which makes some people better off will make others worse off. 
An organization is Pareto-optimal if and only if there is no change that 
19 
will make one or more persons better off without making anyone worse off. 
G. H. Bosquet, The Work of Vilfredo .Pareto (Hanover, N. H.: The 
Sociological Press, 1928), p. 29. 
19 
For a thorough and graphic analysis of the principles of economics 
which relate to Pareto-optimality, see C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic 
Theory, 3d ed., (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972), pp. 456-501. 
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Pareto-Optimality, and Admissions 
As is the case with most emotionally-charged issues, the arguments 
which favor and oppose a particular position tend to run into tomes. 
This study has chosen a few of the arguments, for and against preferen­
tial treatment based on race, which seem most based in reason rather 
than emotion. These arguments were first grouped together and subsumed 
under pro and con categories in laundry-list fashion. Because this 
orderly presentation seemed to imply that some of the arguments were 
superior to others, or that some of the people quoted were more authora-
tive, the arguments are presented in a non-selective random fashion. 
A Summary of Arguments Fo_r and Against Preferential Admissions 
The trump card in the hand of the team which opposes preferential 
admissions seems to be the argument that any classification by race is 
violative of the Constitution of the United States. Specifically, oppo­
nents of the preferential admissions concept (and their allies who oppose 
affirmative action programs generally) believe that any preferential 
treatment based on race violates the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no 
citizen shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro­
cess of law." Anti-affirmative action forces also believe preferential 
treatment based on race is not in keeping with Section II, Article IV of 
the Constitution which says that "the citizen of each state shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states." The element which opposes affirmative action programs which 
classify by race also believes that such classification violates the 
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Fourteenth Amendment, which directs that: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
The anti-preferential admissions contingent believes that the 
typical program for granting admissions by racial classifications will 
deteriorate into a form of quota system. Quota systems are invalid under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also believe 
that any form or racial classification deprives some citizens of the 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause. In defense of this belief, 
they cite many school desegregation cases which point up the constitu­
tional necessity of refraining from any effort to classify by race. One 
such case is Cooper v. Aaron: 
Hie constitutional provision (of the Fourteenth 
Amendment), therefore, must mean that no agency of the 
state or the officers or agents by whom its powers are 
exacted, shall deny to any persons within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. Whoever by virtue of 
public position under a state government . . . denies or 
takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the 
constitutional inhibitions; and as he acts in the name and 
for the states and is clothed with the state's power, his 
act is that of the state. This must be so, or the con­
stitutional prohibition has no meaning . . . thus the pro­
hibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all laws 
of the state denying equal protection of the laws, what­
ever the agency of the state taking action ... or what­
ever guise in which it is taken. 20 
Opponents of preferential admissions programs which consider race 
as a criterion also cite Loving v. Virginia, the landmark case in which 
90 
Cooper v. Aaron, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958). 
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the Supreme Court struck down the iscegenation laws of the state of 
Virginia. In Loving, the Court stated: 
The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious 
racial discrimination in the states. 
Advocates of programs which employ racial classification are also 
able to cite Supreme Court cases which they believe support the consti­
tutionality of such programs. In the Case of San Antonio Independent 
22 
School District v. Rodriguez, for example, the Court lent support to 
a classification designed to help a disadvantaged class in their efforts 
to overcome the effects of past discrimination. In this instance, the 
classification did serve as a limitation of benefits available to those 
who weren't members of the disadvantaged class. However, the limitation 
placed on others was only incidental. Because benefits to other classes 
were only indicentally limiting, the Court ruled that those benefits were 
not a suspect class and therefore not subject to close scrutiny. In San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court ruled that popu­
lation groups which had been disadvantaged by a school financing scheme 
were not a suspect class. Therefore, they were not entitled to a review 
under the close scrutiny standard. The Court explained in its judgment 
that the class of disadvantaged persons had: 
. . . none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: The 
class is not saddled with such disabilities or subjected to 
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness, as to command 
^^"Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. C't. 1817 (1967). 
22 
San Antonio Independent School Pis trie t v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973). 
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extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.^3 
In analyzing the status of Allan Bakke and others who have alleged 
themselves to be victims of reverse discrimination, those who would 
utilize preferential admissions policies see "none of the traditional 
„24 
indicia of suspectness. Proponents of preferential admissions pro­
grams believe that such programs which affect classes of applicants who 
lack "the traditional indicia of suspectness" are "not presumtively 
unconstitutional, even though they directly limit their (white appli-
25 
cants') opportunities by assuring the inclusion of minorities." 
Court Case_s Relating to ^f^ijrinative Action 
It is not difficult for those who support preferential admissions 
and/or affirmative action programs to cit cases in which the Supreme 
Court has upheld race-conscious efforts aimed at eradicating (or providing 
redress for) discrimination against protected minorities. A list of 
cases in which recognition of a racial classification has been made by 
the Court follows: Uni_te_d States_ v.. Montgomery County^ B_oar_d of_ Education, 
395 U.S. 225 (1969); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U. S. 1 (1971); McDaniel v. 402 U.S. 39 (1971); United 
Jewish Organization v. Care^, 97 S. Ct. 996 (1977); and Morton v. 




See "Bakke: Pro and Con, the National Education Association Amicus 




The above cases were concerned with a wide variety of situations. 
In Morton v. Mancari, for example, the Court unanimously upheld, against 
an equal protection challenge, a statute that requires the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs to give a preference in hiring to native Americans. Such 
a position, say proponents of preferential hiring and preferential admis­
sions programs, is totally inconsistent with the tenet that racial class­
ifications are presumptively unconstitutional. Proponents of programs 
which involve preferential treatment hold that, where racial classifica­
tions are installed for the purpose of redressing disadvantage or dis­
crimination, the normal presumption is in favor of the constitutionality 
of state action. 
In defending special admissions programs, their advocates are quick 
to point to the record. The figures cited by proponents of preferential 
admissions programs show that in the 1969-70 academic year there were a 
total of 1,042 black students enrolled in medical schools throughout the 
country. This represented 2.8% of the total enrollment, and was not sig­
nificantly greater than the percentage of black physicians in the country. 
There were 18 American Indians in medical schools, a figure which repre­
sented .04% of total medical school enrollment. 92 Mexican-Americans, 
0.2% of total enrollment were attending medical schools. 
The figures quoted reveal that a substantial increase in minority 
enrollment had materialized in the medical schools by the 1974-75 school 
year. By 1974-75, the percentage of black medical students rose to 6.3%. 
The percentage of American Indians had risen to 0.3%, and the percentage 
26 
of Mexican-Americans had risen to 1.2%. 
__ . 
IbJ.d., pp. 448-449. 
Whether or not those admitted to medical schools under special 
admissions programs are qualified is another issue. In the New England 
Journal of Medicine, Bernard Davis of the Harvard Medical School (who 
favors "stretching the criteria for admission and . . . trying to make 
up for earlier educational disadvantages") questions "how far faculties 
should stretch the criteria for passing." Davis also notes that it is 
"cruel to admit students who have a very low probability of measuring up 
to reasonable standards." Those who oppose preferential admissions pro­
grams are quick to allude to the potential danger of turning out incom­
petent physicians and to express concern about the traumatic effect of 
failure on minority group members, as Davis has done in the New England 
2 7 
Journal of Medicine. 
Proponents of preferential admissions programs readily admit, quite 
often, that their methodology will result in some inconvenience for some 
majority group members. They see this inconvenience as far the lesser 
of two evils. In their view, the alternative is protracted racial injus­
tice. They call attention to white America's penchant for continually 
deferring the minor "inconvenience cost" of racial integration. In 
their minds, there is no effective way to ameliorate the effects of past 
discriminatory treatment unless race may be considered as a factor in 
selecting who may avail themselves of educational programs. This faction 
points the finger at the University of California system for its failure 
to make redress for its own past discriminatory conduct, a failure which 
Malcolm J. Sherman, "Bakke: Viewpoint 2: The Case Against Prefer­
ence," Change, 9, No. 10 (October, 1977), 60. 
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they say created the Bakke issue in the first place. 
One of the most eloquent and persuasive arguments in favor of 
preferential admissions programs has been advanced by McGeorge Bundy, 
a luminary in both academe and the world of government, and a former 
29 
dean at Harvard. Bundy is now president of the Ford Foundation. 
As discussed earlier in this study, the most significant challenges 
to failure to pursue a vigorous program of school desegregation were made 
on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause. Opponents of preferential 
admissions and affirmative action programs have also made compelling 
arguments against preferential treatment by using the Equal Protection 
Clause as the springboai'd for their rationale. Bundy cannot accept the 
notion that the Equal Protection Clause in some way operates to perpe­
tuate de facto white supremacy. Yet, neither does he see special admis­
sions programs as a panacea for all social ills. In Bundy's view, the 
minor inconvenience and suffering imposed on a relatively few majority 
members is justified by the ends being sought. He addresses the issue 
thus.: 
No one can deny that special admissions programs, even 
at their best, have costs and dangers; the grievances of 
Allan Bakke and others may be overstated and even misdirected, 
but they are deeply felt. Racial preference can arouse racial 
antagonism, and the general rule that judgment should be based 
on personal merit alone has its high claims. Still, it seems 
clear that to take race into account today is better than to 
let the doors swing almost shut because of the head start of 
others. We must hope and believe that in the long run our 
effort for equal opportunity will put the need for special 
Lee Daniels and Francesta E. Farmer, "Bakke: Viewpoint 1: The Case 
for Preference," Change, 9, No. 10 (October, 1977), 
29 
See McGeorge Bundy, "The Issue Before the Court: Who Gets Ahead 
in America?" The Atlantic Monthly, 240, No. 5 (November, 1977), 41-54. 
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programs behind us. In that deep sense there is no conflict 
between special admissions and every other form of action to 
help the disadvantaged, white and nonwhite alike. But what 
special admissions, and only special admissions, can do today 
is to make access to the learned professions a reality for 
nonwhites. To get past racism, we must here take account of 
race. There is no other present way. In the words of Alexander 
Heard of Vanderbilt, 'To treat our black students equally, we 
have to treat them differently. 
Still another argument in favor of preferential admissions programs 
has been advanced by various commentators. This argument holds that the 
general interest is served by preferential admissions programs because 
minority graduates are more likely to be able to serve the communities 
from which they came to the programs. In this context, proponents cite 
the crying need for medical services in disadvantaged communities. The 
shortage of physicians in ghetto areas aggravates the health problems 
of minority group members, a situation which is inhumane and which ad­
versely affects the efforts of the minority group to better its economic 
status. According to figures quoted by the Phi Delta Kappan, the infant 
mortality rate for black infants in the United States is almost double 
that of whites, and approximates the infant mortality rates of develop-
„ . 31 
xng countries. 
Phi Delta Kappan also calls attention to studies quoted in the 
National Education Association amicus curiae brief filed in the Bakke 
Case. It has been established, according to NEA, in several studies that 
minority professionals tend to practice in minority communities. Signif­
icantly, every student admitted to the Davis Medical School under the 
— -
Ibid_. , p. 44 . 
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"Bakke: Pro and Con: The National Education Association Amlcus_ Curiae 
Brief, Phi Delta Kappan, 5, No. 7 (March, 1978), 's'«9. 
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special admissions program had expressed an intention to serve disadvan-
32 
taged communities upon graduation. Pointing to the direct link between 
preferential admissions programs and improved health care in minority 
communities, proponents conclude that there exists a compelling societal 
interest in programs which include minorities in medical schools. 
On the other side of the ledger, there are those who hope to 
reverse the trend for minority professionals to practice among minority 
communities. Opponents of preferential admissions programs say that a 
protracted trend of minority professionals practicing only among minor­
ities is a regressive rather than a progressive proposition. 
A point which is often made by those who advocate special admissions 
programs is that the programs make for diversification of the student 
body. The academic community as a whole derives cultural benefits from 
association with minority students who have first-hand insight into the 
folkways and needs of their fellow minority group members. A similar 
argument stresses the need for leadership which can be supplied by min­
ority professionals. As role models practicing in their own communities, 
graduates of special admissions programs will serve to demonstrate the 
feasibility of professional and educational advancement. Thus, the pre­
sence of minority professionals, made possible by preferential admissions 
programs, serves to offset the effect of forces which produce racial 
polorization. 
Anti-preference people counter that preferential admissions programs 
promote polorization of the races by creating resentment among minority 
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members. The rationale employed here holds that being admitted on 
"a pass" undermines the confidence which minority group members have 
finally built up in their own abilities. Minority group members, the 
argument states, resent the implicit assumption that they are intrinsic­
ally inferior and must be given some special form of consideration. This 
theme was dramatically expatiated upon via national television in the 
critically acclaimed series The Paper Chase. Academy award winning actor 
John Houseman, who portrays the irascible but wisely humane Professor 
Kingsfield in the series, becomes involved in assisting a black female 
law student who has been admitted to a highly prestigious law school 
on an affirmative action program. The fictional law student, Donna 
Scott, who is portrayed by actress Denise Nichols, is subjected to 
a variety of pressures as a result of her status as a student admitted 
on "a pass." The pressure intensifies when a wealthy alumnus appear on 
the scene to protest the fact that Donna Scott has been admitted although 
her grades were inferior to those of his own son, whom the school rejected. 
In the debate over Ms. Scott's admission to the law school, most of the 
issues surrounding Bakke unfold, and many of the sources which are cited 
in this dissertation are coincidentally quoted by the actors. Sensitive 
performances by superb actors underline the emotionality of the issue 
involved, and the fact that the program was produced serves to underscore 
the general interest in the Bakke case. Realistically, the dramatization 
offers no definitive answers to the legal questions raised. Realistically 
also, Ms. Scott does not solve her own personal dilemma in the allotted 
"With Justice for Some," The Paper Chase, CBS-TV, February 13, 1979. 
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time span of one hour. Evidence, legal and otherwise, indicates that 
Ms. Scott's counterparts in the real world will also face considerable 
personal stress for years to come. 
oJL Arguments , 
In summary, most arguments against preferential admissions programs 
hold that they are (1) impermissible because they are unconstitutional, 
or (2) improper because they are predicated on the assumption of some 
other criterion than ability and therefore penalize the guiltless. Most 
arguments in favor of preferential admissions programs assert that they 
are (1) constitutional because they make partial recompense for past 
racial discrimination, and (2) are the only viable alternative for cor­
recting the imbalance of educational opportunity which prevails. 
The gist of most arguments opposing any form of special treatment 
in admissions programs is that the more qualified should simply be pre­
ferred to the less qualified. This concept states that the Constitution 
requires color blindness in making choices among individual applicants. 
The center of the matter, says McGeorge Bundy, is that in affirmative 
action programs, blacks and other minority group members undeniably score 
lower on tests. The first point which Bundy makes is that there is a 
clear relation between low scores and low economic status. The second 
point made by Bundy is that there is much confusion about scores and 
records and that their significance is vehemently disputed by even the 
experts. There is, among these experts, says Bundy, a tacit agreement 
that test scores and performance records do not constitute an absolute 
guide to later performance. Bundy indicates that most admissions offi­
cers, particularly at the undergraduate level, would say that mechanical 
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reliance on tests and measurements would be morally wrong and practically 
disastrous. Admissions officers look at other things, says Bundy, "not 
only for help at the margins, but because they think these other things 
are critical to the quality of the student body as a whole." In this 
tactic, Bundy believes they have struck a mother lode of wisdom and jus­
tice. Bundy asks: 
Now we are right at the heart of it. Is race itself 
permissibly such another thing to look at? If I am a qual­
ified black (in the basic sense already discussed), may not 
my blackness perhaps make me more qualified? Have I had 
something extra to go through? If I score 550 where a 
middle-class white scores 650, have I shown as much or more 
of what is so critical to success in learning—a determination 
to learn? Can I bring a different and needed perspective? 
Is there a special need for people like me in courts and 
hospitals and on college faculties? May the profession it­
self be better if more people of my race are in it? Can my 
presence and participation as a student enlarge the educa­
tional experience of others? Does the whole society somehow 
have a need for me in this profession that it simply does not 
have, today, for one more white? If the answer to these 
questions, or soma of them, is yes, are not my qualifications 
by that much improved, and improved precisely by my black­
ness? If so, at some point it becomes right that I should 
be admitted: I am not 'less qualified' when all things are 
considered. 
Admissions officers, as Bundy indicates, are morally obligated to 
"consider all things" in the process of selecting candidates. Much has 
been written in the past decade about the probabilities of selecting out 
qualified minority candidates through the use of standardized testing 
techniques. Many standardized tests may be so constructed as to penalize 
the minority applicant because of the applicant's socioeconomic back­
ground. These tests are said to have a built-in cultural bias. Very 
McGeorge Bundy, "The Issue Before the Court: Who Gets Ahead in 
America?" The Atlantic Monthly, 240, No. 5 (November, 197^, 48. 
89 
recently, standardized tests have come under fire because they purport­
edly are guilty of promulgating a built-in sex bias (against women) as 
well. The age factor is also important and should be among those things 
considered in selecting candidates for admission to academic programs. 
When the Supreme Court ordered that Allan Bakke be admitted to the 
Davis Medical School, he had reached the age of thirty-eight. Thus, he 
is well over the average age of his classmates, exceeding their average 
age by at least a full decade. Bakke is, therefore, a living argument 
in favor of considering the individual abilities of each candidate. 
Indeed, many observers feel that the Bakke decision will make it easier 
for blacks and whites to work together on affirmative action programs. 
New York Senator Patrick Moynihan, for example, has said: 
A bureaucracy that says, 'white teachers get in this 
line and blacks in this line,' threatens to break up the 
coalition that worked for affirmative action in the first 
place. The Bakke decision gets us back into a sensible 
mainstream idea of what affirmative action should be. 
Maybe now we can put the coalition back together. 
The coalition of which Senator Moynihan speaks is not merely a 
rhetorical one. Many educational institutions have, of course, adopted 
affirmative action programs without overt pressure from the federal 
government. One minority admissions program which has won acclaim from 
36 
many quarters is that of Harvard. Harvard's plan is described as 
a "flexible" approach to considering race in selecting applicants. This 
plan won a special nod of approval from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. in 
35 
"Bakke Wins, Quotas Lose," Time, July 10, 1978, p. 15. 
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Arthur Lubow and Phyllis Malamud, "Harvard's Way," Newsweek, 
July 10, 1978, p. 30. 
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37 
his opinion in Bakke. Justice Powell was familiar with the Harvard 
plan because a description of the plan had been attached to an amicus 
curiae brief submitted for consideration in the Bakke case. Harvard had 
submitted the brief along with Columbia, Stanford, and the University of 
Pennsylvania. The brief declared in no uncertain terms that "scholarly 
* 
excellence" is "not the sole or even predominant criterion" for a stu­
dent's acceptance at Harvard. Instead, the brief goes on to say, 
Harvard seeks diversity, and "the race of an applicant may tip the 
balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on the 
farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases. 
Harvard can show impressive results in minority recruiting. In 
the early 1960's, fewer than ten blacks would be accepted in a typical 
year from among fifteen to 25 who applied to Harvard College. In 1968, 
52 blacks were enrolled, representing 3.1% of a Harvard College class of 
1,600. In 1977, when 12,700 candidates vied for 2,196 acceptances to 
the class of 1982 at Harvard and Radcliffe, 631 blacks made application. 
One hundred and seventy-eight of the 631 applicants were admitted, a 
figure which constituted 8.1% of the total. Additionally, Harvard 
accepted 102 Hispanics (4.6% of the total), 125 Asians (5.7%) and eight 
native Americans. A total of 413 minority students were accepted, and 
38 
that number represented 18.8% of the total number accepted. 
37 
"The Harvard Admissions Plan: Acceptable Affirmative Action in 
Justice Powell's View," The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 10, 1978, 
9. 
38 
Arthur Lubow and Phyllis Malamud, "Harvard's Way," Newsweek, July 
1978, 30-31. 
91 
Since many educational institutions have initiated affirmative 
action programs without overt pressure from the federal government, 
there is little reason to expect them to abandon their efforts. The 
Bakke decision places the Supreme Court's stamp of approval on affirma­
tive action programs, although racial quotas are forbidden. Stanford 
University political scientist Martin Lipset believes that "racial 
quotas" could become a type of unwritten criterion much like geographic 
quotas are an unwritten point of consideration among admissions offic-
39 
ials. In view of the willingness of educational institutions to act 
on their own in making room for minority group members, Professor Lip-
set's logic rings true. If Lipset is correct, then race will become a 
subjective point of analysis on the part of admissions officers. This 
means that there will still exist a definite opportunity for directors 
of admission to discriminate on the basis of race. Professor Lipset, 
however, believes that "in this day and age, minorities will probably 
40 
get the advantage if left to subjective selection." In relating to 
this subject, Norman Dorsen, board chairman of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, makes a highly significant point, if his analysis is 
accurate. "Institutionally and practically," Dorsen declares, "it is 
the school admissions officers and administrators who will be crucial 
. . 4L 
in determining what the impact of the Bakke decision will be. 
39 
"Bakke Wins, Quotas Lose," Time, July 10, 1978, p. 15. 
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Assuming the accuracy of Dorsen's belief in the importance of the 
admissions director's ethics and power, it is logical to give some con­
sideration to the admissions official's role in selecting or rejecting 
the nontraditional applicant. Herman Sweatt, James Meredith, and 
Allan Bakke fit the same mold, in the sense that all three were adults 
rather than just-graduated high school seniors when they sought admission 
to college programs of study. 
Appendix A of this thesis is a study-within-a-study which treats 
the subject of testing programs which are used to select or reject 
older nontraditional applicants for admissions to academic programs. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF LANDMARK DECISIONS 
The Bakke Case 
The Bakke decision held that race can be a legitimate considera­
tion in placement of employees as well as acceptance and assignment of 
students, although no quotas may be assigned. Race may be a consid­
eration even though no specific proof of previous racial discrimination 
exists, according to cha Court's ruling in Bakke. State-run schools 
may consider an applicant's race in making admissions choices so long 
as the applicant's race is not the sole factor. 
The Bakke case arose when Allan Bakke was twice denied admission 
to the Davis Medical School, an institution within the University of 
California system. Bakke was denied admission in 1973 and again in 
1974. He then filed suit against the regents of the University of 
California in state court. His suit alleged that the special admissions 
program of the Davis Medical School denied him admission on the basis of 
his race. This denial, Bakke alleged, was a violation of (1) the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States; (2) Article 1, Section 21, of the California Constitution 
and (3) Section 601 of Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI 
provides, in essence, that no person shall on the ground of race or 
color be excluded from participating in federally supported programs. 
^•Regents of the University of California. Petitioner v. Allan 
Bakke. See UL_S^_Law_Week, 46 (June 27, 1978), 4896. 
This should be done even though sossie particular university or college had 
not itself discriminated against any racial group. Mr. Justice Powell 
did not accept the thesis that a university which had not discriminated 
itself against some racial group should seek to redress society's past 
racism. Justice Powell said that what a university should properly do 
would be to seek a diverse student body. Any institution which had 
itself discriminated in the past could use race-conscious corrective 
measures in selecting students. 
By the logic of the Bakke decision, a plan similar to that of the 
Uarvard Admissions Program would be acceptable to the Court. This is 
reason for believing that the Bakke decision will not result in a require­
ment for radical change in policy across the country. Indeed very few 
professional schools or undergraduate schools use such explicitly numeri­
cal affirmative action programs as Davis Medical School's plan. Most 
affirmative action plans in institutions of higher learning more closely 
approximate the methodology of the Harvard Plan. 
Unquestionably, the Bakke decision permits universities and colleges 
to use a good deal of discretion in affirmative action programs. This 
allays the fear of many university and college officials who were con­
cerned that they would be held to some rigid legal standard in countless 
lawsuits arising over admissions decisions. One fact which is clearly 
evident is that a state institution which is itself free of any taint of 
past discrimination is under no obligation to initial any affirmative 
action program. Beyond these guidelines, the result of the Bakke case has 
been to leave a number of issues in a vague, dynamic state. The depths of 
the philosophical conflicts raised by Bakke are yet to be explored, and 
future cases will certainly deal with the issue in a more specific manner. 
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As previously stated, Dr. Harold Spaeth appeared on National 
Public Radio to discuss the Bakke case. Dr. Spaeth had programmed a 
computer to reflect the voting patterns of the nine Supreme Court 
Justices. On the basis of his computer analysis, Dr. Spaeth was confi­
dent in his prediction that the Court would decide unanimously in favor 
of Bakke. 
Thus, the Bakke decision does provide incontrovertible proof of 
one supposition: The Supreme Court remains totally unpredictable. In 
1954, the Supreme Court ruled that a child could not be denied admission 
2 
to a public school on account of race. The Bakke decision holds that 
preferential treatment cannot be afforded to blacks over any other racial 
group. „ To some, this position signals a retreat from the j^r_own decision; 
some believe the Supreme Court has actually come full cycle. This chapter 
devotes some comment to a comparison of the Burger Court with the Warren 
Court. The research analyzes the events and adjudications which changed 
the complexion of desegregation philosophy between Brown and Bakke.. 
This study is significant because it presents an analysis which 
will provide for educational advisers and decision makers an organized 
approach to employ when considering the complexities of preferential ad­
missions programs. To an extent, the study will be of value to decision 
makers in industry as well as education. As previously stated, litigation 
relative to employment and promotion by preferential treatment of minority 
group members looms large on the horizon. 
2 
I^rown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) 
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It is important that educators and business people refrain from 
speculation as to what courses of action the federal judiciary will take 
in the future with regard to preferential hiring and preferential 
admissions programs. 
The Bakke decision was in fact two decisions, because the nine 
Justices formed clusters of two groups. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
was a swing man. This made it possible for there to exist, in fact, 
two majorities. There was, therefore, not a unified voice from the 
bench. 
Justices llarry A Blackmun, William J. 3rennan, Jr., Thurgood 
Marshall, and Byron White called affirmative action lawful under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. This act forbids racial discrimination. 
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and White concluded that the Davis 
Medical School program was constitutional. Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger and Justices William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, and Potter 
Stewart agreed that under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Allan Bakke was 
unfairly treated, although Justice Stevens opined that the issue before 
the Court was not a constitutional one. Justice Powell found for affirm­
ative action programs since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not rule 
out such programs. However, he ruled for Mr. Bakke on the grounds that 
the Davis Medical School program was, on constitutional grounds, too 
restrictive. 
Justice Powell, in announcing the Court's judgment stated that 
race is permissible as one of several admissions factors. Justice Powell 
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commented oil the sixty-odd amicus curiae briefs v/hich were submitted in 
the Bakke case, saying, ,!as we speak today, with .1 notable lack of 
unanimity, it may be fair to say we needed all this advice." 
In his opinion, Mr. Justice Powell singled out the Harvard College 
Admissions program as one which was deserving of imitation. Justice 
Powell's comments on the Harvard Admissions Program and a part of his 
rationale in the Bakke decision are reproduced below because of their 
usefulness as possible guidelines for administrators in setting up 
admissions programs which seek to serve applicants from diverse 
backgrounds: 
In Harvard college 
admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas for the 
number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physi­
c i s t s  o r  C a l i f o r n i a n s  t o  b e  a d m i t t e d  i n  a  g i v e n  y e a r  . . .  
But that awareness (of the necessity of including more than 
a token number of black students) does not mean that the 
Committee sets the minimum number of blacks or of people 
from west of the Mississippi who are to be admitted. It 
means only that in choosing among thousands of applicants 
who are not only 'admissible1 academically but have other 
strong qualities, the Committee, with a number of criteria 
in mind, pays some attention to distribution among many 
types and categories of students. Brief for Columbia 
University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and 
the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae. App. 2,3. 
This kind of pro­
gram treats each applicant as an individual in the 
admissions process. The applicant who loses out on the 
last available seat to another candidate receiving a "plus" 
on the basis of ethnic background will not have been fore­
closed from all consideration from that seat simply because 
he was not the righit color or had the wrong surname. It 
would mean only that his combined qualifications, which 
may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not 
outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications 
would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he 
would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In .summary, it 
is evident that the Davis special admission program 
involves the use of an explicit racial classification 
never before countenanced by this Court. It tells 
applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or "Chicano" hhat 
they are totally excluded from a specific percentage 
of the seats in an entering class. No matter how 
strong their qualifications, quantitative and extra­
curricular, including their own potential for contri­
bution to educational diversity, they are never afforded 
the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred 
groups for the special admission seats. At the sane 
time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity to 
compete for every seat in the class. 
The fatal flaw in petitioners' preferential program 
is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 
22 (1948). Such rights are not absolute. But when a 
State's distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens 
hinges on the color of a person's skin or ancestry, that 
individual is entitled to a demonstration that the chal­
lenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial 
state interest. Petitioner failed to carry this burden. 
For this reason, that portion of the California court's 
judgment holding petitioner's special admissions program 
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment must be affirmed.-* 
Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented in part from 
Justice Powell's opinion and in part concurred with the opinion of 
Justice Powell. It is worthwhile to examine the rationale of 
Justice Brennan in this portion of his opinion which follows: 
We disagree with 
the lower courts' conclusion that the Davis program's 
use of race was unreasonable in light of its objectives. 
First, as petitioner argues, there are no practical means 
by which it could achieve its ends in the foreseeable 
future without the use of race-concious measures. With 
respect to any factor (such as poverty or family educa­
tional background) that may be used as a substitute for 
race as an indicator for past discrimination, whites 
greatly out-number racial minorities simply because 
3 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 98 Sup. Ct. 
2733 (1978). 
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whites make up a far larger percentage of the total popula­
tion and therefore far out-number minorities in absolute 
terms at every socioeconomic level. For example, of n 
class of recent medical school applicants from families 
with less than $10,000 income, at least 71% were white. 
Of all 1970 families headed by a person not a high school 
graduate which included related children under 18, 80% 
were white and 20% were racial minorities. loreover, 
while race is positively correlated with differences in 
CPA and MCAT scores, economic disadvantage is not. Thus, 
it appear that economically disadvantaged whites do not 
score less well than economically advantaged whites, 
while economically advantaged blacks score less well than 
economically disadvantaged whites. These statistics graph­
ically illustrate that the University's purpose to inte­
grate its classes by compensating for past discrimination 
could not be achieved by a general preference for the 
economically disadvantaged or the children of parents of 
limited education unless such groups were to make up the 
entire class. 
The "Harvard" program 
as those employing it readily concede, openly and success­
fully employs a racial criterion for the purpose of insur­
ing that some of the scarce places in institutions of higher 
education are allocated to disadvantaged minority students. 
That the Harvard approach does not also make public the 
precise workings of the system while the Davis program 
employs a specific, openly stated number, does not condemn 
the latter plan for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment 
ajudication. It may be that the Harvard plan is more 
acceptable to the public than is the Davis "quota." If it 
is, any State, including California, is free to adopt it 
in preference to a less acceptable alternative, just as it 
is generally free, as far as the Constitution is concerned, 
to abjure granting any racial preferences in its admissions 
program. But there is no basis for preferring a particular 
preference program simply because in achieving the same 
goals that the Davis Medical School is pursuing, it proceeds 
in a manner that is not immediately apparent to the public/* 
It is noteworthy that while Justices Brennan and Powell were poles 
apart in their opinions, both cited the Harvard College Admissions Programs 
as exemplary in its legality. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion, which 
4Ibid_. 
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expensed the minority view that the Davis program was a valid means 
of redressing past discrimination against members of minority groups, 
argued that past decisions by the Supreme Court, as well as federal 
regulations which had been formulated to carry out Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act had established the principle that "race-conscious 
action is not only permitted but required to accomplish the remedial 
objectives of Title VI." 
Mr. Justice Brcnnan advocated race-conscious action even in the 
absence of specific evidence that the Davis Medical School had itself 
been guilty of past racial discrimination. The Drennan opinion held 
that "Davis' special admissions program cannot be said to violate the 
Constitution simply because it has set aside a predetermined number of 
places for qualified minority applicants rather than using minority 
status as a positive fact to be considered in evaluating the appli-
6 
cants of disadvantaged minority applicants." 
Mr. Justice Powell in his opinion conceded that the need to attain 
diversity in a student body "clearly is a constitutionally permissible 
goal for an institution of higher education." Justice Powell, however, 
stated that "ethnic diversity... is only one element in a range of factors 
a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a hetero­
geneous student body." Mr. Powell denied that an admissions program 
which considers race only as one factor "is simply a subtle and more 
sophisticated—but no less effective—means of according racial pre­





The minority opinion written by Mr. Justicc Brennan held the 
Davis program to be constitutional, arguing: 
That the Harvard approach does not also make pub­
lic the extent of the preference and the precise workings 
of the system while the Davis program employs a specific, 
openly stated number, does not condemn the latter plan, 
(under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.)? 
In a separate opinion in Balclce Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall also 
addressed himself to the Harvard College Admissions Programs. A portion 
of Justice Marshall's opinion is reproduced here because of its direct 
relevance to affirmative action admissions programs in higher education: 
I am convinced, as Mr. Justice Powell seems to be, 
that the difference between the Davis program and the one 
employed by Harvard is very profound or constitutionally 
significant. The line between the two is a thin and 
indistinct one. In each, subjective application is at 
work. 
Because of my conviction that admissions programs 
are primarily for the educators, I am willing to accept 
the representation that the Harvard program is one where 
good faith in its administration is practiced as well as 
professed. I agree that such a program, where race or 
ethnic background is only one of many factors, is a pro­
gram better formulated than Davis' two-track system. 
It is worth noting, 
perhaps, that governmental preference has not been a 
stranger to our legal life. We see it in veterans' 
preferences. We see it in the aid-to-the-handicapped 
programs. We see it in the progressive income tax. We 
see it in the Indian programs. 
We may excuse some of these on the ground that they 
have specific constitutional protection, or, as with Indians, 
that those benefitted are wards of the Government. 
I suspect that it 
would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action program 
in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask 




In order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
account of race. There is no other way. And in order 
to treat some persons equally, we must treat them 
differently. ̂  
We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal Protection 
Clause perpetrate racial supremacy. So the ultimate 
question, as it was in the beginning of this litigation 
is: Among the qualified, how does one choose? 
It is fitting to recapitulate the alignment of the Supreme Court 
Justices in the iiakke decision before making a final coamentary on 
just what was decided. Four Justices (Justice Stevens, Chief Justice 
Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist) ruled that Allan Balclce 
had been treated unlawfully under the terms of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. This act proscribes discrimination "on the ground of race" 
in federally aided programs. The four aforementioned Justices inter­
pret the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as requiring "color blind" policies. 
Another four Justices (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun) stated that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was designed to help 
minorities and did not outlaw affirmative action programs. They said 
that the act conveyed exactly the same rights as the constitutional 
guarantee that no one shall be denied "the equal protection of the 
laws." These four also found the Davis Medical School program to be 
constitutional. Citing the long history of racism in the United States, 
they declared that a university was entitled to use preferential admis­
sions policies to remedy "the past effects of societal discrimination," 
even though that university had not discriminated itself. Otherwise, 




which masks the reality that many 'created equal1 have been treated 
within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow 
citizens." 
The ninth vote was cast by Mr. Justice Powell, lie agreed that 
the Civil Rights Act did not rule out the Davis program. As to the 
Constitution, Mr. Justice Powell found that Allan Bakke's rights had 
been violated because the Davis Medical School Program set up an 
unjustifiable racial classification. Mr. Justice Powell, therefore, 
cast the fifth vote which resulted in the requirement that Allan Bakke 
be admitted to the Davis Medical School. The Powell viewpoint, which 
for now is decisive, does leave margin for effective admissions programs. 
State universities may take race into account as one factor in deciding 
which applicants to admit. The state universities have considerable lee­
way, under the Constitution and Federal law, to adopt and/or retain 
affirmative action programs for minorities. Although Allan Bakke won in 
the Bakke decision, affirmative action as a principle was also the victor. 
The question now becomes what kind of affirmative action programs are 
likely to be acceptable in the eyes of the judiciary in the future. Five 
justices addressed themselves to the constitutional issue in the Bakke 
case, and their opinions offer some clues as to what the Supreme Court 
feels about the manner in which affirmative action programs should be 
constructed. 
Four of the justices Indicated that a proper objective for an 
institution of higher learning was to redress society's past racism. 
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Under the special admissions program of the Davis Medical School, 
16 of 100 first year openings were, in practice, reserved for certain 
minority groups. These minority groups were comprised of blacks, 
Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians. Special admissions applicants 
were rated by a separate committee. The majority of the members of the 
special committee were themselves members of minority groups. Theoreti­
cally, a white Caucasian might be regarded as disadvantaged and considered 
for admission under the special admissions program; in practice, no white 
applicant was ever selected for one of the 16 openings. 
Under the regular admissions procedure, any applicant with a grade 
point average of below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 was automatically disquali­
fied. Applicants for the special admissions program were not disquali­
fied because their grade point averages were lower than 2.5. 
Allan Bakke's grade point average was 3.51 when he applied in 1973. 
In that year, his combined numerical rating for purposes of admission 
was 468 out of a possible 500. When he reapplied in 1974, his numerical 
rating was 549 out of a possible 600. Bakke was not admitted, nor was 
he placed on the alternate list in either year he applied. However, some 
minority students who were admitted in 1973 and 1974 did have grade point 
averages below 2.5. Some who were admitted had grade point averages as 
low as 2.11 in 1973 and 2.21 in 1974. 
The trial court in California agreed with Allan Bakke, and ruled that 
the special admissions procedure of the Davis Medical School was unconsti­
tutional. On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment 
in favor of Bakke, by a six-to-one majority. 
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On June 28, 1978, the Mke_ decision was announced by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
The Unpredictabl.e Impact of _%aklce 
Since that fateful day, June 28, 1978, a plethora of articles, 
opinions, and commentary have sought to pinpoint the meaning of the 
Bakke decision. The Supreme Court's decision, which runs to 154 pages 
and 40,000 words, will provide grist for legal scholars for many years 
to come. The Supreme Court has provided no definitive rules in the 
Bakk£ decision. Rather, the Court has offered (as it often has 
throughout our history) what constitutional scholar A. E. Howard, of 
9 
the University of Virginia, refers to as a "Solomonic Compromise.") 
The Court answered (though it did not settle) the question raised 
by Allan Bakke's rejection to admission to the Davis Medical School. 
The special admissions program was declared invalid for its violation 
of the individual rights secured by the equal protection clause. The 
Court did order that Allan Bakke be admitted to the Davis Medical School. 
Yet the door remains open for schools to design and use race-conscious 
programs of admission, provided such programs properly consider the 
individual rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
What social consequences are likely to follow the ambivalent 
decision handed down in the Bakke case? Does the verdict in favor of 
Bakke signal a retreat from our commitment to equality of educational 
opportunity? Many influential blacks feared the worst when the Bakke 
9 
Tom Matthewa with Mary Lord and Lucy Howard. "The Landmark Bakke 
Ruling," Newsweek, July 10, 1978, p. 20. 
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decision was handed down, For example, Jesse Jackson, the Chicago civil 
rights leader, compared the impact oC Baklce on blacks to a "Nazi march 
„10 
in Skokie or Klan marches in Mississippi. Yet, only three months later, 
HEW Secretary Joseph Califano declared: 
I can announce today the major conclusion we have reached: 
in general, the Bakke_ decision will not interfere with or 
restrict HEW programs of special value and concern to 
minority groups. 
In summary, most legal experts believe that the Baklce decision was 
actually too plit to provide definitive guidelines. The ruling of the 
Court actually involves six separate opinions and leaves many questions 
regarding the legality of racial classifications unresolved. Five of 
the nine justices reversed that part of the California Supreme Court's 
decision which forbade Davis Medical School to consider race in future 
admissions decisions. Justice William Powell, who is regarded as a 
potential "swing man" in future cases similar to Bakke declared in his 
opinion that admissions committees which are attempting to achieve a 
diverse student body may constitutionally consider an applicant's race 
or ethnic background as one among several "plus" factors in the appli­
cant's file. It is evident that more litigation will be required in order 
to determine the exact weight which may be given to race in employment and 
academic admissions programs as well as other selection decisions. A num­
ber of suits which bear upon claims of reverse discrimination are currently 




"Notes and Notions," The Greensboro Record^ September 28, 1978, 
p. A-6. 
107 
The Weber Case: 
Yet unanswered is the question o1: how far private <->nv>loyors *nay go 
in ^ivinij special preference to members of minority groups. This 
question may wall have more far-ruachiu^ legal consequences and more 
important social significance than the issues raised in the Uakke 
ease. The Supreme Court has now bueu askeu to resolve an issue of 
so-called reverse discrimination in employment. The Associated 
10 
l'ress announced, on January 30, 197y, that the Court had agreed to 
hear an appeal in the case of Weber v_. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical 
11 
Corporation. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
12 
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. 
The Weber case is important to educators because it bears 
heavily on hiring and promoting practices and because it also relates 
to another live issue, that of collective bargaining. The importance 
of the Weber case justified a review of the facts surrounding the case. 
See William Raspberry, "From Baklce to Weber,1' The Creensboro 
Record, 30 January 1979, p. A-4, Cols. 3-6. 
11 
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 563 F. 2d 
216 (5th Cir. 1977). 
12 
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 415 F. Supp. 
761 (E.D. La. 1976). 
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The plaintiff, Brian F. Weber, is and was at the time iiuit was 
filed, an employee of Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation at 
its plant in Gramercy, Louisiana. Weber, a white man, was denied 
admission to an on-the-job training program under a racial quota 
system. Under the system, majority and minority workers vere admitted 
to the training program on a one-for-one basis. The quota system was 
part of a collective bargaining agreement between Kaiser, Weber's 
employer, and the United Steelworkers of America. Under the agreement, 
one minority worker for every white worker would be admitted to on-the-
job training for craft positions. It was understood that this plan 
would continue to operate until the percentage of minority craft workers 
approximated the percentage of the minority population in the area sur­
rounding each plant. 
In 1974, when the agreement between Kaiser and the union was drawn, 
the area around Gramercy, Louisiana, had a black population of around 
46%. Blacks represented only 15% of the work force at the Gramercy 
plant. There were 273 skilled craft workers at the plant, of which 
only five were black. There was little hope that the ratios among 
skilled craft workers would change, because blacks were drastically 
underrepresented in apprenticeship and other training programs at the 
plant. 
In theory, the program was democracy in action. In practice, the 
quota system operated in such a way that blacks were admitted to the 
program who had less saniority than their white competitors. On the 
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basis of this fact, Weber, who had applied to the training program 
several times, but was never accepted, claimed that he had become the 
victim of reverse discrimination. As previously stated, the district 
court agreed with Weber's position. The district court enjoined oper­
ation of the training program at Gramercy. The ruling was handed down 
on the ground that Kaiser had failed to establish a prima facie case 
of past hiring or promotion practices of discrimination against minor-
orities. In upholding the district court, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that absent a showing of prior employment dis­
crimination, racial quotas for admission.>to on-the-job training pro­
grams violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any Individual with respect to the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or to limit, segregate, 
or classify his employees so as to deprive any individual of employ­
ment opportunities because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. Union activities which cause or attempt to 
cause an employer to discriminate against an individual, apprentice­
ship, or other on-the-job training programs constrolled by either an 
employer or union which discriminate against a protected class are 
also forbidden. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws obvious, ongoing dis­
crimination. Additionally, the Act prohibits neutral practices which 
actually serve to perpetuate a status quo created by previous employment 
discrimination. Yet the Civil Rights Act does permit an employer to 
apply different terms, privileges, or conditions of employment to major­
ity and minority employees if such application is pursuant to a bona fide 
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seniority system. However, this application of different terms or con­
ditions to members of majority and minority groups may not result in 
intentionally discriminatory seniority systems. This point was clarified 
13 
in the Case of United States v. N.L. Industries. In United States v. 
N.L. Industries, the Eighth Circuit Court held that an employer violated 
Title VII by assigning blacks to one seniority group and whites to 
another group, even though both groups performed identical tasks. 
It is also true that the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not require an 
employer to grant preferential treatment to a member of a protected 
class merely because an individual's class is underrepresented in an 
employer's work force. Section 703 (j) of the Act contains language 
specifically directed at percentage relationships between majority and 
minority workers in an employer's work force: 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to 
require any employer to grant preferential treatment to 
any individual or to any group on account of an imbalance 
which may exist with respect to the total number or percen­
tage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . employed by any employer ... in comparison with 
the total percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. . . . 
It is therefore apparent that Title VII does not guarantee a job 
to every person regardless of qualification. Instead, Title VII forbids 
discriminatory preference for any group, either majority or minority. 
This point has been further clarified by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. 
14 
Duke Power Company. In Griggs, the Court asserted: 
United States v. N.L. Industries, 479 F. 2d 354 (1973). 
14 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). 
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Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, 
is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. 
Thus, it is clear that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not only 
directed at the protection of women and minority groups. The prohibition 
of discrimination on the basis of race and color also makes it illegal to 
discriminate against whites because of their color. It is noteworthy 
that when an individual can prove that he has been victimized by past 
discrimination, the remedial purposes of the Act make it mandatory that 
an employer "make the employee whole" by restoring him to his "rightful 
place" in the employment scheme. This requirement was originally stipu­
lated in a decision handed down by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
the Case of Local 189, United Papermakers & PaperworIters v. United 
15 
States. ' The Supreme Court of the United States later articulated the 
16 
same principle in the Case of Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company.' 
Franks involved a discriminatory seniority system as does Weber. 
In Franks, the Supreme Court sought to remedy past discrimination by 
authorizing fictional seniority which would place victims of discrimina­
tion in as good a position as they would have enjoyed had they never been 
victimized by discriminatory hiring practices. The Court made mention 
of the possibility that relief might be given to those victimized by 
false seniority creation. It was noted that such false seniority might 
diminish the expectations of other employees. The Court viewed this 
possibility as an unavoidable conflict of interest which might exist in 
Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 
F. 2d (5th Cir. 1969), Cert, denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). 
16 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
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any seniority system, but viewed the possibility as inconsequential in 
the implementation of Title VII 
Under this construction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, beneficiaries 
of prior discrimination are not displaced from their jobs as of the effec­
tive date of the Act. Displacement occurs when a Post-Act vacancy occurs 
in a job which is sought. Qualified victims of prior illegal acts are 
given preference unless there exists a compelling business reason for 
not giving them preference. This pattern of preference will continue 
until all vestiges of prior discrimination are x*emoved. A case which 
relates to this process of removing prior discrimination through prefer-
1 8 
ential placement in employment is that of Gamble v. Birmingham S.R.R: 
In this case, the railroad argued that a "vacancy" would occur only when 
it decided that it needed more conductors. For fifteen years, no such 
vacancy had occurred. The Fifth Circuit Court rejected the railroad's 
argument, asserting that "business necessity" is not synonymous with 
"management convenience." The Court ruled that the railroad would not 
suffer" by having a large pool of conductors for use when extra switchmen 
crews were necessary. The Court reasoned that it would cost the railroad 
nothing to qualify black switchmen who had previously been prevented by 
discrimination from becoming or even qualifying as conductors. In Gamble, 
the Circuit Court ruled that incumbent whites working regular assignments 
as conductors could not be "bumped" by black switchmen with longer rail­
road seniority. However, those white conductors who were working on 
l7Ibid at 774. 
18 
Gamble v. Birmingham S.R.R., 514 F. 2d 678 (1975). 
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"extra jobs" were not protected from "bumping." All extra conductor jobs 
in the future had to be open to all qualified conductors, black and white, 
on the usual bidding basis. 
Thus, although an employer cannot treat a class preferentially solely 
to correct imbalance in minority group employment, such devices as artifi­
cial or remedial seniority have been permitted by the federal judiciary 
where deemed necessary to correct the effects of discriminatory employment 
practices. Even racial quotas, as distinguished from absolute preferences, 
have been held to be permissible in cases where past employment discrimina-
u , T.' 19 tion has been shown. 
It is important to note that Title VII is complemented by Executive 
Order 11246. The order requires certain employers who do business with 
the government to adopt affirmative action plans which implement racially 
conscious hiring practices. In response to charges of reverse discrimi­
nation, courts have upheld temporary employment goals as a means of correct­
ing under-utilization of minority employees. In the Case of Contractors 
20 
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary o_f Labor> the Third 
Circuit Court upheld a plan known as the "Philadelphia Plan." The Phila­
delphia Plan imposed goals and timetables on employers who were moving 
slowly in implementing programs to utilize minority group members. The 
employers alleged reverse discrimination under Title VII and the Due Pro­
cess Clause because of the imposition of the goals and timetables. The 
19 
See (for example) Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union 
514 F. 2d 767, 773 (1975) ,* d~enied, 427 U.S. 911~"(1976) f and Carter v. ~ 
Gallager, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (1972). 
20 
^ A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  E a s t e r n  P e n n _ ^ ^ a n i a  v .  S e c r e t a r y  o f  
labor, 442 P. 2d 159~(1971). 
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Third Circuit Court ruled that the reverse discrimination proviso of the 
Act (Section 703 (j) ) does not restrict remedying racial imbalance by 
other means. The court concluded that under subsection 703 (j) of the 
Act and the Due Process Clause, class conscious goals are a permissible 
means of remedying past racial discrimination. 
Summary 
In summary, the Fifth Circuit Court considered, in Weber v. Kaiser 
Aluminum and Chemical Corp., whether voluntary implementation of an affir­
mative action plan by an employer, absent of any prior employment discrim­
ination, is violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 
court focused on the lack of any prior discriminatory practices by the 
defendant, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. The court considered 
the Act's objective to restore employees to their "rightful place" in the 
employment scheme, and ruled that prior discrimination is a prerequisite 
to preferential treatment of minority workers. The court reasoned that, 
absent a finding of prior discrimination, racial quotas cannot be termed 
remedies which are permissible as favoring victims of discrimination. 
Absent a finding of prior discrimination, the court ruled, racial quotas 
become unlawful preference based on race. Such preferences are prohibited 
by sucsections 703 (a) and 703 (d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 
court rejected Kaiser's attempt to justify a quota system as a remedial 
measure designed to compensate for the lack of job training caused by 
past societal discrimination. The court also ruled that, to the extent 
that Executive Order 11246 mandates the discrimination practiced by Kai­
ser, the Executive Order must yield to contradictory congressional 
115 
expre ssions. 
The majority in Weber arrived at an incisive solution to a substantive 
legal enigma. Logically and simply, the court concluded that the value 
of restorative justice depends on the presence of prior injustice. How­
ever, it must be noted that the court did not express an aversion to 
preferences for those victimized by societal discrimination. The language 
of the court clearly indicates that the court felt sympathetic to the 
idea of preferential treatment for those who have been victims of dis­
crimination. The Supreme Court will ultimately resolve the issue of 
whether prior employment discrimination must exist if preferential hiring 
practices ai*e to be permissible. Based on that decision by the Supreme 
Court, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical will play a greater or 
lesser role in affirmative action decisions in the future. 
Sears^ v. EEOC Suit 
Sears, Roebuck & Company has been on the receiving end of several 
edicts issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. These edicts 
have charged Sears with discrimination on the basis of race or sex. On 
January 24, 1979, Sears upset the pattern by filing a massive class action 
lawsuit against EEOC and nine other federal agencies. Sears charges that 
the plethora of conflicting govf?rnment regulations actually restricts 
rather than promotes equal opportunity practices. The suit, which runs to 
34 pages of documentation, asserts that federal agencies have violated the 
public trust by: 
(1) failure to enforce civil rights laws, including education 
and housing provisions; 
116 
(2) violation of anti-discriminatory provisions within their 
own departments; 
(3) placing the blame for government's failures on the 
undeserving shoulders of private employees; and 
(4) initiation of Social Security and Internal Revenue 
Service policies which discourage women from working. 
The Sears suit has potential for growing into a highly significant 
case because of Sears' size and sphere of influence. Time Magazine 
reports that Sears is the largest retailer in the world, tallying annual 
21 
sales in excess of $17 billion. Sears is the acknowledged leader in 
retailing, an industry which employes more than 15% of the total labor 
22 
force. Time reports that Sears has about 417,000 people on its pay-
23 
roll. This means that one out of every 200 workers in the nation is 
employed by Sears. The Washington Post states that Sears is the country's 
second largest employer of women. Only American Telephone and Telegraph 
employes more women than Sears. Sears spokesmen estimate one out of every 
30 Americans will work for Sears at some time .24 
Sears' suit thus offers a potentially far-reaching challenge to 
government-enforced affirmative action programs. The Sears case, docketed 
as Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Attorney General of the United States was 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on January 
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Washington Post, 25 January 1979, p. A-l, crol. 5; p. A-10, cols. 1-3. 
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24, 1979 as previously stated. The major legal remedy Sears asks for is 
an injunction preventing the EEOC or other government agencies from taking 
25 
action against Sears for job bias. 
Sears' troubles with EEOC date back for many years, but began to press 
hard in 1973. In that year, EEOC charged that Sears had followed discrim­
inatory hiring and promoting practices. Sears then added a new dimension 
to its existing affirmative action program. Under the new program, Sears 
outlets were to hire one minority group member for every white person 
hired until the payroll reflected the composition of the local area. It 
was also agreed that women would be hired for jobs which were traditionally 
men's jobs, and vice versa. 
Despite Sears' 1973 program, the EEOC was not satisfied. After an 
investigation in 1977, EEOC concluded that there was still, "reasonable 
cause" to believe that Sears was still discriminating. Since that time, 
Sears and EEOC have been at odds, with neither camp willing to concede 
even minor points. Sears, according to Newsweek, has spent $100 million 
26 
since 1965 in trying to comply with Federal antidiscr iminatory rules.' 
Ray Graham, Sears' director of equal opportunity, indicates that Sears 
has made remarkable progress since 1966. Graham notes that since 1966 the 
company's proportion of women managers has risen from 20% to 30%; of women 
craftworkers from 3.8% to 8.1%; of black managers from 4% to 7.2%; and of 
27 
black craftworkers from 2.8% to 8.9%. 
Jerry Knight, "Sears Facing Major Bias Complaint," The Washington 
Post, 26 January 1979, p. D-l, Cols. 1-3; p. D-3, Cols. 5-6. 
26 
^'Sears Turns the Tables," Newsweek, February 5, 1979, pp. 86-87. 
27 
"A Sears Suit," Time, February 5, 1979, p. 128. 
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The EEOC now demands that 50% of the new management positions and 
33% of the new craft positions be given to women. Sear;; officials pro­
test these goals as unfair and arbitrary. 
Sears has filed its suit in Federal District Court in Washington, DC. 
The suit is filed as a class action on behalf of all retailers who 
employ more than fifteen persons. In the suit, Sears charges that govern­
ment activity, not private industry, is responsible for creating "an un­
balanced civilian work force" which is dominated by white males. William 
D. Snider, editor of the Greensboro Daily News, chronicles the rationale 
28 
of Sears in shifting the blame to the government. Sears indicates that 
it sometimes faces insurmountable obstacles as it attempts to comply with 
regulations which often contradict each other. The government, says Sears, 
is trying to "hold private employers liable for the work force the govern­
ment itself created." White males dominate the work force in America. 
This situation, Sears claims, was created by the "G.I. Bill of Rights, 
Veterans' preference laws, the selective service system, restrictions on 
the number of women and blacks in the armed forces and the types of mili­
tary assignments available to them." Sears also asserts that ••he 1978 
amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act "further restricts 
job opportunities for women and minorities." 
Sears offers up its own retirement system in support of Sears' logic. 
Since the passage of the 1978 amendment, Sears has suspended its mandatory 
retirement policy. Sears had anticipated that only about one third of 
workers reaching retirement age would choose to continue working. The 
2*w illiam D. Snider, "Sears Challenges Federal Confusion," The Greens­
boro Daily News, 4 February 1979, p. G-3, cols 1-4. 
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number actually electing to stay on has far exceeded the 1977 estimates. 
76.7% of the salaried employees and 60.6% of the hourly employees have 
continued to work beyond normal retirement age. Sears originally antici­
pated that about 5,000 fewer openings would be created by retirement in 
the five-year period following passage of the 197 8 amendment. It now 
appears that at least double the number of job openings will be eliminated 
over the next five-year period. 
The personalities involved in the Sears suit are as lively as the 
issues. Sears is represented by Charles P. Morgan, Jr., a well-known 
civil liberties attorney. Morgan has served as director of the American 
Civil Liberties Union Southern Region. In the past, he has represented 
clients in suits for integrated prisoins. integrated juries, legislative 
reapportionment, and voting rights, lie has defended clients such as 
Muhammad Ali, Julian Bond, and Aaron Henry, the Mississippi N.A.A.C.P. 
leader. Morgan sees no conflict in his representation of Sears. "There's 
nothing in the Constitution that says anybody isn't entitled to a defense 
against discrimination," says Morgan, "and in that sense there's no dif­
ference between cases involving Bull Connor and the blacks and the EEOC 
2.'9 
and Sears." Interest in the case may also be heightened by the fact 
that the Sears suit has been assigned, by random draw, to Judge June Green. 
She is the only woman on the district court bench in Washington. 
There has been speculation that the Sears suit is largely a 
pre-emptive public relations and legal manuever. Some have charged that 
2-9 
"Corporations Have Civil Rights, Too," Time, February 5, 1979, 
p. 128. 
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the suit is designed to blunt charges by EEOC that Sears remains guilty of 
discriminatory practices in employment. Sears, however, is evidently 
intent on its purpose of proving its legal point. At a. Washington press 
conference, Sears President A. Dean Swift stated that the firm filed the 
suit not only because of its own problems with Federal government regula­
tions, "but for all corporations and for the Country as a whole. . . . 
This is not a smoke screen. It is not cutesy. It was not done capri-
30 
ciously or without a log of thought." Sears Chairman Edward Telling 
describes the suit as a needed effort "to cut through conflicting regula-
31 
tion and to force a clarification of irreconeilables." 
The Sears suit has drawn a mixed reaction from constitutional 
experts. Some regard the case as highly significant; others are unim­
pressed. Philip B. Kurland of the University of Chicago commented: "I 
don't think it's going very far, if the case rests on the premise that 
the Federal government is responsible for Sears' problems. But I don't 
think that premise is necessary. The argument about multiplicity and 
.32 
duplication of obligations has some merit." 
Charles Morgan, Sears' counselor, ruined what was developing into a 
thriving practice in Birmingham, Alabama, when he defended civil rights 
demonstrators. He is now being accused by liberals of selling out to the 
establishment because of his role in the Sears suit. When asked about 
this accusation, Morgan alluded to his stands on civil rights, his 
30 
'Sears Turns the Tables," Newsweek, February 5, 1979, p. 86. 
31 
"A Sears Suit," Time, February 5, 1979, p. 128. 
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opposition to the war in Vietnam, and to his early push for the impeach­
ment of Richard Nixon. "I just get there five years ahead of them every 
time," says Morgan. 
Only time will tell just how prophetic Morgan's involvement in this 
case will be. When Sears, Roebuck & Company v_. Attorney General of the 
United States was filed, EEOC director of public affairs, Daisy Voight, 
issued a statement which read: "This latest litigation is part of a series 
of court cases initiated by Sears in an effort to defend its current 
practices for hiring and promoting minorities and women." 
"The reason for the government's concern about Sears will become 
clear in the appropriate papers," declared Ms. Voight's prepared state­
ment. When asked if the Sears case might turn into another Bakke case, 
.33 
Ms. Voight replied: "It looks like its going to turn into a joke."' 
The combatants in Se ar s, Roebuck & Company v. Attor ney General 
obviously have divergent views of the potential significance of the case 
as well as the issues themselves. As if to accentuate the divisive nature 
of affirmative action programs, the nation's press has been quick to 
present its own disparate views of the Sears case. The research under­
taken by this dissertation reveals a divergence of opinion rivaled only 
by that of the litigants and the federal bureaucracy. Two of the nation's 
most pretigious and powerful newspapers, The New York Times and The 
Washington Post, find few points in the Sears brief upon which their 
philosophies agree. The New York Times dispatched Sears v. Attorney 
General in an incisive and cursory editorial, which is reproduced in its 
33 
Jerry Knight, "Sears Sues U.S. In Challenge to Job-Bias Policy," 
The Washington Post, 25 January 1979, p. A-l, col. 5; p. A-10, col. 1. 
entirety below: 
For all its deficiencies as a lawsuit, the case of 
Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Attorney General of the United 
States, et al., has struck some responsive chords. Sears, 
the target of job discrimination charges by Federal agencies, 
has turned on its accusers and blamed them for race and sex 
bias in employment. Sears says that their confusion, oppres­
sive tactics, incompetence and delay have denied Sears and 
other employers 'the right to comply1 with equal opportunity 
laws. It asks a Federal court to block a lawsuit by the 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and any Federal 
contract cutoffs until Washington provides a properly balanced 
national work force. 
Much of the evidence is buried in the confidential 
conciliation processes of the employment commission and the 
Government contracts machinery; it is premature to judge 
whether the offender is the Government, Sears, or both. But 
some citizens are ready nonetheless to cheer Sears on. Even 
a giant retailer may evoke sympathy when the adversary is 
Big Government. Moreover, the notorius inefficiency of the 
commission has caused distress for employees and employers 
alike; it prompted a Presidential reorganization plan last 
year which has already resulted in improved performance. 
But Sears would close down the Federal civil rights 
effort until a court finds it to be efficient. Much as one 
may dream of the days of simpler government, it is plainly 
impossible to suspend present operations pending wholesale 
reform. We must all live with complexity and contradiction— 
arguing with the tax collector one day, profiting from a tax 
break the next. Government programs continue to coexist, 
clash and accomodate. 
The Sears lament harmonizes, regrettably, with yet 
another current theme that blames Government for every ill. 
But did the founders of Sears play no part in past inequities? 
Did they shut down their premises 'until such time as the 
Federal Government's policies have created a national work 
force' to their liking? 
The suit plays on collective guilt for past mistreat­
ment of women and minorities, but in this it proves too much. 
A nation that fostered slavery and held back women may never 
completely cleanse itself of guilt. It would be guiltier 
still if it stopped trying. 
Editorial, "The Sears Refrain," The New York Times, 1 February 
1979, p. A-22, cols. 1-2. 
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In the editorial eye of Hie New York Times, Sears' management is 
little more than a self-seeking group of latter-day robber barons. The 
Washington Post, on the other hand, sees altruism and public spiritedness 
behind every Sears executive's desk. The Post's editorial commentary is 
35 
reproduced, in part, below: 
Sears has assembled an impressive bill of particulars to 
to support its claims. Government policies in the past, partic­
ularly those involving military training and veterans benefits, 
have worked to give white males preference over black males and 
women both in learning skills and in getting jobs. Present gov­
ernment policies, which bar employers from discriminating against 
almost everyone, do not take into account the impact these ear­
lier policies have had on the qualifications of minority and 
female workers now in the job market. Similarly, the racial mix­
ture of the pool of workers from which a particular company hires 
is influenced by the housing patterns in areas near its location. 
Those patterns were created, at least in part, by government prac­
tices. Yet by relying on statistical data that ignores both hous­
ing and individual qualifications, agencies like the EEOC assume 
certain employers must be discriminating against female and black 
applicants solely because of the low percentage of such employees 
on their payrolls. 
Sears, and many other employers, have been trying for years 
to impress the government with the significance of factors other 
than just numbers. Their inability to do so by conventional 
means will lead most private employers to applaud the unconven­
tional methods Sears has chosen. That should not be interpreted 
as a rejection by private industry of non-discriminatory hiring 
or affirmative action. Instead, it is a plea that the govern­
ment be realistic and get its own house in order. 
A government that gives priority to veterans for its own 
jobs, even though that priority discriminates against most 
blacks and women, ought to understand some of the problems of 
private industry — problems that bureaucracies around this 
town don't understand and, so far as we can tell, don't even 
try to understand. At the very least, this lawsuit brings these 
problems into sharp focus. It may well trigger a complete over­
haul of all the government's anti-job discrimination programs 
before they collapse of their own weight or are killed off by 
the courts because of their internal inconsistencies. 
35 
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It is impossible to judge whether Sears v. Attorney General will have 
great impact on affirmative action programs at this juncture. Hie suit 
seeks court orders which would "require the defendants (the government) to 
issue uniform guidelines to instruct employers how to resolve existing 
conflicts between affirmative action requirements based on race and sex and 
those based on veteran status, age, and physical or mental handicaps." 
Whether this case will become a landmark case remains to be seen. But 
in seeking to reconcile and coordinate the mountains of directives which 
industry must scale today, Sears has certainly exerted a landmark effort. 
Other Cases Related to Employment 
Another case which could develop into a fight such as the Bakke Case 
is the Case of Communications Workers of America v. Equal Employment 
36 
Opportunity Commission. The final outcome in the case will affect many 
of the 730,000 workers employed by the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company. The case developed in 1973 when AT&T agreed to a consent order 
designed to balance the racial, sexual, and ethnic mix of all AT&T opera­
tions. AT&T's acceptance of the consent decree came only after consider­
able pressure was exerted by EEOC, the Justice Department, and the Labor 
Department. Under the plan which AT&T accepted, it was agreed that the 
company would follow specific timetables and goals for preferential hiring 
and promotions of minority workers. 
The union now challenges the plan as a form of "reverse discrimination." 
Union counsel holds that the plan violates the Equal Protection Clause and 
36 
Communications Workers of America v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 556 F. 2d 167 (1973). 
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it undercuts 
seniority rights won in collective bargaining. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that "the use of employment 
goals and quotas admittedly involves tensions" with the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. However, the Court of Appeals did uphold the plan "because it seems 
reasonably calculated to counteract the detrimental effects of a particu­
lar, identifiable pattern of discrimination. In October of 1977, the 
union filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to review the case. The 
association of the case with AT&T, one of the largest employers in the 
world, enhances the significance of the case's final outcome. 
Another case involving an educational institution directly alleges 
reverse discrimination on the basis of sex. In Cramer v. Virginia Common-
37 
wealth University, James Cramer, a sociologist lost his bid for tenure 
to a woman. The woman had been hired for one year as Cramer had. 
Cramer's suit claims that the preferential program violates Title VII's 
ban on employment discrimination by sex and is also violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Cramer case is now 
pending in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Yet another case which will be influenced by the Bakke decision is 
Associated General Contractors of California v. Secretary of Commerce of 
38 
the United States. This case grew out of a challenge to the Public Works 
Employment Act of 1977. This act stipulates that ten percent of Federal 
grants disbursed under the act must be allocated to businesses which are 
—-
Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth University, 415 F. Supp 673 (1973). 
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associated General Contractors of California v. Secretary of Commerce 
of IKS., 441 F. Supp. 995 (1977). 
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controlled by minorities. Hie Association of Contractors in California 
filed suit against the Department of Commerce of the United States, charg­
ing that the minority-grant rule was unconstitutional. Judge Andrew Hauk 
of the Federal District Court agreed with the contractors. Hauk ruled 
that the minority-grant rule amounted to a quota which violated the due 
process provisions of the Fifth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Title VI bars discrimination in programs funded by the Fed­
eral government. "Affirmative action programs are permissible; race 
quotas are not — it's as simple as that," ruled Judge Hauk. The Justice 
Department has appealed Judge Hauk's ruling directly to the Supreme Court, 
which must now decide whether to hear the case. 
Uzzell v. Friday 
On February 5, 1979, the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
reviewed a significant North Carolina case in the light of the Bakke dec i-
sion. This case, Uzzell v. Friday, relates to regulations which were de­
signed to get more minority participation in student government activity 
on the campus of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Two 
regulations are involved. The first requires that the Campus Governing 
Council must have at least two blacks sitting on the board. The second 
provides that if a student who is brought before a student disciplinary 
panel so requests, then four of the seven judges must be of the same race 
or sex as the defendant. The Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit ruled 
39 
in 1977 that these regulations were discriminatory. The review of 
39 
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40 
case also resulted in the same decision. A deputy attorney general for 
the State of North Carolina announced upon hearing the decision that there 
was a great likelihood that the State would probably appeal to the Supreme 
41 . . 
Court. Hugh Beard, attorney for the plaintiffs, Uzzel and Arrington, 
indicated that this decision is the first lower-court decision to come 
42 
down as a direct result of the Baklce decision. Uzzell v. Fr id ay can 
thus become a highly memorable, or even a landmark, Supreme Court case. 
The Warren and Burger Courts: A Comparison 
Since the Bakke decision, speculation has run rife with regard to 
future decisions relating to affirmative action. A word of caution is in 
order for those who have a penchant for indulging in speculative activity 
on the subject of the Supreme Court. First, as was stated in the introduc­
tion to this thesis, the Court has confounded experts and computer tech­
nology with its decision-making process. Secondly, the Federal courts, 
as important as they are, do not establish all policy. The Executive 
branch of government plays a substantial role in affirmative action pro­
grams, particularly in the area of employment. Congress has the ability 
to vote additional powers to agencies such as EEOC. Congress did increase 
the power of EEOC in 197 2, a time when there was already heavy opposition 
on the part of business, labor, and the academic community to the emerging 
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pattern of hard affirmative action. Finally, the speculator who deals in 
Supreme Court futures places great stock in the knowledge that the Justices 
are bound to follow the weight of judicial opinion. However, the entire 
process' is guided by the weight of opinion, albeit an educated opinion, 
which is convinced that morality and the hope for progress lie on a par­
ticular side of an issue. 
Nonwithstanding these caveats, a cursory analysis of current Supreme 
Court philosophy may be useful in anticipating future court decisions. Of 
the associate justices on the Court when Chief Justice Earl Warren retired, 
four remain. These are William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, 
and Thurgood Marshall. In terms of judicial philosophy, Brennan and 
Marshall have most often aligned with the activist element. White and 
Stewart have been known as conservatives. It is more difficult to cate­
gorize the four newer members of the Burger Court, Harry A. Blackmun, 
Lewis F. Powell, William II. Relinquist, and John Paul Stevens. As a group, 
however, these four have not subscribed to the activism that characterized 
the Warren Court during the sixties. The great majority of school deseg­
regation cases decided by the Warren Court were unanimous decisions; in 
fact, all but one major decision was unanimous. A review of eleven deseg­
regation opinions handed down by the Burger Court from 1971 through 1978 
reveals that only six were unanimous decisions. In the last four terms, 
the justices of the Burger Court have handed down only one unanimous sub­
stantive desegregation opinion. 
It is interesting to note that since 1972 Justices Marshall, Brennan, 
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Douglas, and White have all dissented 
in school desegregation cases. Like other recent decisions, the Bakke 
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case makes it obvious that the Court has no leader who can marshal the 
support for the Court to speak with unanimity. The justices evidently 
are unwilling to put the force of their opinions behind an all-out deseg­
regation effort. In ruling on desegregation cases, the Court has displayed 
a penchant for narrowly drawn and often ambiguous decisions. 
Two major considerations therefore affect the future of affirmative 
action programs: (1) the absence of a philosophical unity on the Supreme 
Court bench, and (2) the recognition that the judiciary alone cannot steer 
the course of future policy in affirmative action. The case review con­
ducted by the researcher evidences a likelihood that the Burger Court will 
continue to rule on a one-dec ision-at-a-time basis, offering little pre­
dictability. In this respect, the Burger Court will manifest a grant 
departure from the philosophy of the Warren Court. 
The Impact of Bakke on Affirmative Action Programs 
The New York Times News Service reported on the effect on Bakke 
insofar as admissions policy among professional schools is concerned^3 
The results of a nationwide survey among administrators led the Times to 
conclude that "many administrators are finding last year's Supreme Court 
decision in the Bakke case sent out decidedly mixed signals." The Times 
saw the educational administrator's current position as "a little like 
that of a baseball hitter getting the bunt sign from the first-base coach 
and a swing-away message from third." 
"Bakke, UNC Decisions Confuse College Policies," The Greensboro 
Daily News, 13 February 1979, p. E-8, cols. 1-3. 
130 
The Times reports widely disparate views among administrators as to 
what the Supreme Court expects of them with regard to the programs of pre­
ferential admissions. For example, the New York University School of Law 
concluded after careful study that the Bakke decision placed its affirma­
tive action program "outside the law." The NYU faculty voted, in January 
of 1979, to abolish a special committee that judged minority-group-appli­
cants separately and instead established a single panel to evaluate all 
prospective students. At the other extreme, the Johns Hopkins Medical 
School has expanded its minority recruitment program since the Bakke 
decision came down in June of 1978. "I viewed the Bakke decision as an 
affirmation of what we have been doing," declared Dr. John Yardley, asso­
ciate dean for academic affairs. 
The University of North Carolina Law School has put forth the most 
commendable effort which the researcher found in an intensive analysis 
of many responses to the Bakke decision. The UNC Law School revised its 
admissions policies to conform to the mandates of the Bakke decision in 
November of 1978. Dean Robert Byrd of the Law School at UNC declared 
that the school's new policy is in accord with the Bakke decision's 
directive that an applicant's race cannot be a decisive factor in any 
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admissions process. 
The school's admissions policy now establishes a two-part process 
which avoids an identifiable racial quota system, according to Byrd. 
About 25 percent of the slots in each entering class are reserved for 
"Bakke Alters UNC Admission," The Greensboro Daily News, 7 
December, 1978, p. D-3, col. 1. 
applicants who do not meet a minimum qualifying score baaed on grade point 
averages and law school admissions tests. Byrd indicates that race and 
ethnic origin will be considered, but adds that seven other criteria will 
also be considered. Among these seven criteria will be "unique work or 
service experience," and "demonstrated compassion." The inclusion of 
such subjective criteria makes race only one factor in the admission 
decision, Byrd said. Byrd emphasized that the new policy was adopted "in 
the light of the Baklce decision" and "not because we were doing anything 
unconstitutional under the old policy." Dean Byrd singled out the opinion 
of Justice Lewis Powell which, he indicated, provided guidelines for the 
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school to follow in setting admissions policy. 
It is predictable, however, that even the most conscientious efforts 
of administrators will be insufficient to penetrate the cloud of ambiva­
lence which hangs over the Bakke decision. "The Bakke decision resolves 
nothing, absolutely nothing," says Harry Wellington, dean of the Yale Law 
School. "I don't even know what the decision is. I think there will be 
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further litigation," Dean Wellington said recently. Perhaps Fred Graham 
of CBS-TV will emerge as the most prophetic of all those who speculated 
about the consequences of the Bakke decision. On the evening of June 28, 
1978, the day the Court ruled in Bakke, CBS-TV ran an hour-long documentary 
on the decision. CBS law correspondent Fred Graham, himself a licensed 
attorney who has practiced law, declared that Bakke will become a "highly 
_ _ 
"Ttor the opinions of Justice Powell and his colleagues as well as an 
incisive analysis of the Court's rationale, see The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, July 3, 1978, pp. 3-10. 
'Bakke, UNC Decisions Confuse College Policies," The Greensboro 
Daily News, 13 February 1979, p. E-8, Cols. 1-3. 
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memorable if not a landmark case." Graham sees the Bakke decision as a 
case which "lays the groundwork for a new body of law," and envisions the 
Supreme Court as adopting, in Bakke, a "middle-ground position, leaving 
itself leeway to expand in several directions." Graham compares the posi­
tion of the Court at the juncture of Bakke to a great ocean liner whose 
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change of course is at first imperceptible, but then becomes inexorable. 
That metaphorical ocean liner which is the Supreme Court has not 
merely one captain, but nine. The researcher concludes that insofar as 
affirmative action is concerned, the Court's course remains largely 
uncharted, and the speed with which it will proceed is still the subject 
of debate among the nine justices. 
47 
Fred Graham, The Bakke Decision, CBS-TV, June 28, 1978. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to investigate and analyze the issues 
which confront educational administrators in the administration of affirm­
ative action admissions programs. The research yielded data which will 
assist educators in dealing with educational, legal, and moral issues 
related to affirmative action programs. 
To achieve this purpose, the study achieved two basic objectives. 
The first objective was to examine the legal aspects of affirmative action 
programs. This objective was attained by tracing the evolution of the 
Federal judiciary's thought processes in deciding cases related to affirm­
ative action programs. The second objective was to alert administrators 
to the pitfalls which await those who attempt to anticipate the future pol­
icies of the Federal government. To achieve this goal, the study high­
lighted the dynamic nature of legal philosophy in the United States insofar 
as racial discrimination and affirmative action programs are concerned. 
Summary 
In outlining the history of the Federal courts' activity, the 
researcher sought out, summarized, and analyzed those court cases which 
bear most directly on the educational administrator's decision-making 
responsibilities. To provide the administrator with a broad background 
of information, the study presented an overview of the policies of the 
Federal government as they relate to preferential admissions programs. 
Policy related to preferential employment policies was also discussed. 
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In the interest of aiding the educator in his quest to envision the 
large aspects of governmental policy, the study also addressed the sub­
ject of the administrative branch of government and its sphere of 
influence. The importance of Executive orders was stressed, and the 
educator was admonished that the a.dministrative branch still wields 
great power, particularly in the area of employment practices. 
To enlighten the administrator about the reasoning process of 
the courts, with respect to racial discrimination, the study presented 
an historical treatment of the Supreme Court's activity in cases 
involving race. While most cases reviewed were directly related to 
education, some cases were covered because of their bearing on edu­
cational circumstances. The historical presentation reflected a 
judicial role after the Civil War (and for half a century following 
the war) which was counterproductive in promoting racial justice. 
The net effect of Supreme Court decisions following the Civil War 
was to put the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments into 
mothballs. The Court lent impetus to segregation practices in 
Plessy v. Ferguson when it upheld a Louisiana statute which required 
racial segregation of passengers on trains. Three years later, in 
1899, in the Case of Cummiig v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
sustained the action of a Georgia school board in closing down a 
black high school although the board continued to find funds to 
operate the county's white high school. In 1908, in Berea College v. 
Kentucky, the Court upheld as a valid regulation of corporate char­
ters a Kentucky law requiring both white and black schools to keep 
the races separate in their operations. 
In Sweatt v. Painter, a 1950 case, the Court moved into the 
modern era. In Sweatt, the Court moved in the direction of overturn­
ing the "separate but equal" doctrine established in Plessy v. 
Ferguson. Chief Justice Fred Vinson's opinion forecasted the demise 
of "separate but equal." Justice Vinson noted that there were 
"qualities which are incapable of objective measurement," and that 
the law school of the University of Texas "cannot be effective in 
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law 
interacts." 
In 1954, the landmark decision striking down the "separate 
but equal" doctrine wau handed down in Brown v. Board of Education 
of Topeka. This case was decided under the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. Chief Justice Earl Warren also found that 
segregation of the races with the sanction of the law denies black 
children the equal protection of the laws. On May 31, 1955, in 
Brown v. Board of Education, the Court leaned more toward a "gradual­
ism" approach to desegregation, remanding certain cases to Federal 
district courts with instructions to order local school districts to 
proceed with desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate 
speed." 
In Aaron v. Cooper, a 1958 case, the Court made it clear that 
it would not tolerate postponement of court orders, even in the face 
of threatened violence. 
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There followed a series of cases which came to the Supreme 
Court as the result of resistance to the Court's orders to desegre­
gate the public schools. This pattern was broken by the Court in 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, a 1969 case in which 
the Court dashed any hope that "freedom of choice" or any other plan 
could be used constitutionally to delay further the implementation 
of Brown. 
Despite the fact that President Richard M. Nixon used busing 
as an emotionally charged campaign issue in the presidential election 
of 1968, the Burger Court approved busing as an acceptable vehicle 
which could be utilized in effecting constitutionally acceptable 
desegregation plans. This approval of busing came in the 1971 case, 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. 
An issue which rivals busing for sheer controversial content 
is affirmative action admissions programs. This issue was side­
stepped by the Supreme Court in 1974. The case in point, De Funis v, 
Odegaard. Since De Funis (the plaintiff who alleged his rejection by 
the University of Washington Law School constituted reverse discrimi­
nation) was allowed to complete law school, the Court saw no need to 
decide the issue, and declared the case to be moot. The four appointees 
of President Richard Nixon and Justice Potter Stewart voted to moot the 
De Funis case. These four appointees of President Nixon are: Justices 
Blackmun, Burger, Rehnquist, and Powell. 
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Predictably, the issue of preferential admissions programs 
reappeared before the Supreme Court, this time in the case of Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke. On June 28, 1978, the 
Supreme Court by a 5-to-4 vote affirmed the constitutionality of 
college admissions programs which gave special advantage to blacks 
and other minorities in order to help remedy past discrimination 
against them. However, the Court also ruled, by a 5-to-4 vote, that 
the University of California Medical College at Davis was obligated 
to take Bakke into its program. The Court declared that Davis 
Medical School's affirmative action program was invalid because it 
was inflexible and unjustifiably biased against white applicants. 
The Court ruled that although race may be considered as one 
factor in university admissions procedures, the Davis Medical 
School must admit Allan Bakke because its special admissions had 
illegally excluded him from consideration for sixteen seats in two 
of its freshman classes. The denial of Mr. Bakke "of this right to 
individualized consideration without regard to race is the principal 
evil" of the Davis program, said Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell. 
Mr. Justice Powell thus joined four members of the Court in upholding 
an order by the California Supreme Court that Mr. Bakke, who is a 
white engineer, be admitted to the Davis Medical School. Justice 
Powell joined the other four members of the Court, however, in hold­
ing that the California courts had erred in ruling that the Davis 
Medical School could not take the race of the applicant into 
cons ideration. 
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Finally, this dissertation selected the situations which are most 
likely to shed some light on the probable future of affirmative action 
programs. The consensus among legal and educational scholars is that 
the Bakke decision of 1978 offered no definitive answers to those 
administrators who must set policy for admitting minority applicants 
to programs of study and for hiring, promoting, and transferring 
applicants and employees who are members of minority groups. 
Two cases which loom large in the future of affirmative action 
programs involve two of the nation's largest employers American Tele­
phone and Telegraph, and Sears, Roebuck and Company. In the case of 
Communications Workers of America v_. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, the union challenges EEOC's plan for preferential hiring 
and promoting of minority workers. Many of American Telephone and 
Telegraph's 730,000 workers will be affected by the outcome of this 
case, a case which the union has asked the Supreme Court to hear. 
In a suit entered on January 24, 1979, Sears filed a massive class 
action against EEOC. In the suit, Sears alleges that conflicting govern­
ment regulations concerning preferential employment practices operate as 
a deterrent to equal opportunity practices rather than as a catalyst for 
eliminating discrimination in employment. Whether this case, Sears v^. 
Attorney General of the United States, will become a landmark decision 
is impossible to say at this writing. It is easy enough to quote experts 
who believe the case will fade into obscurity as well as those who think 
the Sears case will arouse interest on a plane with that aroused by Bakke, 
and will ultimately produce a decision at least as meaningful as that 
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handed down in Bakke. 
A meaningful case which will be heard by the Supreme Court sometime 
in the future is Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation. In 
this case, which observers are billing as a "blue collar Bakke" and "son 
of Bakke," the plaintiff, Brian Weber, charges that Kaiser's promotion 
policies result in his being victimized by reverse discrimination. This 
case is doubly important to educators because it involves both hiring and 
promotion practices and the issue of collective bargaining. 
The Macro-View of the Problem 
This study does not attempt to cover a wide range of governmentally-
based forces which affect the administrator's realm of policy making. 
The central purpose of the study is to provide, in a concise and coherent 
fashion, a collation of leading Supreme Court cases which focus on affirm­
ative action. The decisions of the Court form one of the pillars upon 
which much of our civil rights and civil liberties policy is constructed. 
This study should enable the reader to see and interpret what the Court 
has decided on basic issues relating to affirmative action. The reader 
should also be able to acquire some insight into the reasons why the Court 
has ruled as it has. This insight should focus the attention of the astute 
administrator on the more basic question of the role and the limitation of 
courts and the law in facing problems within the context of a highly com­
plex political system. 
The "macro-view"of the system permits the administrator to observe 
the continuity and the changes in the posture of the Supreme Court. As an 
example of this change in posture, this study summarized the changes 
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which came about in the transition from the era of the Warren Court 
to the era of the Burger Court. The thrust of this study is aimed 
at highlighting the conceptual and philosophical changes which occur 
with the passage of time. 
In the beginning pages of the Review of the Literature section 
of the study, the black man in the United States was seen to be a 
being with no status as a citizen, a nonentity to whom it was unlaw­
ful to teach reading and writing. As the legal and educational his­
tory of the issues—discrimination, preferential admissions and hiring, 
reverse discrimination—unfolded, conflicts of a different nature 
emerged, but the basic question as to what constitutes true equality 
remains unsettled. 
A basic reason why the issue of what constitutes equality is 
an open question is that the Supreme Court must, as was stated in this 
dissertation, operate within the bounds of public opinion. As the 
cases cited in this study illustrate, the Constitution is written in 
broad and sometimes ambiguous language. As a result, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the meaning of the Constitution very differently at 
different times. When the Supreme Court hands down a landmark decision, 
as it did in Brown I, a period of social upheaval follows. The civil 
rights movement of the 1960's and the continuing controversy over busing 
in the 1970's followed in the wake of Supreme Court decisions. There 
will be another decision which will have an impact like Brown some 
time in the future, but this study can discern no pattern which will 
reveal the nature of the decision or the date it will be handed down. 
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Conclusions 
It is difficult, often foolhardy, to draw specific conclusions 
as to the future outcome of societal issues solely on the basis of 
legal research. However, the following general conclusions may be 
reached, on the basis of an analysis of this study, with regard to 
affirmative action admissions programs. 
1. The impact of the Bakke decision will not be fully decided 
for some time to come. Application of the principles laid down in 
Bakke will be a matter of prolonged legal interpretation and con­
ceptual analysis. 
2. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Allan Bakke in the 
Bakke decision, to the extent that Bakke was admitted to the Davis 
Medical School by Supreme Court decree. Quotas, that is, the require­
ment that a certain number or percent of applicants be selected from 
certain minority groups, were ruled to be unconstitutional by the Court 
in Bakke. However, race may be considered, among other factors, in 
establishing admissions policies and criteria. The Supreme Court did 
not state the extent to which the criterion of race could be employed. 
Admissions officials and other administrators thus bear a greater bur­
den than before Bakke. Their subjective judgment must be exercised 
in assigning weights to the factors which affect final selection policy. 
3. Universities and colleges which receive federal aid are under 
no obligation to initiate affirmative action programs unless their par­
ticular institutions are guilty of prior discrimination against some 
minority group. This point was made clear in the Bakke decision. 
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4. This study focused, logically enough, on Supreme Court 
decisions in analyzing the legalities of affirmative action admissions 
policies. However, the educational administrator, as well as the 
administrator in industry, should not minimize the broad range of acti­
vities which influence the formulation and exercise of civil rights 
and civil liberties policies. Other decisions which affect civil rights 
and liberties are those made by lower courts, special interest groups, 
the administrative arm of government, a variety of Federal and State 
agencies, legislators, both State, Local, and National, and educational 
administrators themselves. 
5. The legal view of what constitutes a social contract varies 
widely over time, and what is regarded as inhuman today was "the law 
of the land" as decreed by the Supreme Court only a short while ago. 
6. The administrator will operate in a fog of uncertainty inso­
far as affirmative action programs are concerned for the immediately 
forseeable future. Cases will subsequently be heard which will deter­
mine the final definition of "affirmative action." In the interim, 
the administrator will be required to develop an even greater tolerance 
for ambiguity. Clearly drawn guidelines will be lacking for years, 
perhaps decades. 
7. A higher level of dedication to the profession and a fuller 
measure of devotion to the welfare of humankind will be required of 
those who will withstand the pressure of the aforementioned ambiguity 
and uncertainty. 
8. The most commonly used device for selecting students for 
admission to college-level programs of study is the SCAT-II Test. 
The research conducted by this study suggests that a need exists to 
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re-examine the selective devices used to choose from among nontraditional 
and minority group applicants. 
9. An analysis of the personalities who are involved in affirmative 
action issues will preclude the supposition that there exists a good person/ 
bad person dichotomy. People of keen intellect, sound moral fiber, and 
impressive educational backgrounds may be found on both sides of any sub-
issue which relates to affirmative action. 
10. The Bakke case will serve as a legal springboard, propelling a 
series of affirmative action cases toward the doorstep of the Supreme Court. 
The next major issue which the Court will decide will be concerned with 
affirmative action programs which are related to hiring and employment 
practices. 
Recommendations 
This study provides up-to-date information about the legal aspects of 
affirmative action programs and reviews the conceptual and philosophical 
foundations upon which preferential admissions and hiring programs are 
based. As previously stated, it was not the intent of this study to pro­
vide definitive answers to questions concerning the constitutionality of 
specific affirmative action programs. Legal scholars are in disagreement 
as to the significance of the Bakke decision, the most important decision to 
date which relates to preferential admissions and hiring programs. Brown v. 
Board o_f Education o_£_ Topeka-was a landmark decision which changed the face 
of public education; yet the Courts are still interpreting the Brown case 
every day. Based on the results of this study, however, the following 
approaches to establishing and administering affirmative action programs 
are recommendable; 
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1. Because of the dynamic nature of the preferential treatment issue 
school officials must be wary of making decisions in this area without 
advice of legal counsel. To protect the constitutional rights of all, and 
to avoid adverse criticism and litigation, adriiinistrators and university 
and college boards should keep abreast of all developments which bear upon 
preferential admissions and hiring programs. It is advisable that school 
officials, and their legal counsel, seek out acceptable models, such as the 
Harvard Plan, to base their programs on. 
2. Another highly recommendable practice is that institutions which 
admit minority group members on a preferential basis should inform legisla­
tors, board members, and the general public exactly what their policy is. 
When a school admits minorities preferentially, this information will 
surely and quickly become common knowledge. It is far better that the 
public and all applicants be informed of preferential admissions policies 
than to learn of them because a complaint or a law suit is filed. This 
sort of publicity leads to the impression that some nefarious or underhanded 
practice is going on in the institution. 
3. The institution which has a preferential admissions policy must 
realize that the obligation to the minority student only begins when the 
admissions decision is made in his favor. The emotional and financial needs 
of minority students often far exceed those of traditional students. Every 
institution which accepts minority group members on a preferential basis 
incurs a responsibility to assist those students in progressing all the way 
through their programs. Providing continuous assistance to those who are 
preferentially admitted is obligatory because it is humane, decent and highly 
desirable; moreover, it minimizes the potential for criticism and possible 
litigation. 
145 
4. Educators should make their viewpoints known to the public and 
to elected officials. It should be remembered that the Supreme Court is 
and always has been a political institution. In considering any case, 
the Court must find a way to maximize public acceptance of its decision. 
To achieve that goal, the Warren Court, for example, put off a decision in 
the Brown I case until it could hand down a unanimous opinion. The politi­
cal ties of the courts contribute to the tendency of the law to move slowly. 
Progress toward a just society is tediously slow. In the history of the 
United States, progress has been measured by the passage of generations 
rather than by the passage of months and years. The educator who seems 
perfectly willing to wait for justice appears to be consenting by silence 
to injustice. 
5. The academic community should support and engage in research 
which aims to develop testing programs and procedures designed to bring 
the maximum number of nontraditional students into the mainstream of 
higher education. Also, the institution which adopts preferential admis­
sions policies should employ standardized test scores with great caution 
until new and more sophisticated techniques for developing performance 
predictors are found, and until these performance predictors are thoroughly 
tested. 
Concluding Statement 
As societies change, they tend to become increasingly complex. As 
the complexity of a social structure increases, solutions to societal prob­
lems are more difficult to derive and even more difficult to organize. The 
difficulty inherent in organizing complex social solutions results in more 
frequent incidences of social disruption. During extremely chaotic periods, 
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social values are put to the test. New values are chosen, values which 
are deemed to be more capable of directing behavior toward the fulfillment 
of a society's needs. 
The effort to compensate for past discrimination, which has taken 
the form of affirmative action programs, seeks to preserve the best of the 
old social order; that is, affirmative action seeks to provide a solution 
which permits much of the old structure to remain ongoing and viable. The 
objective of the faction which supports affirmative action programs is to 
permit the victims of discrimination to catch up with other Americans, and 
to catch up without the necessity of tearing down the underpinnings of 
American capitalism and move toward a total welfare state. Opponents of 
affirmative action call it reverse discrimination, and present the argument 
that any form of preference offered to groups rather than to individuals is 
unfair and unconstitutional. 
To attack reverse discrimination because it also exemplifies invidious 
racial discrimination now seems commendable. Such an attack is the act of 
one who is deeply concerned for the sufferings of others. The major objec­
tion to this position is that the existence of some reverse discrimination 
would serve as badly needed compensation for protracted oppression in the 
past. Some reverse discrimination would, according to proponents, also in­
sure a more equal, more diversified, more productive society. Such a society 
is an ideal which is logically associated with the commitment to democracy 
in education, to the belief that every pupil has the right to the kind and 
level of schooling which enables him or her to achieve the largest measure 
of growth. In the face of confusion and ambivalence, the dedicated profes­
sional continues to place the goal of helping students first on the list. 
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However, even the most dedicated educators have differing views as to the 
desirability of any program which affords preferential treatment to members 
of some minority group. The official positions of the American Foundation 
of Teachers and the National Education Association were on opposite sides 
of the courtroom in the Bakke^ case. 
The American system of jurisprudence supports the principle that 
access to any privilege is allocated to the individual. When access to 
privilege is based on membership in a group, the principle which declares 
that rights belong to individuals rather than groups is abrogated. This 
observation deserves as much respect as the declaration that all whites 
have an obligation to share in the collective guilt for the black condi­
tion in America. Both Statements are basically sound philosophically. 
Each concept, if adhered to and applied with good intent and common sense, 
could yield desirable results for all. There has emerged a tendency for 
the opposing factions in the affirmative action issue to shout past each 
other. The forces ultimately deploy themselves along racial lines. At this 
critical stage in the development of the American democracy, the simplistic 
treatment of discrimination as purely a function of racism serves no viable 
end. 
The final goal, if the issue of affirmative action is to be addressed 
constructively, must be the goal of redefining discrimination and reassess­
ing cultural disadvantages. When affirmative action is seen as a contest 
which sets black against white, the concept of affirmative action will not 
command the respect and support which is required within the white community. 
The Bakke decision has delineated a new and greater challenge; a challenge 
which is laid down to all racial groups. That challenge is to refrain from 
and present the argument that any form of preference offered to groups 
rather than to individuals is unfair and unconstitutional. 
To attack reverse discrimination because it also exemplifies 
invidious racial discrimination now seems commendable. Such an attack 
is the act of one who is deeply concerned for the sufferings of others* 
The major objection to this position is that the existence of some 
reverse discrimination would serve as badly needed compensation for 
protracted oppression in the past. Some reverse discrimination would, 
according to proponents, also insure a more equal, more diversified, 
more productive society. Such a society is an ideal which is logically 
associated with the commitment to democracy in education, to the belief 
that every pupil has the right to the kind and level of schooling which 
enables him or her to achieve the largest measure of growth. In the 
face of confusion and ambivalence, the dedicated professional continues 
to place the goal of helping students first on the list. However, even 
the most dedicated educators have differing views as to the desirability 
of any program which affords preferential treatment to members of some 
minority group. The official positions of the American Federation of 
Teachers and the National Education Association were on opposite sides 
of the courtroom in the Bakke case. 
The American system of jurisprudence supports the principle that 
access to any privilege is allocated to the individual. When access to 
privilege is based on membership in a group, the principle which declares 
that rights belong to individuals rather than groups is abrogated. This 
observation deserves as much respect as the declaration that all whites 
have an obligation to share in the collective guilt for the black 
condition in America. Both statements are basically sound philo­
sophically. Each concept, if adhered to and applied with good intent 
and common sense, could yield desirable results for all. 
There has emerged a tendency for the opposing factions in the 
affirmative action issue to shout past each other. The forces ulti­
mately deploy themselves along racial lines. At this critical stage in 
the development of the American democracy, the simplistic treatment of 
discrimination as purely a function of racism serves no viable end. 
The final goal, if the issue of affirmative action is to be 
addressed constructively, must be the goal of redefining discrimin­
ation and reassessing cultural disadvantage. When affirmative action 
is seen as a contest which sets black against white, the concept of 
affirmative action will not command the respect and support which is 
required within the white community. The Bakke decision has delin­
eated a new and greater challenge, a challenge which is laid down to 
all racial groups. That challenge is to refrain from considering 
opportunity as a unique black issue or a unique white issue and to 
begin thinking of opportunity as an economic issue. Educators now 
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APPENDIX A 
THE DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
IN THE CASE OF DE FUNIS V. ODEGAARD 
I agree with Mr. Justice Brennan that this case is 
not moot, and because of the significance of the issues 
raised I think it is important to reach the merits. 
I 
The University of Washington Law School received 1,601 
applications for admission to its first-year class beginning 
in September 1971. There were spaces available for only 
about 150 students, but in order to enroll this number the 
school eventually offered admission to 275 applicants. 
All applicants were put into two groups, one of which 
was considered under the minority admissions program. Thirty-
seven of those offered admission had indicated on an optional 
question on their application that their "dominant" ethnic 
origin was either Black, Chicano, American Indian, or Filipino, 
the four groups included in the minority admissions program. 
Answers to this optional question were apparently the sole 
basis upon which eligibility for the program was determined. 
Eighteen of these 37 actually enrolled in the Law School. 
In general, the admissions process proceeded as follows: 
An index called the Predicted First Year Average (Average) 
was calculated for each applicant on the basis of a formula 
combining the applicant's score on the Law School Admission 
Test (LSAT) and his grades in his last two years in college. 
On the basis of its experience with previous years' applica­
tions, the admissions committee, consisting of faculty, 
administration, and students, concluded that the most out­
standing applicants were those with averages above 77; the 
highest average of any applicant was 81. Applicants with 
averages above 77 were considered as their applications 
arrived by random distribution of their files to the members 
of the committee who would read them and report their 
recommendations back to the committee. As a result of 
the first three committee meetings in February, March, 
and April 1971, 78 applicants from this group were 
admitted, although virtually no other applicants were 
offered admission this early. By the final conclusion 
of the admissions process in August 1971, 147 applicants 
with averages above 77 had been admitted, including all 
applicants with averages above 78, and 93 of 105 appli­
cants with averages between 77 and 78. 
Also beginning early in the admissions process was 
the culling out of applicants with averages below 74.5. 
These were reviewed by the Chairman of the Admissions 
Committee, who had the authority to reject them summarily 
without further consideration by the rest of the Committee. 
A small number of these applications were saved by the 
Chairman for committee consideration on the basis of 
information in the file indicating greater promise than 
suggested by the Average. Finally during the early months 
the Committee accumulated the applications of those with 
averages between 74.5 and 77 to be considered at a later 
time when most of the applications had been received and 
thus could be compared with one another. Since De Funis' 
average was 76.23, he was in this middle group. 
Beginning in their May meeting the Committee con­
sidered this middle group of applicants, whose folders had 
been randomly distributed to Committee members for their 
recommendations to the Committee. Also considered at this 
time were remaining applicants with averages below 74.5 
who had not been summarily rejected, and some of those 
with averages above 77 who had not been summarily admitted, 
but instead held for further consideration. Each Committee 
member would consider the applications competitively, 
following rough guidelines as to the proportion who could be 
offered admission. After the Committee had extended offers 
of admission to somewhat over 200 applicants, a waiting list 
was constructed in the same fashion, and was divided into 
four groups ranked by the Committee's assessment of their 
applications. De Funis was on this waiting list, but was 
ranked in the lowest quarter. He was ultimately told in 
August 1971 that there would be no room for him. 
Applicants who had indicated on their application 
forms that they were either Black, Chicano, American Indian, 
or Filipino were treated differently in several respects. 
Whatever their averages, none were given to the Committee 
Chairman for consideration of summary rejection, nor were 
they distributed randomly anions committee members for con­
sideration along with the other applications. Instead, all 
applications of Black students were assigned separately to 
two particular Committee members; a first-year Black law 
student on the Committee, and a professor on the Committee 
who had worked the previous summer in a special program for 
disadvantaged college students considering application to 
Law School. Applications from among the other three 
minority groups were assigned to an assistant dean who was 
on the Committee. The minority applications, never directly 
compared to the remaining applications, either by the sub­
committee or by the full Committee. As in the admissions 
process generally, the Committee sought to find "within the 
minority category, those persons who we thought had the 
highest probability of succeeding in Law School." In 
reviewing the minority applications, the Committee attached 
less weight to the Average "in making a total judgmental 
evaluation as to the relative ability of the particular 
applicant to succeed in law school." 82 Wash. 2d 11, 21, 
507 P. 2d 1169, 1175. In its publicly distributed Guide 
to Applicants, the Committee explained that "(a)n applicant's 
racial or ethnic background was considered as one factor in 
our general attempt to convert formal credentials into 
realistic predictions." 
Thirty-seven minority applicants were admitted under 
this procedure. Of these, 36 had Averages below De Funis' 
76.23, and 30 had averages below 74.5, and thus would 
ordinarily have been summarily rejected by the Chairman. 
There were also 43 nonminority applicants admitted who had 
Averages below De Funis. Twenty-three of these were return­
ing veterans, se n.2, supra, and 25 others presumably 
admitted because of other factors in their applications 
making them attractive candidates despite their relatively 
low averages. 
It is reasonable to conclude from the above facts 
that while other factors were considered by the Committee, 
and were on occasion crucial, the Average was for the most 
applicants a heavily weighted factor, and was at the 
extremes virtually dispositive. A different balance was 
apparently struck, however, with regard to the minority 
applicants. Indeed, at oral argument, the Law School 
advised us that were the minority applicants considered 
under the same procedure as was generally used, none of 
those who eventually enrolled at the Lav/ School would 
have been admitted. 
The educational policy choices confronting a 
university admissions committee are not ordinarily a 
subject for judicial oversight; clearly it is not for 
us but for the law school to decide which tests to 
employ, how heavily to weigh recommendations from pro­
fessors or undergraduate grades, and what level of 
achievement on the chosen criteria are sufficient to 
demonstrate that the candidate is qualified for admission. 
What places this case in a special category is the fact 
that the school did not choose one set of criteria but 
two, and then determined which to apply to a given 
applicant on the basis of his race. The Committee 
adopted this policy in order to achieve "a reasonable 
representation" of minority groups in the Law School. 
22 Hash. 2d, at 20, 507 P. 2d, at 1175. Although it 
may be speculated that the Committee sought to rectify 
what it perceived to be cultural or racial biases in the 
LSAT or in the candidates' undergraduate records, the 
record in this case is devoid of any evidence of such 
bias, and the school lias not sought to justify its pro­
cedures on this basis. 
Although testifying t!iit"(w)e do not have a quota..." 
the Law School dean explained that "(w)e want a reasonable 
representation. Ue will go down to reach it if we can," 
without "taking people who are unqualified in an absolute 
sense...." (Statement of Facts 420,) By "unqualified in 
an absolute sense" the dean meant candidates who "have no 
reasonable probably likelihood of having a chance of suc­
ceeding in the study of law...." But the dean conceded 
that in "reaching," the school does take "some minority 
who at least, viewed as a group, have a less such likeli­
hood than the majority student group taken as a whole." 
"Q. Of those who have made application to go to 
the law school, I am saying you are not taking the 
best qualified? 
"A. In total? 
"Q. In total. 
"A. In using that definition, yes." 
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It thus appears that by the Committee's own assess­
ment, it admitted minority students who, by the tests 
given, seemed less qualified than some white students 
who were not accepted, in order to achieve a "reasonable 
representation." In this regard it may be pointed out 
that for the year 1969-1970—the year before the class 
to which De Tunis was seeking admission—the Law School 
reported an enrollment of eight Black students out of a 
total of 356. (Defendents1 Ex. 7.) That percentage, 
approximately 2.2Z, compares to a percentage of Blacks 
ia the population of Washington of approximately 2.1%. 
II 
There was a time when law schools could follow the 
advice of Wigmore, who believed that "the way to find 
out whether a boy has the makings of a competent lawyer 
is to see what he can do in a first year of law studies." 
Wigmore, Juristic Psychopoyemetrology—Or, How to Find 
Out Whether a Boy Has the 'takings of a Lawyer, 24 111. 
L. Rev. 454, 463-464 (1929). In those days there were 
enough spaces to admit every applicant who met minimal 
credentials, and they all could be given the opportunity 
to prove themselves at law school. But by the 1920's 
many law schools found that they could not admit all 
minimally qualified applicants, and some selection pro­
cess began. The pressure to use some kind of admissions 
test mounted, and a number of schools instituted them. 
One early precursor to the modern day LSAT was the Ferson-
Stoddard Law Aptitude examination. Wigmore conducted his 
own study of that test with 50 student volunteers, con­
cluded that it "had no substantial practical value." But 
his conclusions were not accepted, and the harried law 
schools still sought some kind of admissions test which 
would simplify the process of judging applicants, and in 
1948 the LSAT was born. It has been with us ever since." 
The test purports to predict how successful the 
applicant will be in his first year of law school, and 
consists of a few hours' worth of multiple-choice questions. 
But the answers the student can give to a multiple-choice 
question are limited by the creativity and intelligence of 
the test-maker; the student with a better or more original 
understanding of the problem than the test-maker may realize 
that none of the alternative answers are any good, but there 
is no way for him to demonstrate his understanding. "It is 
obvious from the nature of the tests that they do not give 
the candidate a significant opportunity to express himself. 
If he is subtle in his choice of answers it will go atainst 
him; and yet there is no other way for him to show any 
individuality. If he is strong-minded, nonconformist, 
unusual, original, or creative—as so many of the truly 
important people are—he must stifle his impulses and con­
form as best he can to the norms that the multiple-choice 
testers set up in their unimaginative, scientific way. The 
more profoundly gifted the candidate is, the more his resent­
ment will rise against the mental strait jacket into which 
the testers would force his mind." 3. Hoffmann, The Tyranny 
of Testing 91-92 (1962). 
Those who make the tests and the law schools which use 
them point, of course, to the high correlations between the 
test scores and the grades at law school the first year. 
E.g., Winterbottom, Comments on "A Study of the Criteria for 
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar," An Article by 
Or. Thomas M. Goolsby, Jr., 21 J. Legal Ed. 75 (1968). 
Certainly the tests do seem to do better than chance. But 
they do not have the value that their deceptively precise 
scoring system suggests. The proponents' own data show that, 
for example, most of those scoring in the bottom 20% on the 
tast do better than that in law school—Indeed six of every 
100 of them will be in the top 20% of their law school class. 
And no one knows how many of those who were not admitted 
becuase of their test scores would in fact have done well 
were they given the chance. There are many relevent factors, 
such as motivation, cultural backgrounds of specific minorities 
that the test cannot measure, and they inevitably must impair 
its value as a predictor. Of course, the law school that 
admits only those with the highest test scores finds that on 
the average they do much better, and thus the test is a con­
venient tool for the admissions committee. The price is paid 
by the able student who for unknown reasons did not achieve 
that high score—perhaps even the minority with a different 
cultural background. Some tests, at least in the past, have 
been aimed at eliminating Jews. 
The school can safely conclude that the applicant with 
a score of 750 should be admitted before one with a score of 
500. The problem is that in many cases the choice will be 
between 643 and 602 or 574 and 528. The numbers creat an 
illusion of difference tending to overwhelm other factors. 
"The wiser testers are well aware of the defects of the 
multiple-choice format and the danger of placing reliance 
on any one method of assessment to the exclusion of all 
others. What is distressing is how little their caveats 
have impressed the people who succumb to the propaganda 
of the test-makers and use these tests mechanically as 
though they were a valid substitute for judgment." 
Hoffmann, supra, at 215. 
Of course, the tests are not the only thing con­
sidered; here they were combined with the prelaw grades 
to produce a new number called the Average. The grades 
have their own problems, one school's A is another school's 
C. And even to the extent that this formula predicts law 
school grades, its value is limited. The law student with 
lower grades may in the long pull of a legal career sur­
pass those at the tope of the class. "(L)aw school 
admissions criteria have operated within a hermetically 
sealed system; it is now beginning to leak. The tradi­
tional combination of LSAT and GPA (undergraduate grade 
point average) may have provided acceptable predictors of 
likely performance in law school in the past....(But) 
(t)here is no clear evidence that the LSAT and GPA provide 
particularly good evaluators of the intrinsic or enriched 
ability of an individual to perform as a law student or 
lawyer in a functioning society undergoing change. Nor is 
there any clear evidence that grades and other evaluators 
of law school performance, and the bar examination, are 
particularly good predicators of competence or success as 
a lawyer." Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Education: 
Special Programs for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible 
by Traditional Criteria, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 321, 332-333. 
But, by whatever techniques, the law school must make 
choices. Neither party has challenged the validity of the 
Average employed here as an admissions tool, and therefore 
consideration of its possible deficiencies is not presented 
as an issue. The Law School presented no evidence to show 
that adjustments in the process employed were used in order 
validily to compare applicants of different races; instead, 
it chose to avoid making such comparisons. Finally, although 
the Conunittee did consider other information in the files of 
all applicants, the Law School has made no effort to show 
that it was because of these additional factors that it ad­
mitted minority applicants who would otherwise have been 
rejected. To the qoiitraxy, the school system appears to 
have conceded that by its own assessment—taking all fac­
tors into account—it admitted minority applicants who 
would have been rejected had they been white, lie have 
no choice but to evaluate the Law School's case as it 
has been made. 
Ill 
The Equal Protection Clause did not enact a require­
ment that Law Schools employ as the sole criterion for 
admissions a formula based upon the LSAT and undergraduate 
grades, nor does it prohibit law schools from evaluating 
an applicant's prior achievements in light of the barriers 
that he had to overcome. A Black applicant who pulled 
himself out of the ghetto into a junior college may there­
by demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance and 
ability that would lead a fairninded admissions committee 
to conclude that he shows more promise for law study than 
the son of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at 
Harvard. That applicant would not be offered admission 
because he is Black, but because as an individual he has 
shown he has the potential, which the Harvard man may 
have taken less advantage of the vastly superior oppor­
tunities offered him. Because of the weight of the prior 
handicaps, that Black applicant may not realize his full 
potential in the first year of law school, or even in the 
full three years, but in the long pull of a legal career 
his achievements may far outstrip those of his classmates 
whose earlier records appeared superior by conventional 
criteria. There is currently no test available to the 
Admissions Committee that can predict such possibilities 
with assurance, but the Committee may nevertheless seek 
to guage it as best it can, and weigh this factor in its 
decisions. Such a policy would not be limited to Blacks, 
or Chicanos or Filipinos, or American Indians, although 
undoubtedly groups such as these may in practice be the 
principal beneficiaries of it. But a poor Appalachian 
white, or a second generation Chinese in San Francisco, 
or some other American whose lineage is so diverse as to 
defy ethnic labels, may demonstrate similar potential 
and thus be accorded favorable consideration by the 
committee. 
The difference between such a policy and the one 
presented by this case is that the Committee would be 
making decisions on the basis of individual attributes, 
rather than according a preference solely on the basis 
of race. To be sure, the racial preference here was not 
absolute—the Committee did not admit all applicants 
from the four favored groups. But it did accord all 
such applicants a preference by applying, to an extent 
not precisely ascertainable from the record, different 
standards by which to judge their applications, with the 
result that the Committee admitted minority applicants 
who, in the school's own judgment, were less promising 
than other applicants who were rejected. Furthermore, 
it is apparent that because the Admissions Committee 
compared minority applicants only with one another, it 
was necessary to reserve some proportion of the class 
for them, even if at the outset a precise number of 
places were not set aside^ That proportion, apparently 
15% to 20%, was chosen because the school determined it 
to be "reasonable,11 although no explanation is provided 
as to how that number rather than some other was found 
appropriate. Without becoming embroiled in a semantic 
debate over whether this practice constitutes a "quota," 
it is clear that, given the limitation on the total num­
ber of applicants who could be accepted, this policy did 
reduce the total number of places for which De Funis could 
compete—solely on account of his race. Thus, as the 
Washington Supreme Court concluded, whatever label one 
wishes to apply to it, "the minority admissions policy is 
certainly not benign with respect to nonminority students 
who are displaced by it." 82 Wash. 2d, at 32, 507 P. 2d, 
at 1182. A finding that the state school employed a 
racial classification in selecting its students subjects 
it to the strictest scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The consideration of race as a measure of an appli­
cant's qualification normally introduces a capricious and 
irrelevant factor working an invidious discrimination, 
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402; Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 10, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 668. Once race is a starting point educators and 
courts are immediately embroiled in competing claims of 
different racial and ethnic groups that would make diffi­
cult, manageable standards consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause. "The clear and central purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state 
sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States." 
Loving, supra, at 10. The Law School's admissions policy 
cannot be reconciled with that purpose, unless cultural 
standards of a diverse rather than a homogeneous society 
are taken into account. The reason is that professional 
persons, particularly lawyers, are not selected for 
life in a computerized society. The Indian who walks 
to the beat of Chief Seattle of the Muckleshoot Tribe 
in Washington has a different culture Prom examiners at 
law schools. 
The key to the problem is the consideration of 
each application in a racially neutral way. Since LSAT 
reflects questions touching on cultural backgrounds, 
the Admissions Committee acted properly in my view in 
setting minority applications apart for separate 
processing. These minorities have cultural backgrounds 
that are vastly different fron the dominant Caucasian. 
Many Eskimos, American Indians, Filipinos, Chicanos, 
Asian Indians, Burmese, and Africans come from such 
disparate backgrounds that a test sensitivity tuned for 
most applicants would be wide of the mark for many 
minorities. 
The melting pot is not designed to homogenize 
people, making them uniform in consistency. The melting 
pot as I understand it is a figure of speech that depicts 
the wide diversities tolerated by the First Amendment 
under one flag. See 2 S. Morison & H. Commager, The 
Growth of the American Republic, c. VIII (4th ed. 1950). 
Minorities in our midst who are to serve actively in our 
public affairs should be chosen on talent and character 
alone, not on cultural orientation or leanings. 
I do know, coming as I do from Indian country in 
Washington, that many of the young Indians know little 
about Adam Smith or Karl Marx but are deeply imbued with 
the spirit and philosophy of Chief Robert B. Jim of the 
Yakimas, Chief Seattle of the Muckleshoots, and Chief 
Joseph of the Nez Perce which offer competitive attitudes 
towards life, fellow man, and nature. 
I do not know the extent to which Blacks in this 
country are imbued with ideas of African Socialism. 
Leopold Senghor and Sekou Toure, most articulate of 
African leaders, have held that modern African political 
philosophy is not oriented either to Marxism or to 
capitalism. How far the reintroduction into educational 
curricula of ancient African art and history has reached 
the minds of young Afro-Americans I do not know. But at 
least as respects Indians, Blacks, and Chicanos—as well 
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as those from Asian cultures—I think a separate class­
ification of these applicants is warranted, lest race 
be a subtle force in eliminating minority members 
because of cultural differences. 
Insofar as LSAT tests reflect the dimensions and 
orientation of the Organization Man they do a disservice 
to minorities. I personally know that admissions tests 
were once used to eliminate Jews. How many other minori­
ties they aim at I do not know. My reaction is that the 
presence of an LSAT test is sufficient warrant for a 
school to put racial minorities into a separate class in 
order better to probe their capacities and potentials. 
The merits of the present controversy cannot in my 
view be resolved on this record. A trial would involve 
the disclosure of hidden prejudices, if any, against cer­
tain minorities and the manner in which substitute measure­
ments of one's talents and character were employed in the 
conventional tests. I could agree with the majority of 
the Washington Supreme Court only if, on the record, it 
could be said that the Law School's selection was racially 
neutral. The case, in my view, should be remanded for a 
new trial to consider, inter alia, whether the established 
LSAT tests should be eliminated so far as racial minorities 
are concerned. 
This does not mean that a separate LSAT test must be 
designed for minority racial groups, although that might 
be a possibility. The reason for the separate treatment 
of minorities as a class is to make more certain that 
racial factors do not militate against an applicant or on 
his behalf. 
There is 110 constitutional right for any race to be 
preferred. The years of slavery did more than retard the 
progress of 31acks. Even a greater wrong was done the 
whites by creating arrogance instead of humility and by 
encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior race. 
There is no superior person by constitutional standards. 
A De Tunis who is white is entitled to no advantage by 
reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, 
no matter what his race or color. Whatever his race, he 
had a constitutional right to have his application considered 
on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner. 
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The slate is not entirely clean. First, we have 
held that pro rata representation of the races is not 
required either on juries, see Cassell v. Texas, U.S. 
282, 286-287, or in public schools, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 24. 
Moreover, in Ilughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 
we reviewed the contempt convictions of pickets who 
sought by their demonstration to force an employer to 
prefer Negroes to whites in his hiring of clerks, in 
order to ensure that 50% of the employees were Negro. 
In finding that California could constitutionally enjoin 
the picketing there involved we quoted from the opinion 
of the California Supreme Court, which noted that the 
pickets would "'make the right to work for Lucky depen­
dent not on fitness for the work nor on an equal right 
of all, regardless of race, to compete in an open market, 
but, rather, on membership in a particular race. If 
petitioners were upheld in their demand then other races, 
white, yellow, brown and red, would have equal rights to 
demand discriminatory hiring on a racial basis."1 Me 
then noted that 
"(t)o deny to California the right to ban picket­
ing in the circumstances of this case would mean 
that there could be no prohibition of the pressure 
of picketing to secure proportional employment on 
ancestral grounds of Hungarians in Cleveland, of 
Poles in Buffalo, of Germans in Mi.lv/aukee, of 
Portuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans in San 
Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in New 
York, and so on through the whole gamut of racial 
and religious concentrations in various cities." 
The reservation of a proportion of the law school class 
for members of selected minority groups is fraught with simi­
lar dangers, for one must immediately determine which groups 
are to receive such favored treatment and which are to be 
excluded, the proportions of the class that are to be allo­
cated to each, and even the criteria by which to determine 
whether an individual is a member of a favored group. There 
is no assurance that a common agreement can be reached, and 
first the schools, and then the courts, will be buffeted with 
the competing claims. The University of Washington included 
Filipinos, but excluded Chinese and Japanese; another school 
may limit its program to Blacks, or to Blacks and Chicanos. 
Once the Court sanctioned racial preferences such as these, 
it could not then wash its hands of the matter, leav­
ing it entirely in the discretion of the school, for 
then we would have effectively overruled Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, and allowed imposition of a 
"zero" allocation. But what standard is the Court to 
apply when a rejected applicant of Japanese ancestry 
brings suit to require the University of Washington to 
extend the same privileges to his group? The Committee 
might conclude that the population of Washington is now 
2% Japanese, and that Japanese also constitute 2% of 
the Bar, but that had they not been handicapped by a 
history of discrimination, Japanese would not constitute 
5% of the Bar, or 20%. Or, alternatively, the Court 
could attempt to assess how grievously each group has 
suffered from discrimination, and allocate proportions 
accordingly; if that were the standard the current 
University of Washington policy would almost surely 
fall, for there is no Western State which can claim 
that it has always treated Japanese and Chinese in a 
fair and evenhanded manner. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197; 
Oyaina v. California, 332 U.S. 633. This Court has not 
sustained a racial classification since the wartime 
cases of Koreinatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), 
and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), 
involving curfews and relocations imposed upon Japanese-
Americans . 
Hor obviously will the problem be solved if next 
year the Law School included only Japanese and Chinese, 
for then Norwegians and Swedes, Poles and Italians, 
Puerto Ricans and Hungarians, and all other groups 
which form this diverse Nation would have just complaints. 
The key to the problem is consideration of such 
applications in a racially neutral way. Abolition of the 
LSAT would be a start. The invention of substitute tests 
might be r.iade to get a measure of an applicant's cultural 
background, perception, ability to analyze, and his or 
her relation to groups. They are highly subjective, but 
unlike the LSAT they are not concealed, but in the open. 
A law school is not bound by any legal principle to admit 
students by mechanical criteria which are insensitive to 
the potential of such an applicant which nay be realized 
in a more hospitable environment. It will be necessary 
under such an approach to put more effort into assessing 
each individual than is required when LSAT scores and 
undergraduate grades dominate the selection process. 
Interviews with the applicant and others who know him 
is a time-honored test. Some schools currently run sum­
mer programs in which potential students who likely 
would be bypassed under conventional admissions cri­
teria are given the opportunity to try their hand at 
law courses, and certainly their performance in such 
programs could be weighed heavily. There is, moreover, 
no bar to considering an individual's prior achieve­
ments in light of the racial discrimination that barred 
his way, as a factor in attempting to assess his true 
potential for a successful legal career. Hor is there 
any bar to considering on an individual basis, rather 
than according to racial classifications, the likeli­
hood that a particular candidate will more likely 
employ his legal skills to service communities that 
are not now adequately represented than will competing 
candidates. Not every student benefited by such an 
expanded admissions program would fall into one of the 
four racial groups involved here, but it is no draw­
back that other deserving applicants will also get an 
opportunity they would otherwise have been denied. 
Certainly such a program would substantially fulfill 
the Law School's interest in giving a more diverse 
group access to the legal profession. Such a program 
might be less convenient administratively than simply 
sorting students by race, but we have never held 
administrative convenience to justify racial 
discrimination. 
The argument is that a "compelling" state 
interest can easily justify the racial discrimination 
that is practiced here. To many, "compelling" would 
give members of one race even more than pro rata 
representation. The public payrolls might then be 
deluged say with Chicanos because they are as a group 
the poorest of the poor and need work more than others, 
leaving desperately poor individual Blacks and whites 
without employment. By the same token large quotas of 
blacks or browns could be added to the Bar, waiving 
examinations required of other groups, so that it would 
be better racially balanced. The State, however, may 
not proceed by racial classification to force strict 
population equivalencies for every group in every occu­
pation, overriding individual preferences. The Equal 
Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial 
barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our 
theory as to how society ought to be organized. The 
purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to 
produce Black lawyers for Blaclcs, Polish lawyers for 
Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for 
Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for 
Americans and not to place First Amendment barriers 
against anyone. That .is the point at the heart of 
all our school desegregation cases, from Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, through Swarm v. 
Chariotte-Meclclenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1. 
A segregated admissions process creates suggestions 
of stigma and caste no less than a secregated class­
room, and in the end it may produce that result des­
pite its contrary intentions. One other assumption 
must be clearly disapproved, that Blacks or Browns 
cannot make it on their individual merit. That is a 
stamp of inferiority that a State is not permitted to 
place on any lawyer. 
If discrimination based on race is constitution­
ally permissible when those who hold the reins can come 
up with "compelling" reasons to justify it, then con­
stitutional guarantees acquire an accordionlike quality. 
Speech is closely brigaded with action when it triggers 
a fight, Chaplinsky v. jew aampshire, 315 U.S. 563, as 
shouting "fire" in a crowded theater triggers a riot. 
It may well be that racial strains, racial susceptibi­
lity to certain diseases, racial sensitiveness to envi­
ronmental conditions that other races do not experience, 
may in an extreme situation justify differences in 
racial treatment that no fairminded person would call 
"invidious" discrimination. Mental ability is not in 
that category. All races can compete fairly at all pro­
fessional levels. So far as race Is concerned, any 
state-sponsored preference to one race over another in 
that competition is in my view "invidious" and violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
The problem tendered by this case is important and 
crucial to the operation of our constitutional system; 
and educators must be given leeway. It may well be that 
a whole congeries of applicants in the marginal group 
defy known methods of selection. Conceivably, an 
admissions committee might conclude that a selection by 
lot of, say, the last 20 seats is the only fair solution. 
Courts are not educators; their expertise is limited; and 
and our task ends with the inquiry whether, judged by the 
main purpose of the Equal Protection Clause—the pro­
tection against racial discrimination—there has been 
an "invidious discrimination." 
We would have a different case if the suit were 
one to displace the applicant who was chosen in lieu of 
De Funis. What the record would show concerning his 
potentials would have to be considered and weighed. The 
educational decision, provided proper guidelines were 
used, would reflect an expertise that course should honor. 
The problem is not tendered here because the physical facilities 
were apparently adequate to take De Funis in addition to 
the others. My view is only that I cannot say by the tests used 
and applied he was invidiously discriminated against because 
of his race. 
I cannot conclude that the admissions procedure of 
the Law School of the University of Washington that excluded 
De Funis is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The judgement of the Washington 
Supreme Court should be vacated and the case remanded for a new 
trial. 
